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1. Executive Summary 
 
Historic England holds the primary responsibility for the preservation of underwater 
heritage assets (UHA) in the English Inshore Marine Planning Area.  Contemporary 
threats to UHA, whether protected by virtue of a specific legal designation or 
otherwise, are potentially increasing with the march of technology – enabling discovery 
of and access to UHA at an unprecedented level.  
Effective protection of UHA must incorporate effective enforcement of the laws 
designed to that end – whether in the case of specifically focused heritage laws or 
those related to salvage or marine licensing.  This project helps to identify areas where 
potential synergies in enforcement effort might exist.  Further, it explores the limitations 
and obstacles to effective cross-party working and offers some solutions for 
overcoming them. 
As well as extensive desk-based research, structured interviews were held with key 
individuals within the relevant organisations.  Their insights and sharing of experience 
has been invaluable and provided an opportunity to confirm the reality of enhanced 
UHA enforcement opportunities and capabilities.   
Arranged over five substantive chapters, the project considers the underpinning 
issues, the law, the capabilities of the principal actors (and others) offshore, their 
limitations in the context of UHA protection and finally some potential solutions.  It 
concludes with a number of recommendations.  As the end of Chapters 4, 5 and 6, 
there are short summaries of the key points for ease of reference. 
 
Key Findings and Recommendations  
Numerous public (and other) bodies with a significant range of primary 
responsibilities operate in the English Inshore Marine Planning Area. These bodies 
have a variety of enforcement powers, some of which are generic and available to 
more than one body. 
More extensive use of collaborative working and of the generic powers could bring 
significant benefit in the context of UHA protection; and a coordinated intelligence 
gathering capability would provide the opportunity of focused and effective targeting 
of physical resources, the availability of which is not guaranteed in all cases. 
The generic powers confer considerable potential.  In particular the marine 
enforcement powers contained in the Policing and Crime Act 2017 alongside those 
available to marine enforcement officers (including IFCOs) in the Marine and Coastal 
Access Act 2009 offer significant possibilities. Powers to stop and search in 
particular have significant potential within the English Inshore Marine Planning Area 
(and beyond, although this report is concerned solely with the EIMPA). 
The availability of physical resources on the water is also limited.  Some bodies, by 
their very nature, have significant assets at their disposal in respect of their core 
statutory obligations. Others do not, although there is evidence of the expansion of 
2 
 
some bodies’ resources and other examples of resource-sharing.  Unmanned 
autonomous technology is in its infancy, has limited take up and should be 
expanded. 
There is considerable scope to more effectively utilise existing structures in respect 
of intelligence to inform operational interventions.  The National Maritime Information 
Centre (NMIC), for example, provides a real-time, round the clock oversight of the 
English Inshore Marine Planning Area (and beyond).  As a multi-agency 
collaborative venture between a number of maritime stakeholder departments it is 
ideally placed strategically to coordinate information and tasking in respect of UHA. 
Otherwise, the maritime presence of other bodies provides potential to develop 
protocols in respect of information gathering and incident reporting if actually 
enforcement intervention is not possible pursuant to that body’s statutory powers 
It has been discovered that degree of cross-party joint working already exists but 
often on a local, ‘ad hoc’ basis. There is widespread institutional acceptance and 
even enthusiasm for further cross-party joint working. There are a number of very 
significant opportunities for cross-party joint working available to Historic England. 
A commonly identified obstacle however has been the reported lack of 
understanding of the context, nature and cultural importance of UHA. Despite 
welcome contemporary policy developments, our respondents reported a general 
lack of appreciation of and easy access to information relating to the regulatory 
framework surrounding UHA, their location and the appropriate procedures/protocols 
to follow when in suspected cases of underwater heritage crime. 
Developing a security protocol for each protected UHA, engaging with licenced 
teams and/or other local stakeholders to create a local sense of cultural value of the 
coastal community’s cultural heritage also offers further enhancement of protection 
for UHA. 
There is no national protocol for handling UHA crime. In particular this potentially 
leaves the Border Force and those Police Services with responsibility for a coastal 
environment at an operational disadvantage. Developing a unique ‘tag’ – which could 
also include a geographical marker (tag) on call-handling, navigational, intelligence 
systems -  for recording underwater heritage crime would go some way to raising its 
profile, although it is noted that offences involving the Interference with Protected 
Wrecks and Protected Military Remains, as well as dealing in tainted cultural objects 
are already identified within Home Office Recording Standards.1   
The current link to purely financial value is not fit for purpose and the cultural loss 
context should be a material consideration in assigning operational priorities. 
The perception that protection of UHAs is constrained by very limited resources and 
physical marine presence is not entirely accurate. This research has found a change 
is occurring, with asset numbers increasing thanks to new Border Force patrol 
                                            
1 See for  example, Crimes against Society ,available from, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/76
7782/count-crimes-society-dec-2018.pdf (last accessed February 2019) 
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vessels and planned increases in Royal Navy Fisheries Protection Squadron 
vessels.  
There was a high and very encouraging degree of acceptance amongst interviewees 
of the government’s current policy of increasing cross-party working, and an 
acceptance of the desirability of enhancing the protection of UHA’s, even when their 
functions did not do not specifically encompass such protection.  
Provided effective cross-party working can be achieved in respect of the protection 
of UHA’s then that protection can realistically be enhanced, possibly substantially, 
from the present level. Historic England would not have to establish a rationale for 
such enhancement, nor its desirability as these would by and large be a ‘given’. 2 
Additional recommendations encompass: 
Developing a training package for coastal Rural Crime Teams and BF staff specially 
but also make available to partner agencies and National Coastwatch Institution 
(NCI) as part of Continuing Professional Development or accredited training 
programme. 3 
Develop an electronic Common Enforcement Manual, (CEM) which can provide easy 
access to the substance of the regulatory framework (including marine licensing for 
which the MMO is responsible) and a pre-determined operational protocol for 
observation, investigation and communication with relevant organisations.  
The concept of a CEM was regarded as an essential prerequisite of joint working 
arrangements by the organisations interviewed and was universally acclaimed. It is 
difficult, if not impossible, to stress the perceived importance of this by these 
organisations.  
Increasing the understanding of both coastal Police Services and Border Force 
officers as to the cultural impact of crime directed at UHA and the value of the 
resulting cultural loss to society.  This could be achieved as a component of an 





                                            
2 Maritime environment is covered in the Heritage Crime Memorandum of Understanding.  Potentially 
the parties to the MoU could be expanded to include the Border Force and MCA etc. as additional 
signatories .     
3 Historic England has commissioned a Handbook for the Prevention and Investigation of Heritage 
Crime (forthcoming 2020) which will include a chapter on crime in the maritime environment and will 





2.1 Objectives and Parameters 
 
The United Kingdom’s (UK’s) Underwater Cultural Heritage (UCH) is unusually 
extensive and diverse, with an archaeological record spanning millennia up to the 21st 
century4. While there is statutory protection for some of this UCH, the enforcement of 
such protection is somewhat challenging. Underwater Heritage Assets5  (UHA) are 
often situated in remote locations,6 far less populated by law enforcement agencies 
than the terrestrial environment. The marine archaeological and diving communities 
consequently play an important role in the detection and reporting of marine heritage 
crimes, but the location of many sites limits the potential for crimes to be detected. 
Furthermore, Historic England, which is responsible for the administration of such 
protection, lacks any marine or aerial assets and the regional coastal Police 
authorities, who are principally responsible for the investigation and prosecution of 
maritime heritage crime, either lack or have very limited marine and aerial assets. 
Consequently, there is little or no intelligence available as to the extent to which the 
statutory protection of UHA’s is breached, little deterrent effect present and the 
enforcement mechanism is inevitably retrospective and confined to post event 
terrestrial investigation. Remediation is unlikely and thus the impact to UHA will always 
be significant. Indeed, the lack of any marine or aerial assets focused even partly on 
the prevention and detection of maritime heritage crime has led to the perception 
within both the marine archaeological and the wider diving community that such 
statutory protection is relatively unattainable.  
  
There is, however, a marine and aerial presence by other government departments 
and agencies, including the Border Force (BF), Royal Navy (RN) and Inshore Fisheries 
and Conservation Authorities (IFCA’s), in the English Inshore Marine Planning Area. 
These operate under the specific legislative framework relating to their specific 
functions. The exact nature and quantity of this presence has not, to the authors’ 
knowledge, ever been collated. Nor has, they believe, the potential for this presence 
ever been examined with a view to utilising it, presumably at a marginal cost to the 
public purse7, to enhance protection of the UHA in the English Inshore Marine Planning 
                                            
4 See for example Bates, MR, Parfitt, S and Roberts, MB (1997) The chronology, palaeogeography 
and archaeological significance of the marine quaternary record of the West Sussex coastal plain, 
Southern England, U.K., Quaternary Science Reviews, 16(10), 1227-1252 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0277-3791(96)00119-9  (last accessed October 2018) 
 
5 A Heritage Asset can be defined as: ‘a building, monument, site, place, area or landscape identified 
as having a degree of significance meriting consideration in planning decisions, because of its 
heritage interest. Heritage asset includes designated heritage assets and assets identified by the local 
planning authority (including local listing). See, National Planning Policy Framework (2012) 
Department for Communities and Local Government, London, pp. 52; and the UK Marine Policy 
Statement (2011) HM Government, NI Executive, Scottish Government, Welsh Assembly Government 
paragraph 2.6.6.1  
6 See further https://historicengland.org.uk/advice/heritage-at-risk/archaeology/protected-wreck-sites-
at-risk/ (last accessed October 2018) 
7 Marginal cost is assumed as these resources are already at sea and therefore any additional costs 
arising from detection and reporting of marine heritage crimes would be marginal as the running costs 
of the resources  would be covered under their statutory duties 
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Area. While it is the case that the various legislative frameworks that these marine and 
aerial assets operate under limit their ability to directly enforce the legislative 
provisions relating to the protection of UHA, they will still permit their utilisation for the 
purposes of monitoring activity and providing evidence of possible infringements, as 
well as providing a highly visible and deterring presence.  
 
If these existing marine and aerial assets can be utilised to some extent to enhance 
the protection of the UHA, albeit at a marginal cost, then there will be value added to 
government through a more effective utilisation of existing resources and a potential 
achievement of a more effective enforcement environment. This aligns with the current 
drive for government departments and agencies to work together, reducing the 
pressure on already limited resources. Examples of this cross-party working are 
already emerging, for example an analogous scheme non-specifically targeted 
towards the protection of UHA can be seen in the National Crime Agency (NCA), BF 
and National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) formerly the Association of Chief Police 
Officers’ (ACPO) ‘Project Kraken’. This is described as ‘an initiative to increase 
vigilance along the UK’s coastline and maritime environment’.8 It is principally targeted 
towards terrorism and serious and organised crime, and seeks to encourage the 
reporting of suspicious or unusual activity by the community of maritime users and 
stakeholders. Equally, activities undertaken by the BF and the Maritime and 
Coastguard Agency (MCA) represent a UK-wide view reflected in the UK Marine Policy 
Statement (UKMPS) for the generalised protection and enhancement of heritage 
assets.9  
 
The identification of such resources and the scope for their utilisation would facilitate 
the drive for cross party working and the streamlining of limited resources. This is 
seen as an important step towards cost-effective working and sustainable use of 
government time and resources, which is especially important when considering the 
complexity of enforcement in the marine environment.10 
 
This Project therefore seeks: 
 to investigate what existing maritime and aerial resources utilised by 
government departments and agencies or their contractors are present in the 
English Inshore Marine Plan area 
 to catalogue the legislative frameworks under which they operate 
                                            
8 See further http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/313-project-kraken-
leaflet/file (last accessed October 2018) 
9 The UK Marine policy Statement, - available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69322/pb3654
-marine-policy-statement-110316.pdf (last accessed October 2018) 
10 See for example http://www.recaap.org/Portals/0/docs/NMIC-information-booklet.pdf; and 
also the Defra led ‘Pioneer’ scheme – the latter having no overt connection to the historic 
environment, though indicative of the drive to closer cooperation, see for example 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/defra-single-departmental-plan-2015-to-
2020/single-departmental-plan-2015-to-2020 , and 
https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/natural-capital-committee  (last accessed October 
2018)   
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 to establish to the extent to which they could lawfully be utilised in part to 
facilitate the enforcement11 of statutory protection for UHA’s which are 
protected by legislation or otherwise 
 to make recommendations, if appropriate, to implement enhanced protection 
of UHA’s in the English Inshore Marine Planning Area. 
   
   
2.2 Literature Review 
In order to inform the context of the report a literature review is included which sets 
out in general terms the threats UHA and responses to those threats by reference to 
currently available literature.  Specific and more detailed consideration to all of the 
areas highlighted in the review features throughout the remainder of the report.  The 
literature review provides opportunity for additional research into a range of areas not 
elaborated here, given the specific focus of this study.  
 
2.2.1 - Threats to Underwater Heritage Assets 
 
The threats to UHA are manifold and reflect the ever widening range of uses to which 
the sea is being put. While for many, diving and its associated activities (such as 
mooring) are the main focus,12 UHA are  also impacted upon by a diverse range of 
activities including fishing, shipping, marine aggregate dredging, salvage activity and 
treasure hunting, oil and gas exploration and pipeline and cabling activity.  
Hutchison suggests that as well as the straightforward threat of human impact, UHA 
are in addition threatened by a “lack of awareness of [their] cultural potential and 
complacency about the size of the resource of underwater sites”.13 This is easy to 
understand when the National Monuments Record contains details of more than 
40,000 marine sites in English Inshore Marine Planning Area, as opposed to 
Australia’s 6,000 or Canada’s 9,000.14 However, the “greatest museum of human 
civilisation”15 should not be taken for granted, nor explored and used up simply 
                                            
11 The term ‘enforcement’ is used here in its widest sense to encompass not just the detection and 
prosecution of maritime heritage crime but also the deterring thereof and the acquisition of evidence 
relating thereto  
12 See, for example, Edney, J, ‘A Framework for Managing Diver Impacts on Historic Shipwrecks’ 
(2016) Journal of Maritime Archaeology 11(3) 271 
13 Hutchison, G, ‘Threats to underwater heritage’ (1996) Marine Policy 20(4) 287, 290 
14 Roberts, P and Trow, S, Taking to the Water: English Heritage’s Initial Policy for the Management 
of Maritime Archaeology in England (2002) 
(www.divetheworld.com/library/marinearch/maritime_arch_policy.pdf (last accessed October2018) 
15 Scovazzi, T, ‘Protection of the underwater cultural heritage’ in Richard Caddell and Rhidian Thomas 
(eds.), Shipping, Law and the Marine Environment in the 21st Century: Emerging challenges for the 
law of the sea — legal implications and liabilities, (Lawtext Publishing, 2013), 293 
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because it can be,16 and so the protections given to it are important considerations for 
any society.  
The general lack of awareness of the importance of UHA to society can impact the 
protection of UHA at all levels of involvement. At the very top level, Flatman argues (in 
relation to the United Kingdom, Portugal and the Netherlands) that “[t]he governments 
of each country are failing, at a most fundamental level, adequately to support the 
management of an irreplaceable part of their cultural heritage, a cultural heritage, 
moreover, that each seems happy to exploit at every turn but never to resource 
sufficiently”.17 While further ‘down’ the levels of involvement, in a recent study of diver 
perceptions of UHA in the south west of England, Sophie Scott found that a significant 
amount of divers felt that a “lack of societal pressure is to blame for looting at wreck 
sites”18 and that reduction of illegal looting will occur when and if it becomes much 
more socially unacceptable to loot UHA.  
In addition to the social context affecting the protection of UHA, threats also exist in 
the form of economic factors, such as fluctuations in the market value of scrap metal. 
Innes McCartney has studied the wrecks of the Battle of Jutland found off the coast of 
Denmark and notes that some 65% of them “bear the scars of commercial salvage 
activity”, with a considerable number missing their propellers and/or condensers.19 As 
a result of surveys carried out in respect of the state of the ships between 2000 and 
2016, McCartney has shown that a large amount of this illegal salvage activity was 
carried out between these two dates, being a timeframe which “coincides with a period 
where there has been a sharp rise in the value of copper-based metals which has 
seen a metal theft crime wave on land as well as under the sea”.20 Similarly, it is 
alleged that entire WWII wrecks have disappeared from the bed of the South China 
Sea in recent years, as salvors seek to take advantage of the increasing demand in 
China for scrap metal.21 
 
2.2.2 - Protection for Underwater Heritage Assets 
 
In England, UHA situated in the English Inshore Marine Planning Area do not benefit 
from any blanket protection. However, certain assets are protected under the 
                                            
16 Hutchison, 289 
17 Flatman, J ‘Managing the marine cultural heritage: defining, accessing and managing the resource’ 
(2008) International Journal of Nautical Archaeology 37(2) 411, 412 
18 Scott, S ‘Enhancing Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage in the Marine Environment’ 
(MSc Applied Marine Science, Plymouth University, 2017), 29 
19 McCartney, I, ‘The Battle of Jutland’s Heritage Under Threat: Commercial Salvage on the 
shipwrecks as observed 2000 to 2016’ (2017) The Mariner’s Mirror 103:2, 196 
20 Ibid., 203 
21 Holmes, O, Ulmanu, M and Roberts, S ‘The world’s biggest grave robbery: Asia’s disappearing 
WWII Shipwrecks’ (The Guardian, 3 November 2017) https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-
interactive/2017/nov/03/worlds-biggest-grave-robbery-asias-disappearing-ww2-
shipwrecks?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other (last accessed October 2018) 
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Protection of Wrecks Act 1973 (“PWA”) (shipwrecked vessels) and the Protection of 
Military Remains Act 1986 (remains of aircraft and vessels on military service) 
(“PMRA”). The ability also exists for Historic England to protect certain assets by 
scheduling them as ancient monuments under the Ancient Monuments and 
Archaeological Areas Act 1979 (“AMAAA”), although at present, while there are eleven 
five sites designated as scheduled monuments in English waters, these are all in 
intertidal or estuarine areas. There are no scheduled ancient monuments in the 
English Inshore Marine Planning Area below the low water mark, although several 
sites are currently being considered for scheduling.22  
In addition, UHA, specifically scheduled or otherwise, receive some protection through 
the marine licensing system provided for in the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009. 
The marine licensing system is administered and controlled by the Marine 
Management Organisation (MMO) and so a detailed consideration of the enforcement 
of that system is outside of the scope of this literature review. It is however introduced 
in outline in Chapter 3 , along with an explanation of the role of the Receiver of Wreck 
and the obligations stemming from the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (MSA).    
The protections given to UHA under PWA, PMRA and AMAAA are covered in detail in 
Chapter 3. The focus of this project is on both the enforcement of such designations 
in order to achieve the desired protection for the UHA in question, and on enhancing 
the protection of all UHA.  It is widely acknowledged that in any sphere, “legislation is 
only as good as the administration system(s) established to deal with the public 
education and enforcement issues that arise from that legislation”.23  More specifically, 
for legislation that attempts to prohibit certain activities at certain sites (like PWA, 
PMRA and AMAAA), adequate surveillance of UHA sites and enforcement of the 
provisions of the law in respect of any breaches observed are necessary in order for 
that legislation to be effective.24  Indeed, Kingsley suggests that control over heritage 
assets is “directly proportional” to matters including their visibility and the enforcement 
of legislation protecting them.25 
Enforcement of provisions protecting UHA is given a wide meaning in this report, to 
include not just the detection and prosecution of maritime heritage crime, but also the 
deterring thereof and the acquisition of evidence relating thereto. Given the 
geographical and technological factors that increase the burden of enforcement 
activity in the marine area (as explained below), deterrence and voluntary compliance 
                                            
22 See Lowther, J, Parham, D and Williams, M,  ‘All at Sea: When Duty Meets Austerity in Scheduling 
Monuments in English Waters’[2017] Journal of Planning & Environment Law 246  for a discussion on 
the policy of Historic England relating to scheduling UHA below the low water mark.  
23 Staniforth, M, ‘ Australian Approaches to Shared Heritage: Royal Navy Vessels in Australian 
waters’  (Shared Heritage: Joint Responsibilities in the Management of British Warship Wrecks 
Overseas, Wolverhampton, July 2008) https://content.historicengland.org.uk/images-
books/publications/management-of-british-warship-wrecks-overseas/shared-heritage-management-of-
british-warship-wrecks-overseas.pdf/#page=75 (at pp23-35) ( last accessed October 2018) 
24 Edney, 279 
25 Kingsley, SA, ‘Environmental Reviews and Case Studies: Impacts on Maritime Cultural Resources: 
Assessing the Invisible’ (2016) Journal of Environmental Practice 18(3) 184 
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with the legislative provisions must be a key aim for any enforcement regime.26 The 
empirical study of Read et al. suggests that “improved ease of enforcement can result 
in improved potential voluntary compliance… [by] acting as a deterrent, which would 
see lower numbers of breaches being observed”.27 Therefore it is hoped that improving 
the enforcement of legislative provisions protecting UHA in the English Inshore Marine 
Planning Area will deter further offences and encourage voluntary compliance with the 
legislation.  
 
2.2.3 - Enforcement Provisions in the Acts 
 
More detailed consideration of the legislative underpinning to the regimes in place to 
offer protection to UHA is provided in Chapter 3.  In terms of a basic framing of the 
issues the report is presenting, a general overview of the legislation, solely in the 
context of enforcement, is considered below. 
 
 
Protection of Wrecks Act 1973 
As befits its origins as a Private Members Bill, the PWA is short and to the point, 
consisting of three substantive sections only. It contains no provisions or mechanisms 
for enforcement of the protections it enacts and as such benefits from no direct budget 
for enforcement. Previously, reliance for enforcement has been placed on the licensee 
for a site, assuming that such licensees will be able to and be motivated to monitor 
and protect ‘their’ site, at least during the main diving season.28  
This displacement of enforcement activity is not peculiar to England, indeed Edney 
notes that, in relation to the numerous World War II wrecks in Chuuk Lagoon in the 
Federated States of Micronesia, in the absence of adequate resources for 
enforcement of legislation to protect the wrecks (such as a prohibition on removing 
anything from the wrecks), “responsibility for enforcement has by default become the 
responsibility of the licensed dive guides, who have no law enforcement authority or 
training”.29  However, any potential there may be of successful enforcement by such 
unofficial persons is dependent upon the understanding and acceptance of such an 
unofficial role by all parties involved. With regard to the English Inshore Marine 
Planning Area, Chief Inspector Mark Harrison noted in an interview with the Nautical 
Archaeology Society (at the time on secondment with English Heritage to start the 
                                            
26 Edney , 279 and 282 
27 Read, AD,  West, RJ (et al), ‘Optimizing Voluntary Compliance in Marine Protected Areas: A 
comparison of recreational fisher and enforcement officer perspectives using multi-criteria analysis’ 
(2011) Journal of Environmental Management (92) 258 
28 Dromgoole, S ‘Military Remains on and around the Coast of the United Kingdom: Statutory 
Mechanisms of Protection’ (1996) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 11(1) 23, 27 
29 Edney, J ‘Impacts of recreational SCUBA diving on shipwrecks in Australia and the Pacific: A 
Review’ (2006) Micronesian Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences 5(1/2) 201, 224 
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Heritage Crime Initiative) 30 that potential offences committed by divers were not being 
reported to the appropriate authorities by others in the diving community because 
those in the community didn’t know who to report to and didn’t believe that such reports 
would be taken seriously.31   
The lack of specific provisions in the PWA setting out a mechanism for enforcement 
has been criticised for some time.32 However, with no appetite for legislative 
amendment apparent at present, the fix for the historical lack of enforcement of the 
PWA will have to be found in the practices of those bodies present in the marine are, 
rather than in Parliament.  The detail of the Act is considered in Chapter 3. 
 
Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act 1979 
 
The AMAAA contains various enforcement provisions, such as a power for anyone 
authorised in writing by the Secretary of State to enter land for the purpose of 
inspecting a scheduled monument in order to ascertain whether works affecting it are 
being carried out in breach of the Act.33 However, these enforcement provisions 
appear to be aimed at monuments situated and offences carried out on land. For 
example, the power to enter land to inspect a scheduled monument is of somewhat 
limited use in territorial waters given that the public have access to the sea under the 
public right of navigation. Similarly, the power given to the Secretary of State under 
section 10 of the Act to compulsorily acquire any scheduled monument in order to 
secure its preservation, is much more effective on land, where practical measures can 
be taken to exclude others from a site and thus provide protection to that site. Those 
that would seek to damage a scheduled monument on the foreshore or the bed of the 
sea cannot be so easily excluded. In 2010, Sussex Police issued a caution to a man 
that was making furniture from the timbers of the Anne and Amsterdam. 
With regard to the five sites currently protected as scheduled monuments in intertidal 
or estuarine areas, these enforcement powers are similarly of less effect in areas 
where the monuments are covered by water, whether permanently or at various stages 
of the tides. As explained above, the public right of navigation means that anyone can 
navigate over tidal waters and so powers to enter ‘land’ or to acquire a monument in 
order to protect it are of diminished benefit when the public cannot be excluded from 
the monument in the first place.  Partnerships have been developed in a number of 
                                            
30 Mark Harrison is now head of Heritage Crime and Policing Advice at Historic England 
31 Berry, J, ‘Heritage Crime’ in Nautical Archaeology Society Newsletter, Summer 2011; quoting Chief 
Inspector Mark Harrison https://www.nauticalarchaeologysociety.org/sites/default/files/u9/2011-3.pdf 
(last accessed October 2018) 
32 Halfin, S, ‘The Legal Protection of Cultural Property in Britain: Past, Present & Future’ (1995) 
DePaul-LCA Journal of Art and Entertainment Law 6(1) 1, 27 
33 Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act 1979, s 6(1) 
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areas by NCI and Heritage Watch in areas where there are wreck sits as it discussed 
further below in respect of the Salcombe site security policy. 34   
 
Protection of Military Remains Act 1986 
The PMRA contains powers for any “authorised person” to board and search any 
vessel in UK waters provided that such authorised person has reasonable grounds for 
believing that an offence under PMRA has been, is being or is going to be committed 
by those on board the vessel.35  The authorised person is also given powers to seize 
anything on board the vessel that he or she has reasonable grounds for believing is 
either evidence of the offence or is necessary to seize in order to prevent it being 
concealed, lost, altered or destroyed.36 To support the powers of boarding and seizure, 
obstructing an authorised person is made an offence,37 and in addition the authorised 
person may “use such force as is reasonably necessary for the purpose of exercising 
any power conferred on him by this section and may do anything else reasonably 
necessary for that purpose, including ordering a vessel to stop”.38 These are powerful 
provisions for enforcement, particularly when contrasted with the lack of any 
enforcement provisions in the PWA.39 
An authorised person is defined in PMRA as any person “authorised in writing by the 
Secretary of State to exercise the powers conferred by [section 6]… or a person of a 
description of persons so authorised”.40 The administration and enforcement of PMRA 
is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence. The administration of the Act is currently 
split between the Joint Casualty and Compassionate Centre (in relation to air crash 
sites) and Navy Command (in relation to sunken vessels). While the enforcement of 
the Act is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence Police.  However, there is no 
limit in the relevant section of PMRA as to who the Secretary of State may designate 
as an “authorised person”.  
 
 
2.2.4 - Enforcement of Protections for UHA 
 
The need for adequate enforcement of legislative protections benefiting UHA has been 
acknowledged for some time, with Fletcher-Tomenius et al. suggesting that “in the 
absence of adequate resources devoted to [the] enforcement” of legislation designed 
to protect historic wrecks, the provisions of such legislation are breached more than 
                                            
34 At p121. 
35 Protection of Military Remains Act 1986, ss 6(1) and 6(2) 
36 Protection of Military Remains Act 1986, s 6(3) 
37 Protection of Military Remains Act 1986, s 6(6) 
38 Protection of Military Remains Act 1986, s 6(4) 
39 Dromgoole, 33 
40 Protection of Military Remains Act 1986, s 6(8) 
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they are observed.41 While it is difficult to assess this statement on the basis that little 
data is available to confirm the comparative amount of breaches and observances, it 
is possible to locate some data on the numbers of prosecutions taken under the Acts, 
although much of this is either unpublished or grey literature.  
This lack of enforcement was noted by Chief Inspector Mark Harrison more recently 
(on his secondment to English Heritage in 2010 to start the Heritage Crime Initiative) 
in an interview with the Nautical Archaeology Society; “Until I joined English Heritage, 
the number of divers caught for diving and removing objects was negligible”.42 
Similarly, Bradley et al. in their report in 2012 on the extent of heritage crime in England 
commissioned by English Heritage,43  note that while the definition of heritage crime 
they adopted for the study included crimes at marine sites, the report was unable to 
provide a full account of such crimes as there was “severely limited evidence” 
available:  
“Marine heritage assets include protected wrecks and military remains 
(including designated war graves), plus other submerged archaeology. 
Considerable legal requirements and constraints affect marine and marine 
heritage, ranging from the broad Merchant Shipping Act 1995 to the specific 
Protection of Military Remains Act 1986. This legal context means that there 
are many potential offences, but the web search together with intelligence from 
English Heritage and other sources only identified 13 incidents altogether, and 
these related to just 7 sites in English territorial waters (nb. 1 related to a wreck 
designated as UK property but located in Danish territorial waters).    
The offences identified included vandalism, tampering with a wreck, theft and 
illegal diving. Of these 13 incidents just 3 had resulted in formal warning or 
caution, although another 3 were still under investigation. There may be 
substantial under-reporting of heritage crime in the marine sector, but this is 
inevitably difficult to prove.”44  
More recently, Operation Birdie, the national campaign to prevent, investigate and 
Enforce Crime in the Maritime Environment has resulted in cases being prosecuted 




                                            
41 Fletcher-Tomenius, P, O’Keefe, P and Williams, M ‘Salvor in Possession: Friend or Foe to Marine 
Archaeology?’ (2000) International Journal of Cultural Property 9(2) 263, 298 
42 Berry, NAS  
43 Bradley, D, Bradley, J (et al) , ‘The extent of crime and anti-social behaviour facing designated 
heritage assets: Final Report’ (March 2012) https://historicengland.org.uk/advice/caring-for-
heritage/heritage-crime/Concernedowners/ (last accessed October 2018) 
44 Ibid. 8-9 
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2.2.5 - The Problems for Enforcement 
 
Geographical and Geospatial 
Enforcement measures in relation to marine heritage crime are always going to be 
complicated. The UK territorial waters alone (not including the internal waters) 
encompasses an area that is almost half the size of the UK land mass.45 The sheer 
size of the area in which heritage assets are located means that one of the main 
methods of effective enforcement and deterrent, namely, having a capable guardian 
of the assets,46 is immediately made more difficult. Coupled with this, the vast majority 
of heritage assets in the inshore marine area are underwater and so hidden from ‘plain 
sight’.47 This makes potential offences much less obvious, which has negative 
implications for resource logistics and costs.48  
These negative implications arise not only as a result of the problem of awareness of 
any offences being carried out, but also the difficulty of obtaining adequate evidence 
of such offences in order to bring a successful prosecution. These difficulties can be 
illustrated by considering the example of the PWA. If a vessel is designated by the 
Secretary of State under section 1 of the Act, then it becomes an offence (for anyone 
not holding a licence from the Secretary of State) not only to remove any part of that 
vessel, but also to tamper with any part of it (for example by moving objects around 
on a vessel),49 to dive around the vessel50 or to deposit anything that might, if it fell on 
the wreck, damage the wreck or obstruct access to it.51 Apart from removing any part 
of a vessel (for which there will at least be a piece of physical evidence that remains 
after the offence has been committed), all of these offences are such that unless 
someone is caught in the act of committing such an offence, it can be very difficult to 
collate sufficient evidence upon which to base a prosecution.  
Further, for some of these offences, the possibility of being ‘caught in the act’ is 
extremely low. For instance tampering with any part of a protected vessel is an offence. 
Not only does it risk damaging the protected vessel, but it jeopardises the information 
that subsequent archaeologists could recover from the site; “the totality of the 
information is crucial and that is why archaeologists take pains to record the 
relationships and associations of structure and contents”.52 However, without official 
divers patrolling protected wrecks at all time (which is certainly beyond the resources 
                                            
45 Momber, G, ‘Reflections on the Legal Standing of Underwater Archaeology in the UK’ (2000) 
Journal of the Society for Underwater Technology 24(3) 115, 116 
46 Smith, RG, and Anderson, K, ‘Understanding Non-compliance in the Marine Environment’ No.275 
in Trends and Issues in crime and criminal justice series, Australian Institute of Criminology (2004), 3 
47 McKinnon, JF, ‘‘Memorialization, Graffiti and Artifact [sic] Movement: A Case Study of Cultural 
Impacts on WWII Underwater Cultural Heritage in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands’ (2015) Journal of Maritime Archaeology 10(1) 11, 12 
48 Edney, J, and Spenneman, DHR, ‘Can artificial reefs reduce impacts on historic shipwrecks? The 
Management Dimension’ (2015) Journal of Maritime Archaeology (10) 141, 151 
49 Protection of Wrecks Act 1973, Section 3(3)(a) 
50 Protection of Wrecks Act 1973, Section 3(3)(b) 
51 Protection of Wrecks Act 1973, Section 3(3)(c) 
52 Hutchinson, 288 
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of Historic England), it is very difficult to prove that any particular diver has tampered 
with any part of a vessel.  
Such problems in collating sufficient evidence are not just restricted to the activity of 
divers. Similar problems attend the offences that can be caused by the activities of 
fishing boats, for example. Fishing using trawling or dredging methods can damage a 
vessel53 and so give rise to an offence under section 3(3)(a) of PWA, and could also 
possibly give rise to an offence under section 3(3)(c) of PWA even if no damage is 
caused. However, proving that a particular boat caused particular damage to a 
particular protected wreck will be extremely difficult unless those on the boat can be 
‘caught red handed’ in the act that causes the damage.  
The evidential problem is also greater where archaeological records of UHA are 
lacking. While the salvage of certain items is largely obvious, such as propellers,54 in 
general salvage activities can be difficult to assess without a comprehensive record of 
the intact state of the wreck. Indeed, McCartney notes that it is difficult to assess the 
full extent of what has been taken from the wrecks at the Battle of Jutland site, because 
proper records of the state of the wrecks only start from 2000 and such records “have 
been aimed at recording what is present, not what may have been removed from the 
sites”.55  
 
Technological and Resource-Based 
In addition to the geographical and geospatial factors affecting enforcement of marine 
heritage protections, technology and resources have a key impact as well. The 
widespread use of SCUBA equipment and the ever-growing recreational diving 
industry both mean that underwater heritage assets are accessible to far greater 
numbers of people than ever before.56  This brings an increased risk of harm to UHA 
not only because increased accessibility makes the likelihood of someone that is 
willing to commit an offence visiting a particular asset greater, but also because the 
very fact of increased access to wrecks causes damage as a result of the corrosive 
effect of exhaled air bubbles from divers’ breathing equipment.57 
Furthermore, the development of deep-water technology, in relation to both diving and 
remote controlled underwater vehicles, means that far greater depths of water are 
accessible to human activity, which results in a large number of heritage assets that 
were previously protected from human impact by their inaccessibility, becoming 
                                            
53 Firth, A., McAleese, L., Anderson, R., Smith, R., and Woodcock, T. 
2013. Fishing and the Historic Environment. EH6204. Prepared for English Heritage, available from 




56 Dimmock, K and Cummins, T ‘History of scuba diving tourism’ in Ghazali Musa and Kay Dimmock 
(eds.) Scuba Diving Tourism (Routledge, 2013) 14–28 
57 Edney, 277 
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available for human exploration and exploitation.58 As Hutchison concludes, “[a]cess 
to the oceans is now restricted by cost alone”.59 
Technological advances that threaten underwater heritage are not confined to the 
diving sector. Fishing with bottom-towed gear is well known to damage UHA.60 
Similarly, aggregate dredging activity is highly damaging to UHA.61 This variety of 
activities that have potential to lead to offences under the protecting legislation, means 
that enforcement activity needs to be targeted at a wider audience than just the diving 
community. 
Technological advances increase the both the threat to underwater heritage assets 
and the number of assets threatened, but on top of this, they also have resource 
implications. A lack of resources provided for heritage crime enforcement both in terms 
of people and equipment, leads both to a lack of adequate enforcement activity, but 
also to an inability to enforce protective legislation provisions where potential offenders 
have the technological advantage.62 
 
Cross-Party Working – a potential solution to the difficulty of enforcement? 
This project seeks to investigate the possibility of cross-party working in relation to the 
enforcement of protections for UHA. While the police and Historic England have, 
respectively, limited marine or aerial assets to assist with enforcement of UHA 
protections, other bodies active in the English Inshore Marine Planning Area (such as 
the MCA, the MMO and the Royal Navy) do and the possibility for utilising their assets 
to aid in the enforcement of protections for UHA needs to be investigated.  
In the general field of marine activity, there has been a growing focus on the 
efficiencies that can be achieved by joint-working and joint use of assets and data. For 
example, in each of the UK Overseas Territories involved in the Blue Belt Programme 
(a UK government project that provides £20million of funding over four years to 
improve the management and protection of the natural marine environment of seven 
UK Overseas Territories),63 the project involves developing and implementing cost 
                                            
58 Parham, D and Williams, M ‘An Outline of the Threat to Underwater Cultural Heritage in 
International Waters’ Proceedings of JNAPC 21st Anniversary Seminar at the Society of Antiquaries 
London, 12 November 2010, 5-15 (5) 
(http://www.academia.edu/7742933/An_Outline_of_the_Nature_of_the_Threat_to_Underwater_Cultur
al_Heritage_in_International_Waters -  last accessed 20 October 2017) 
59 Hutchinson, 288 
60 Firth, A ‘UK Safeguarding of Underwater Cultural Heritage: Factual Background’ Briefing Paper for 
BA/Honor Frost Foundation Steering Committee on Underwater Cultural Heritage (March, 2014), 16 
61 See for example the campaign to designate under PMRA the remains of at least 60 aircraft shot 
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effective monitoring and enforcement strategies. In the Pitcairn Islands in 2017, this 
involved working in partnership with the New Zealand Royal Navy and the National 
Maritime Information Centre (NMIC) to deliver an aerial patrol over targeted areas in 
the Pitcairn Island Exclusive Economic Zone.64 Similarly, in the majority of the 
territories involved, the programme undertook “near real-time analysis of satellite data 
to build intelligence on Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, as a precursor to 
targeted enforcement”.65  
The ideas of joint-working and joint use of assets have also received academic 
attention. In a study focusing on the use of data relating to UHA, Dellino-Musgrave 
and Guiden compared the National Record of the Historic Environment (maintained 
by Historic England) with the data set maintained by the UK Hydrographic Office in 
respect of UK waters. The comparison showed the extent of the inaccuracies and 
inconsistencies between the datasets and recommended joint working between the 
parties (such as by regular exchanges of information and reconciliation exercises) in 
order to improve the baseline data on UHA, which in turn will give decision-makers 
“comprehensive, reliable and accessible data on which to base long-term planning, 
decision-making, and resource management”.66 Interestingly, the discrepancies in 
datasets were uncovered despite a level of existing cross-party collaboration in the 
field of hydrographic data. In 2009, the Department for Food, Environment and Rural 
Affairs came together to produce a Memorandum of Understanding on bathymetric 
survey data and data gathering that was aimed at increasing offshore survey efficiency 
for government organisations.  Currently the parties include such organisations as the 
UK Hydrographic Office and Natural England, but Historic England are not a party to 
the MoU.67 
With regard to heritage protection the Heritage and Cultural Property Crime National 
Strategic Assessment lists the unlawful disturbance and salvage of maritime sites as 
a key threat. 68   
  
Can we revisit this paragraph please? The assessment makes a number of references 
to wrecks and highlights Op Birdie and that wreck interference is one of the seven 
priorities. 
                                            
64 Ibid., 11 
65 Ibid., 5 (see also 7, 9, 12 and 15) 
66 Dellino-Musgrave, V, and Guiden, N ‘‘Marine data, access, and interoperability: Two case studies of 
English national records’ (2013) Conservation and Management of Archaeological Sites 15(3-4) 298, 
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67 Maritime and Coastguard Agency, ‘Share Hydrographic Data with Maritime and Coastguard Agency 
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68 NPCC Heritage and Cultural Property Crime Working Group,  July 2017, available at 
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This follows the earlier recognition that that joined-up practices are essential if we are 
to achieve effective protection of heritage assets: “The historic environment and 
cultural property is vulnerable because assets are often located in isolated, sometimes 
rural localities or are displayed for the public to enjoy. Police officers cannot patrol 
every neighbourhood for every hour of every day.  The delivery of intelligent and 
efficient law enforcement activity in financially challenging times must, therefore, 
include a focus on ‘collective efficacy’; law enforcement professionals working with 
local people and partner agencies to protect heritage assets from theft and damage to 
the historic environment.”69 
Indeed, to a certain extent, cross-party working is already happening in relation to 
UHA. The Memorandum of Understanding on the Prevention, Investigation, 
Enforcement and Prosecution of Heritage Crime between Historic England, the Crown 
Prosecution Service, the Association of Chief Police Officers and certain Local 
Authorities70 sets out the responsibilities of each of the parties in respect of protected 
marine wreck sites: “The police in partnership with [Historic England] are responsible 
for the prevention and investigation of unauthorised activities in respect of wreck sites 
designated as ‘restricted areas’ as defined by the Protection of Wrecks Act 1973. The 
Receiver of Wreck will work in partnership with the police and [Historic England] where 
there has been a failure to report the finding of wreck under the Merchant Shipping 
Act 1995... The Crown Prosecution Service is responsible for prosecution of such 
crimes where there is sufficient evidence and it is in the public interest to do so. 
Participating Local Authorities where this affects their local government area will 
provide assistance and advice in any campaigns of prevention and, where their 
expertise is needed and resources allow, in the investigation and prosecution of such 
crimes.”71 In addition, the responsibilities in respect of protected military remains is set 
out as follows: “The police will in partnership with the Ministry of Defence take 
responsibility for the prevention and investigation of unauthorised activities in respect 
of crashed military aircraft and sunk or stranded military vessels which are within a 
protected place or controlled site.”72 
Similarly, the stakeholder group ARCH (Alliance to Reduce Crime against Heritage), 
coordinated by Historic England, is a voluntary network of groups and organisations 
involved in heritage. “The overriding objective of the group is to reduce the amount of 
crime that causes damage to, or interferes with, the enjoyment of heritage assets in 
England. Over two hundred groups and organisations have joined ARCH and in many 
cases these groups already meet and/or share information through a number already 
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established formal and informal 'networks'; this represents a valuable intelligence-
gathering tool for law enforcement professionals.” 73  
However, cooperation with regard to intelligence is only of worth in relation to the 
protection of UHA if there is effective legislative enforcement and so this cross-party 
working needs to be expanded to encompass regulatory and other bodies who are 
active in the marine area and have assets, such as vessels and drones (limited to date 
to police forces – such as the Devon and Cornwall Constabulary’s UAV unit), that 
could assist in the detection of breaches and enforcement of the legislative provisions 
protecting UHA.  
The need for cross-party working in the area of protection of UHA is not peculiar to 
England and has been recognised and implemented to some extent by other 
countries. For example, the wrecks of British World War II ships HMS Repulse and 
HMS Prince of Wales are both situated in Malaysian waters and designated as 
protected places under PMRA. The wrecks contain significant amounts of valuable 
metals and have been targeted by scrap metal scavengers. The Marine Department 
of Malaysia, like Historic England, has no vessels that it can use to patrol the area to 
deter such scavengers, but it has been reported that the Malaysian Coast Guard and 
Maritime Enforcement Agency has been instructed to provide assistance by patrolling 
the area in order to spot possible offences taking place and deter others from 
committing such offences.74 Similar use of the coastguard appears to be taking place 
in French waters, with the head of the Historic England dive team noting that a vessel 
recently undertaking (legal) archaeological research in French waters was boarded by 
the French coastguard in order to check that those on board had all the necessary 
licences for their work and that no offences were taking place.75 
In England, the potential for such cross-party working was identified in a recent 
prosecution of salvors for recovering UCH without a Marine Licence (an offence under 
the MACCA). This enforcement operation, explored more fully later in the report, was 
a co-ordinated effort by the MMO, the body responsible for marine licensing in the UK 
marine area, the Royal Navy Fisheries Protection Squadron( RNFPS) and Historic 
England.76  
The RNFPS is itself also an example of successful cross-party working in the marine 
area. It is borne of an agreement between the Ministry of and the MMO in relation to 
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the provision of marine enforcement services, such as fishery protection, by the 
RNFPS. In addition, since 2012/13 the RNFPS vessels have also been tasked with 
maritime counter terrorism, pollution control and counter-drug surveillance roles in 
addition to their main task of fishery protection.77 Although it has been suggested that 
the three vessels allocated to the RNFPS are not sufficient to carry out the patrols 
necessary to fulfil these aims.78 
While some cross-party working has therefore been embraced in the English Inshore 
Marine Planning Area, the potential for much greater integration needs to be 
examined. The limited planning in the marine sector and the regulation that has 
informed it has suffered in the past from a sectoral approach that treats marine 
activities as discrete sectors and, in doing so, hinders inter-agency cooperation.79  
The preliminary step to breaking down these artificial barriers is to quantify the 
available marine regulatory assets and understand their potential for utilisation to 
identify potential breaches of the protective legislation and thus help Historic England, 
the Police and the Crown Prosecution Service to build the necessary evidence base 
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3. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTION OF 
UNDERWATER HERITAGE ASSETS  
In this part, a more detailed explanation of the specific provisions of law that may be 
utilised is provided. As noted in English Heritage’s Project Report ‘Marine Archaeology 
Legislation Project’,80 the result of the incremental development of the salvage regime 
by case law over the centuries, much of it now enshrined in the International 
Convention on Salvage 1989,81 is that the law conferred upon divers and commercial 
operators offers considerable freedom to initiate the salvage of  property in danger at 
sea, irrespective of  its heritage worth. To temper this freedom a number of statutory 
reforms have been introduced, which constrain the liberties of a salvor and, in doing 
so, confer an element of protection upon the UHA. 
 
3.1 The Protection of Wrecks Act 1973 
 
The Protection of Wrecks Act 1973 (PWA) was passed as a direct consequence of the 
looting of wrecks of historical interest. Designation and licensing are the chosen 
mechanisms of control.82  The PWA authorises the Secretary of State83  to designate 
as a restricted area the site of a vessel of historical, archaeological or artistic 
importance84 lying wrecked in or on the seabed.85  There is no further definition of 
these criteria in the PWA but non-statutory guidance has been issued.86 In practice 
the age of vessels designated dates from possible 500 BC to the middle of the 20th. 
Century. As the title of the Act suggests the PWA is potentially restricted in its 
application due to the use of the term ‘vessel’. The term is not defined in the PWA but 
the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (MSA) defines the term as "... including any ship or 
boat or any other description of vessel used in navigation.".87 Clearly, this would 
encompass log boats and rafts but it is uncertain if flying boats or amphibious vehicles 
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would be included. The remains of historic aircraft would undoubtedly be outside the 
definition, which is a significant omission,88 as would flooded landscapes.  
 
The objective of the PWA is to protect the restricted area itself from unauthorised 
interference and not merely the vessel or its contents. It is an offence, within a 
restricted area, to tamper with, damage or remove any object or part of the vessel or 
to carry out any diving or salvage operation.89  Further operations within the area are 
then controlled by the issuing of licences, authorising only certain specified activities. 
The Secretary of State may grant a licence, subject to conditions or restrictions, to 
persons considered to be competent and properly equipped, for the carrying out of 
salvage operations in a manner appropriate to the importance of the wreck or 
associated objects.90  In determining whether to designate a vessel and/or grant a 
licence authorising diving or salvage operations91 the Secretary of State will receive 
advice from the Historic England’s Historic Wrecks Panel, which replaced the Advisory 
Committee on Historic Wreck Sites in 2011, in relation to England.92  The Panel 
advises staff on specialist issues of policy and practice related to complex, contentious 
and high profile wreck sites in UK territorial waters adjacent to England and in UK 
controlled waters adjacent to England and licensing in UK territorial waters adjacent 
to England, as appropriate. 
 
A diving contractor has also been appointed, to visit both potential sites to advise on 
their condition and nature and to visit existing sites for the purpose of monitoring their 
condition and the activities of the licensee, if any.93  Where a licence is granted, it will 
be subject to conditions or restrictions, appropriate to each individual site. In autumn 
2015 the licensing process was amended to move from four different types of licence 
to just one, framed by conditions that are relevant to the proposed activities. This 
change does not alter the processes for approving and issuing licences but rather 
amends the type of licence issued to make it fit for purpose with current archaeological 
techniques and to reflect the broad range of reasons for which people seek to access 
protected wreck sites. The change also introduced the term ‘Principal Licensee’ who 
is the main licence holder and, usually, these conditions will normally require that all 
divers are listed in a schedule kept by the principal licensee, that activities are kept to 
those authorised on the licence, that intrusive activities are carried out under the 
direction of the approved archaeologist, that recovered artefacts are given immediate 
preservation treatment as approved by the archaeologist and that an annual report is 
submitted and records are deposited with the relevant heritage bodies. The present 
policy is that initially only certain limited activities on the site will be authorised, short 
of excavation and recovery.  
 
                                            
88 Aircraft do come within the meaning of ‘wreck’ for the purposes of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 
by virtue of  the Aircraft (Wreck and Salvage ) Order 1938 (S.R.&O 1938 No.136) and s.51 Civil 
Aviation Act 1949  
89 s.1(3)   
90 s.1(5) 
91 The licence does not necessarily authorise activities that are intended to lead to a salvage award.  
92  ‘Accessing England’s Protected Wreck Sites Guidance Notes for Divers and Archaeologists’ 
Historic England (2010) p.3 https://historicengland.org.uk/listing/what-is-designation/protected-wreck-
sites/ (last accessed October 2018) 
93 Previously, the contract was held by the Archaeological Diving Unit at the University of St. Andrews. 
Since April 2003 it has been held by Wessex Archaeology.  
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Finally, a licence may be varied or revoked by the Secretary of State at any time upon 
not less than one week's notice.94  However any such revocation would be subject to 
the constraints imposed by Administrative Law in that, e.g. the revocation should be 
reasonable, taking into account only material considerations and after the licensee 
has been consulted and been afforded an opportunity to make representations.  A 
breach of any condition or restriction contained in the licence is treated as having 
been done without the authority of the licence, thereby making it a criminal offence.95  
Additionally, other consents, such as licences from the Crown Estate and the Marine 
Management Organisation (MMO) must be obtained. Where authorised recoveries of 
wreck these must be reported to the Receiver of Wreck under the terms of the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1995. 
 
 
3.2 The Ancient Monuments & Archaeological Areas Act 1979 
 
The Ancient Monuments & Archaeological Areas Act 1979 (AMAAA) has seen limited 
application below Low Water until recent times.96  In principle, the AMAAA has 
significant advantages over the PWA and it has been identified97 as the one single 
piece of legislation having the greatest potential to satisfy the United Kingdom’s 
obligations under the European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological 
Heritage (revised).98  The Act works by the scheduling of monuments.99  The definition 
of a 'Monument'100 encompasses, inter alia, buildings, structures or work, cave or 
excavation, vehicle, vessel, aircraft or other movable structure. 101  The AMAAA is far 
more flexible in its possible application than the PWA and, in particular, can apply to 
flooded landscapes such as quarries, cave dwellings and fish traps,102 as well as 
aircraft and vehicles.103  
                                            
94 S.1(5)(b) 
95 s.1(6) 
96  In 2001 Historic Scotland scheduled as monuments three battleships and four cruisers of the 
scuttled German High Seas Fleet in Scapa Flow (References AMH/9298 & AMH/9308 respectively). 
At the time of writing (March 2003) it is proposed to schedule the remains of eight sailing fishing 
vessels in Aberlady bay, Scotland (reference AMJ/7512/1/1). CADW scheduled the wreck of the 
Louisa in December 2001 but the vessel is now part of the reclaimed area of  the Cardiff Bay project. 
At the time of writing (May 2018) Historic England is reviewing several applications for scheduling 
below the Low Water Mark, which it had previously rejected. See further Lowther, J Parham, D. & 
Williams, M. ‘All at Sea: When Duty meets Austerity in Scheduling Monuments in English Waters’ 
Journal of Planning and Environmental Law (3) 2017 pp.245-334 
97 Joint Nautical Archaeology Policy Committee, ‘An Interim Report on The Valletta Convention & 
Heritage Law at Sea’  (2003): University of Wolverhampton  
98 ETS no. 143.  Hereafter ‘the Valletta Convention’ 
99 Under s.53 a monument situated in, on or under the seabed within the seaward limits of UK 
territorial waters may be scheduled 
100 Curiously although the title of the Act refers to 'Ancient' monuments there is no age limit and post 
1945 structures have been scheduled  
101 s.62(7) 
102  For an  account of the Act  in so far as it may be applied to underwater archaeological remains 
see ‘Legal Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage’ Dromgoole, S. (ed.) Kluwer Law 
International (1999) chp.12 
103 Lowther et al 
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To be scheduled, the monument must be of ‘national importance’.104   Once scheduled, 
it is an offence to, inter alia, demolish, destroy, alter or repair a monument without 
'scheduled monument consent', to damage a monument or use a metal detector 
therein without written consent.105  In practice, such consent is rarely given, except for 
rescue excavations, and it is the practice of the heritage agencies to pursue a policy 
of preservation in situ, rather than encourage active investigation of monuments by 
excavation, which is seen as destructive. This principle is now enshrined as a 
cornerstone of the Valletta Convention.106  
In relation to ‘sites’ comprising, or comprising the remains of, any vehicle, vessel, 
aircraft or other movable structure or part of it the object cannot be scheduled“...unless 
the situation of that object in that particular site is a matter of public interest”.107  This 
provision is not easy to interpret. The limitation appears to arise because the purpose 
of the Act is to schedule significant sites, rather than simply to protect significant 
objects themselves. A narrow interpretation would suggest that a wreck of a vessel or 
aircraft could not be scheduled unless the fact that it came to rest in a particular 
location made its conservation a matter of public interest. Conversely, a liberal 
interpretation might allow one to take the view that the very presence of a significant 
wreck in a particular location makes that location of some historical or archaeological 
interest and therefore a matter of public interest. Clearly, the Act, being based upon 
the concept of the scheduling of sites, should not be concerned with the conservation 
of an object that is still capable of movement in accordance with its design. Thus, an 
aircraft that can still fly or a vessel that can still be navigated are inappropriate subjects 
for scheduling. However, where such an object has been incorporated into a site and 
is incapable of movement according to its design e.g. because it has crashed or been 
wrecked at a particular location, then scheduling may be appropriate. It may be that 
this is what the limitation is attempting to achieve. In any event it is desirable that this 
confusion is clarified by amendment of the provision in order to make its purpose 
explicit. 
 
In terms of enhancing protection from unauthorised interference the AMAAA does 
have one significant drawback. Unlike the PWA, the AMAAA lacks the flexibility to 
restrict public access by diving upon maritime scheduled monuments, where such 
restriction would be appropriate in terms of heritage management. Scheduling per se 
does not create a public right of access to terrestrial monuments. Where a monument 
is under public ownership108 the public have a right of access, but this right may be 
regulated or negated. 109  Although nominally these provisions apply underwater, in 
fact they sit very uneasily with the maritime legal framework.  The public would appear 
to enjoy a right to swim in tidal waters, unless specifically prohibited. 110  On the basis 
that the courts would equate swimming with underwater diving, it would appear that 
                                            
104 This term is undefined. 
105 s.2(1), 28(1) & 42(1); consent may be granted subject to conditions s.2(4). 
106 European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage (revised) ETS no. 143.  
107 S.61(7)(c); (8)(a). 
108 I.e. in the ownership or guardianship of the Secretary of State, local authority or English Heritage. 
109 S.19(1), (2)(a07(b), (3). 
110 Decided law provides no assistance on the question of whether there is a right to bathe in the sea. 
Since it is not expressly prohibited then, on the Common Law basis that that which is not expressly or 
impliedly prohibited is lawful, it would appear to be a residual right. It is probable that the public right 
of navigation is restricted to craft and does not extend to persons swimming.  
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the public enjoy a right to access scheduled monuments in tidal waters, unless 
specifically otherwise prohibited. No underwater scheduled monuments are currently 
in the ownership or guardianship of the relevant Secretary of State and few, if any, are 
likely to become so. Thus the power to regulate or prohibit access cannot be utilised 
unless the monument in question is brought into such ownership or guardianship. This 
would involve a legal process, which would probably not be entered into lightly, as well 
as the possibility of the payment of compensation to the owner of a monument, e.g. a 
wreck, brought into such ownership or guardianship. Given this limitation, the use of 
the AMAAA underwater may be restricted to a few suitably robust sites of public 
interest and enforcement would be restricted not to excluding access but excluding 
damage and unauthorised recoveries.   
 
 
3.3 The Protection of Military Remains Act 1986 111 
 
In February 2001 the Ministry of Defence112 published a ‘Consultation Document’,113 
inviting interested parties to express their views on the protection of wrecked military 
vessels which had sunk with loss of life.114  This consultation exercise had been 
announced115 by Dr. Lewis Moonie116 in response to the growing public controversy 
over interference with last resting places associated with sunken military vessels117 
and a concerted campaign by interested parties and ex- service associations to have 
such interference regulated under the Protection of Military Remains Act 1986 
(PMRA).118  In November 2001 the MOD published its report on the consultation 
exercise119 and this document heralded a radical new policy for administration of the 
PMRA. 
                                            
111 For a detailed account of the Act see ‘Legal Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage’ 
Dromgoole, S. (ed.) Kluwer Law International (1999) chp.12 
112 Hereafter ‘MOD’ 
113 “Military Maritime Graves and The Protection of Military Remains Act 1986: A Consultation 
Document”[ February 2001] Ministry of Defence,  Whitehall, London. 
114 Ibid. p.6 
115 See statement of Dr. Moonie on Maritime Graves House of Commons Written Answers 25 Jan. 
2001 at www.parliament.uk (last accessed October 2018) 
116 Under Secretary of State for Defence 
117 See further 'Ripping Off The Dead' ,  Diver, May 1999; 'Divers raid seabed war graves for trinkets', 
The Independent, 11/11/1999; 'Divers set to plunder battleship war graves', Sunday Telegraph 
27/11/2000; ‘Wartime wrecks looted by Divers’ 3/12/2000 at www.telegraph.co.uk and ‘The Depths of 
Dishonour’, Western Daily Press, 9/1/2001. Between 19th. October 1999 and 20th. April 2000 the 
MOD received 51 Parliamentary Questions relating to this issue; see further statement of Dr. Moonie, 
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence, 26th. June 2000, at www.parliament.uk   
cols.415W - 417W. (last accessed October 2018) 
118 Which hitherto had not been utilised, except in relation to the remains of military aircraft. For a 
discussion of the genesis of this controversy and the law relating to the salvage of military remains 
see Williams, M.,  “War Graves” and Salvage: Murky Waters ?” Journal of International Maritime Law 
7(5) pp. 151-158.   
119 “Military Maritime Graves and the Protection of Military Remains Act 1986: Consultation Report” 
[November 2001] Ministry of Defence,  Whitehall, London.  
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The primary objective of The PMRA is to prevent disturbance of military remains, 
irrespective of the presence of human remains or the cause of the loss.120  It is wide 
ranging and has the potential to control many archaeological excavations. The 
regulatory framework of the PMRA works upon the concepts of 'Protected Places', 
'Controlled Sites' and the prohibition of certain excavations. 121  
Protected Places are the remains of any aircraft which crashed in military service or 
of any vessel designated (by name, not location) which sunk or stranded in military 
service122 after 4th. August 1914.123  Although the vessels, as opposed to aircraft, 
need to be specifically designated by name, the location of each vessel need not be 
known, since it is the presence of the remains and their designation that makes the 
place protected and not knowledge of the location.  If there is a belief or reasonable 
grounds for suspecting that a place is comprised of the remains of a military aircraft or 
designated vessel then it is an offence to conduct unlicensed diving or salvage 
operations to tamper with, damage, remove or unearth any remains or enter any hatch 
or other opening. Thus diving upon such remains is permitted, provided no tampering 
or removal of objects etc. occurs.124  
Controlled Sites  are  designated areas comprising the remains of a military aircraft or 
a vessel sunk or stranded in military service less than two hundred years ago.125  It is 
an offence within a controlled site to tamper with, damage, move or unearth any 
remains, enter any hatch or opening or conduct diving, salvage or excavation 
operations for the purposes of investigating or recording the remains, unless 
authorised by licence.126  Since unauthorised investigation is prohibited, it would seem 
that any unlicensed diving is prohibited on these sites.127       
Finally, the PMRA appears to prohibit any excavation in the United Kingdom if 
undertaken to discover whether the place comprises the remains of a military aircraft 
or vessel of any nationality, whenever the casualty took place, i.e. regardless of age.128  
This is a surprisingly wide provision and would appear to prohibit the archaeological 
                                            
120 A common misconception is that the 1986 Act is concerned solely or primarily with ‘war graves’. It 
is not, but the habitual reference to maritime military remains as ‘war graves’ has led to a confused 
perception of the law. The term appears to be a corruption of the terminology used in the Royal 
Charter incorporating the Imperial War Graves Commission. Under the Charter the Commission is 
charged with “... caring for the graves of officers and men ... who ... have been, or may be, buried ..." 
and "... to make fit provision for the burial of officers and men ...". Predictably the legal advisers to the 
Commission have taken the view that it is not responsible for unrecovered human remains and that it 
is quite erroneous in law to refer to ships with unrecovered human remains as 'war graves', since they 
do not constitute a 'burial' as such. 
121 The Act applies to both United Kingdom and international waters but foreign vessels may only be 
designated within UK waters. 
122 This would include support vessels of the Fleet Auxiliary and requisitioned vessels.   
123 The date hostilities commenced against Germany; see further s.1(2). 
124  Provided that the location of datums etc. did not constitute tampering within the meaning of the 
Act. 
125  s.1  
126  s.2(3)(a).   
127  The issue would turn upon whether the court interpreted 'investigation' to include mere visual 
inspection without physical contact. 
128  s.2(3)(c). 
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investigation of any possible military wreck, since one of the purposes of excavation 
would be to establish the identity of the remains.  
The non-statutory criteria for determining designation are whether or not: 129 
(a) lives were lost; 
(b) there is evidence of sustained disturbance or looting (and strength of 
evidence); 
(c) designation is likely to curb or put a stop to such disturbance or looting; 
(d) diving on the vessel or site attracts sustained and significant public criticism; 
(e) the vessel is of historical significance; 
 
In terms of enforcement some several legal ambiguities exist, particularly in relation to 
Controlled Sites. These are:  
 
(a) In relation to those operations which are prohibited in Controlled Sites, the use 
of the term “… diving or salvage operation …” poses a number of difficulties. 
The term 'diving operation' is neither defined by the PMRA nor by any other 
primary legislation and therefore carries its normal grammatical meaning.130 
Clearly, the expression would encompass submersion by a person using diving 
apparatus, as well as the use of a machine carrying persons, such as a manned 
submersible. What is not clear is whether it would also include the use of a 
Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) simply to locate a wreck and inspect it.131  
Given that the purpose of the Act is to prohibit unauthorised exploration of 
maritime military remains, it would surely be open to the courts to take the view 
that the means of underwater observation, whether manned or not, is irrelevant 
and that the use of a robotic machine, where the operators remain above the 
surface constitutes a ‘diving operation’. However, the PMRA renders a breach 
a criminal offence and it is a cardinal principle of statutory interpretation that 
penal statutes are construed strictly in favour of the individual.132  
Consequently, the court may take a more forensic and restrictive approach to 
interpretation and consider that the use of remotely controlled machines per se 
does not amount to a diving operation.   
 
(b) An additional difficulty in relation to Controlled Sites arises from the fact that 
diving or salvage operations are prohibited “… for the purpose of investigating 
or recording details of any remains…”.133  The term ‘investigating’ has been 
taken literally to mean simply visually examining a wreck.134  Since this is an 
inevitable ingredient of all recreational and commercial diving operations,135 this 
would amount to a prohibition of all diving operations within a Controlled Site 
                                            
129 “Military Maritime Graves and the Protection of Military Remains Act 1986: Consultation Report” 
op.cit. para.16 p.6.  
130 The expression is defined, for the purposes of the Diving At Work Regulations (S. I. 1997 No. 
2776), as " ... a diving operation identified in the project plan ...". A search of Canadian, Australian, 
American and New Zealand legislation revealed no use or definition of the expression. 
131 Quare could the use of a towed sonar device be a ‘diving operation’ within the meaning of the 
PMRA 
132 See further R. v. Cuthbetston [1980] 3 W.L.R. 89 (H.L.) 
133 S.2(3)(a). 
134 See ‘Legal Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage’ Dromgoole, S. (ed.) Kluwer Law 
International (1999) chp.12. Contextually, this would be the grammatical meaning.  
135 At least initially, preparatory to other operations. 
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without the authority of a licence. Certainly, the MOD has publicly adopted such 
an interpretation.136  However, while this interpretation has merit, there are 
grounds for taking a more restrictive approach. If a total prohibition on all diving 
operations had been intended, there would be little point in specifying the 
purposes for which the diving operation was prohibited. The fact that the PMRA 
refers to such operations for specified purposes suggests that Parliament’s 
intention was to allow diving operations for other, unspecified, purposes.137  
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that, had a total prohibition been 
contemplated, then one envisages clear and unambiguous wording would have 
been utilised, comparable to that in the PWA, which talks of “…diving or salvage 
operations directed to the exploration of any wreck …[or the use of] equipment 
constructed or adapted for any purpose of diving operations”. 138  Moreover, if 
a total prohibition on diving within a Controlled Site is imposed by the PMRA, 
then no apparent purpose is served by the provision of the additional offence 
of taking part in a diving operation carried out for the purpose of tampering with, 
unearthing, removing etc. or entering military remains within the site. Simply 
executing a diving operation per se within the site, without this additional 
seabed activity, would constitute an offence. Consequently, it is arguable that 
‘investigation’, for the purpose of the PMRA, envisages activity which amounts 
to more than merely diving to visually examine military remains within a 
Controlled Site.  Given that the objective of the legislation is to protect military 
remains from unauthorised interference, a purposive interpretation would be 
that diving operations are only prohibited if they are intended to, or are likely to, 
result in physical interference or entry into a wreck. Such an interpretation 
would then permit a purely visual examination, whether by a diver or by a 
Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV), without the necessity for a licence.  
 
(c) This ambiguity is compounded when one also considers the meaning of 
‘salvage operation’. A 'salvage operation' is not defined in the PMRA. However, 
it is defined by the MSA as " ...  any act or activity undertaken to assist a vessel 
or any other property in danger in navigable waters ... ".139  Clearly the words 
"...any act or activity...", per se, would embrace the use of a ROV, but the 
qualification that, in order to be a salvage operation, the activity must be 
undertaken to assist a vessel in danger is problematic, in circumstances where 
there is no intention to ultimately recover the vessel or any part of it.  While 
success is undoubtedly a precursor to entitlement to a salvage award, the 
conferment of a benefit upon the property in danger is not a  pre-requisite of the 
status of a 'salvor'. Salvage by its very nature is speculative and the rendering 
of assistance, i.e. a salvage service, per se, without the attainment of success, 
will still amount to a salvage operation and make the operative a 'salvor'. This 
is well illustrated by the principle that a person engaged in work preparatory to 
recovery of a sunken vessel or its cargo will nevertheless be a salvor in law and 
have the possessory rights of a salvor in possession, notwithstanding that 
                                            
136 “Military Maritime Graves and the Protection of Military Remains Act 1986: Consultation 
Document” op.cit. para. 14 p.6. 
137 Any diving operation to secure safety or health or prevent serious damage to property is 
permissible under s.2 (6). 
138 S.1(3)(b). 
139 Sch. 11 Article 1(a).  
28 
 
actual recovery has yet to be effected.140  As Brice stated,141 no exhaustive list 
of salvage services can be given, but it is clear that the locating of an 
endangered vessel, inspecting it and assessing its predicament can constitute 
a salvage service, where it is accompanied by an intention to effect recovery 
or, at least, such an intention is not excluded. Indeed the American courts have 
conferred the status of salvor in possession upon persons where location of a 
wreck and assessment of its condition have been undertaken by a ROV with a 
view to raising material from the wreck.142  Consequently, it is arguable that a 
person using a ROV to locate and survey a wreck would be conferring a salvage 
service and therefore would be engaging in a salvage operation. On the other 
hand, the absence of a firm intention to recover a vessel or any of its contents 
in the foreseeable future and the lack of proximity between survey and any 
eventual recovery may make it difficult for a court to regard merely locating and 
inspecting a vessel as a salvage service in the conventional sense and 
therefore a salvage operation, contrary to the PMRA.  
 
 
3.4 The Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009: Marine Licensing 
 
The introduction of the marine licensing regime under the Marine and Coastal Access 
Act 2009 (MACCA) was potentially the most significant legislative addition to the 
protection of UHA’s since the PWA. In determining an application for a marine licence, 
the Marine Management Organisation (MMO)143 must have regard to, inter alia, the 
need to protect the environment. For the purposes of marine licensing the environment 
includes “… any site (including any site comprising, or comprising the remains of, any 
vessel, aircraft or marine structure) which is of historic or archaeological interest.”.144  
While the expression ‘historic or archaeological interest’ is not defined in the Act itself, 
a definition has been provided for the Self Service Marine Licence process, which is 
discussed below.  It is also important to note that this definition is wider than that used 
in the PWA and will encompass any site of historical or archaeological interest, 
including monuments and flooded landscapes. 
 
Marine licensing has imposed considerable restraints upon the hitherto freedom to 
remove objects from the seabed, including the freedom of salvors to conduct salvage 
without prior authorisation, thereby affording a default position where in many 
circumstances UHA’s are protected from unauthorised disturbance and recovery 
without the necessity for designation or scheduling under the PWA, AMAAA or PMRA. 
However, it is important to recognise that not all disturbance and/or recovery in respect 
of UHA’s requires authorisation by a marine licence, but any large scale disturbance 
or recovery is almost certainly likely to require a marine licence, thereby affording a 
considerable degree of protection to UHA’s.    
 
                                            
140 The Tubantia [1924] P. 78. 
141 Brice, G.  Maritime Law of Salvage 3rd. ed. (1999) Sweet & Maxwell. London. at pp. 103-105.  
142 Colombus-America  v. Unidentified Etc. Vessel  1988 AMC 2957. 
143 The licensing authority for marine licences in English territorial waters in the Secretary of State 
(s.114((8)) but the Secretary of State has entered into an agreement for discharge of that function by 
the MMO under s. 14((1)).  
144 S.115(2). The MMO will consult Historic England in respect of potential impacts of the proposed 
activity upon UHA’s. 
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Marine licensing functions by imposing a requirement for a marine licence for the 
carrying out of a ‘licensable marine activity’.145  Where a marine licence is granted the 
authorised activity must be carried out in accordance with the licence. The Act then 
sets out thirteen licensable marine activities,146 the activities which would be relevant 
to the protection of UHA’s being: 
 
 To deposit any substance or object within the UK marine licensing area,147 
either in the sea or on or under the sea bed, from any vehicle, vessel, aircraft 
or marine structure, or  
      any container floating in the sea;  
 To deposit any substance or object anywhere in the sea or on or under the sea 
bed from a British vessel, British aircraft or British marine structure, or a 
container floating in the sea, if the deposit is controlled from a British vessel, 
British aircraft or British marine structure; 
 To use a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, marine structure or floating container148 to 
remove any substance or object from the sea bed within the UK marine 
licensing area; 
 To carry out any form of dredging within the UK marine licensing area (whether 
or not involving the removal of any material from the sea or sea bed;149 
 
These criteria are extremely wide and would encompass many routine activities. To 
avoid excessive regulation or administrative burden two Statutory Orders provide 
approximately forty exemptions, obviating the need to apply for a marine licence 
provided any conditions imposed by these statutory exemptions are compiled with.150 
In any attempt to mitigate this administrative tasking and reduce costs for applicants 
in respect of licensable activities which pose a low risk to the marine environment a 
system of self-servicing for marine licences has been introduced.151  In relation to 
UHA’s it is particularly noteworthy that the self-service activities includes any removal 
of “discrete minor objects of archaeological or historic interest from the seabed”, 
described in the associated application.152 ‘Minor objects’ are defined as discrete 
debris, while ‘Archaeological or historic interest’ is defined as “includes all traces of 
human existence having a cultural, historical or archaeological character such as sites, 
structures, buildings, artefacts and human remains, together with their archaeological 
and natural context vessels, aircraft, other vehicles or any part thereof, their cargo or 
other contents, together with their archaeological and natural context; and (iii) objects 
                                            
145 S.65(1). 
146 S.66(1). 
147 The UK marine licensing area encompasses the UK marine area, i.e. the UK territorial sea, EEZ 
and Continental Shelf, with the exception of the Scottish Inshore Region; s.42(1), s.66(4)  
148 A floating container would include any buoyancy device, such as a diver’s ‘lifting bag’, which when 
inflated provides positive buoyancy to lift objects underwater  
149 Dredging is defined as including the use of any device to move any material (whether or not 
suspended in water) from one part of the sea or sea bed to another part; s.66(2)(a) 
150 Marine Licensing (Exempted Activities) Order 2011 (S.I. 408/2011); Marine Licensing (Exempted 
Activities)   Order 2013 (S.I. 526/2013) 
151 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/self-service-marine-licensing (last accessed October 
2018). The fee for a self-service marine licence is £50.00, which is a considerable cost reduction.  
152 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/self-service-marine-licensing/self-service-activities-
table (last accessed October 2018). The meaning of ‘discrete’ is somewhat unclear but presumably 
relates to what are termed by marine archaeologists disarticulated objects that have become 
detached from any structure or are free standing, such as items of cargo or personal possessions 
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of prehistoric character”.153 This is an extremely wide definition, which mirrors largely 
that contained in the UNESCO Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural 
Heritage 2001154 and encompasses, through the marine licensing system, all UHA’s, 
in contrast to the more limited ambit of UHA’s protected by the PWA, AMAAA or 
PMRA.155 The removal of such objects under a self-service marine licence is subject 
to the criteria and conditions, including a consent from Historic England or an approved 
methodology.156 
 
Finally MMO guidance states that a marine licence is not required to use a floating 
container, such as a lifting bag, to remove an object from the seabed where the object 
does not require a total lifting capacity greater than 100KG and the object to be 
removed has not been on the seabed for longer than 12 months. An example is given 
of a recently lost outboard motor or other objects the nature and condition indicate 
clearly that the item not been lost for a period of time in excess of 12 months. This 
guidance seems somewhat misleading, since it would be for the MMO to prove all 
elements of the criminal offence, including the fact that the object had been on the 
seabed beyond 12 months. The guidance appears to suggest that it is for the applicant 
to establish this or otherwise to obtain a marine licence. Quite what the basis of this 
exemption is is not clear. It is not statutory and appears therefore to be entirely 
administrative. However given that the activity may constitute a criminal offence 
without the obtaining of a marine licence, the exemption appears to be a policy 
decision not to enforce a legislative criminal provision for administrative or logistical 
reasons. Given the decision in R (on the application of Pretty) v Director of Public 




3.5 The Salvage Regime 
 
A ‘salvage operation’  is defined as "any act or activity undertaken to assist a vessel 
or any other property in danger ..." 158 and entitlement to a salvage reward for "a useful 
result" is expressly conferred159. The term ‘property’ appears to be extremely wide, but 
legal opinion is that, at its widest, it only encompasses maritime property, i.e. it is  
synonymous with ‘wreck’160 under the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (MSA). 
                                            
153 Ibid  
154 See http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/underwater-cultural-heritage/2001-convention/ 
(last accessed October 2018) 
155 The definition is not without its problems, in that the expression ‘cultural, historical or 
archaeological character’ remains undefined, especially in a chronological sense  
156 A template for such approval is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/self-
service-marine-licensing  (last accessed October 2018) 
157 [2001] UKHL 61 
158 International Convention on Salvage 1989 Shed. 11, Article 1(a) 
http://treaties.fco.gov.uk/docs/pdf/1996/TS0093.pdf   (accessed October 2018); a ‘salvor’ is not 
defined but presumably will be someone conducting a salvage operation. 
159 Article 12 ibid 
160  Defined as “ includes jetsam, flotsam, lagan and derelict found in or on the shores of the sea or 
any tidal water.” (s.255(1)). In Sir Henry Constable's Case (1601) 5 Co. Rep. 106a  Jetsam was 
defined as goods cast into the sea to lighten an endangered ship, the ship later sinking; Flotsam as 
goods left floating after a ship sinks and Lagan as goods cast into the sea with a buoy attached to 
mark their location for later recovery. A derelict is a vessel abandoned at sea by the master and crew, 
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Consequently the salvage regime has no application to archaeological material 
deriving from submerged landscapes. The MSA, through its incorporation of the 
International Convention on Salvage 1989 (ICS) into United Kingdom law, effected a 
welcome modernisation of salvage law161. However this modernisation related 
principally to commercial salvage. 'Voluntary' salvage (ex contractu), where the salvor 
does not act under a contractual obligation, the normal case in maritime archaeology, 
retained most of its essential characteristics. Much of the salvage relating to UHA’s is 
voluntary salvage, often undertaken by recreational divers or avocational 
archaeologists who are recreational divers. That said, voluntary salvage by 
commercial concerns can occur, usually associated with recovery of metal cargoes or 
gold or silver bullion and specie.  
The traditional elements of voluntary salvage, a service provided ex contractu, which 
successfully recovers endangered property, are preserved by the ICS and this has 
significant implications for the underwater cultural heritage. Since there is no 
requirement for a contractual nexus, any person may initiate salvage of another's 
property, indeed an owner cannot unreasonably refuse such a service162.  Such 
freedom is however constrained by the operation of the legislation protecting UHA’s 
and imposing the requirement for a marine licence for recovery of objects from the 
seabed other than by hand. These legislative provisions are considered below.  
 
3.6 Merchant Shipping Act 1995 and Receiver of Wreck  
 
Under section 236(1) MSA a person who takes possession of wreck in UK waters or 
brings it into those waters must give notice to the Receiver of Wreck (ROW).163 That 
person, a salvor in law, will usually be entitled to a savage award and the function of 
the ROW, an official of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, is to reunite owner with 
their recovered property, subject to the payment of any salvage claimed. There is no 
statutory time limit for such reporting, though an administrative time limit of 28 days is 
adhered to by the ROW. It is an offence, without reasonable excuse, not to report the 
taking of possession of wreck164 and such failure has been recently been the subject 
of a number of prosecution detailed in Chapter 5 below.   
Most historic wreck remains unclaimed and it is in respect of such unclaimed wreck 
that effective changes in the administrative policy relating to the disposal of historic 
wreck have been introduced by the ROW. If no owner claims title to wreck within a 
                                            
without hope of recovery (The Aquila 1 C. ROB. 38 (1798) per Sir W Scott at 40). Sunken vessels 
resting on or in the seabed, or their remains, will be a Derelict in law. The term ‘wreck’ also 
encompasses the both the remains of vessels, their equipment, cargo and apparel. Aircraft come 
within the meaning of ‘wreck’ for the purposes of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 by virtue of  the 
Aircraft (Wreck and Salvage ) Order 1938 (S.R.&O 1938 No.136) and s.51 Civil Aviation Act 1949 
161  The Convention is incorporated by s. 224 and the text of the Convention is contained in Schedule 
11 to the MSA  
162 Article 19 ibid; this is a reflection of the imperative which the public policy behind salvage placed 
upon returning endangered property to the main stream of commerce in society, thereby minimising 
society's economic dislocation 




statutory period of one year then the Crown is entitled to the unclaimed wreck,165 
unless the Crown has granted the right to such unclaimed wreck to a person.166 The 
ROW obtains a market valuation and may then dispose of the property as thought 
appropriate, the salvage award being paid by the person or institution that acquires 
the material upon the basis of the valuation, together with any expenses of the 
ROW.167 The salvor's interest is protected because the salvage paid by the acquiring 
institution is negotiated with the Receiver upon the basis of the valuation(s).168 The 
public interest in archaeological material being disposed of as a single collection to a 
publicly accessible museum is facilitated by the ROW firstly offering the wreck to such 
an institution in the United Kingdom. If no institution in this country is prepared to 
acquire it, then it will be offered to similar institutions abroad. Finally, the material will 
only be disposed of by way of public auction or returning the wreck to the salvor in lieu 
of salvage if no suitable institution is prepared to acquire it.169. In practice divers, as 













                                            
165 S.241 & 24.  
166 The Crown has granted the right of unclaimed wreck washed ashore to persons, often to those 
holding manorial titles  
167 Where wreck is disposed of to a publicly accessible collection the Receiver's fees are waived but 
any expenses incurred by the Receiver must be paid, since the Maritime and Coastguard Agency has 
no funding for conservation etc. and must recoup these costs  
168 In practice many finders waive their right to salvage in return for the material being disposed of to a 
museum 
169 A notable exception occurs where wreck, recovered outside UK territorial waters, is landed in the 
UK and remains unclaimed;  the court in The Lusitania  [1986] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 132. held that title to 
such wreck does not vest in the Crown and must be returned to the salvor 
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4. MARINE ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES  
 
“In order for us to influence and intervene where necessary, we must carefully 
assess and prioritise the maritime risks and opportunities we face and allocate our 
resources accordingly” 170 
 
4.1 Context and Maritime Presence 
As has been noted, despite its raft of heritage responsibilities offshore, Historic 
England does not have a stand-alone marine enforcement presence.  Heritage crime 
is not identified as serious or organised crime according to the National Crime Agency 
definition,171 however, the unlawful disturbance and salvage of maritime sites and 
metal theft are acknowledged as key priorities and subject to the involvement of 
organised criminality172  The seriousness of heritage crime may reflect the value (both 
cultural and/or financial) of the item; or be reflected in the fact that the impact of 
heritage crimes may have an irreversible nature.173  Circumstances that certainly apply 
to UHA, although interviews with the relevant police forces revealed that crimes 
against the person were significantly regarded as a key priority rather than crimes 
against property, including UHA.  It may be that there is a differential appreciation of 
the policy drivers and the operational priorities manifested in the appreciation of the 
relevant Forces’ work in this area. 
Whilst there are a number of broad-based heritage crime initiatives,174 including 
Operation Birdie, the difficulties in realising their potential in the offshore environment 
are significant and challenging: location, accessibility and cost for example.  A better 
response would be to co-ordinate the targeting of partnership intelligence and 
enforcement resources and capability.  Such an approach resonates with the 
government’s Maritime Security Strategy, which notes that ‘in a climate of limited 
resources we must maximise the effect of our assets, focusing on integration and 
                                            
170 Ministry of Defence, Department for Transport, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, and Home Office 
(2014) The UK National Strategy for Maritime Security, Cm8829 HMSO available from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-strategy-for-maritime-security  (last accessed 
October 2018) 
171 See for example National Crime Agency (2018) National Strategic Assessment of Serious and 
Organised Crime 2018, available from http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/905-
national-strategic-assessment-for-soc-2018/file  (last accessed October 2018) 
172 Association of Chief Police Officers, Heritage and Cultural Property Crime National Strategic 
Assessment 2017, available from 
http://www.nationalruralcrimenetwork.net/content/uploads/2017/11/Heritage-and-Cultural-Property-
Crime-National-Strategic-Assessment-2017-FINAL.pdf (last accessed October 2018) 
173 Historic England (2017) Guidance for Sentences: Heritage Crime, available at 
https://historicengland.org.uk/images-books/publications/heritage-crime-guidance-
sentencers/heag054a-guidance-for-sentencers/ (last accessed October 2018) 
174  Heritage and Cultural Property Crime National Strategic Assessment 2017; and Historic England 
(2016) Heritage Crime: A Guide for Law Enforcement Officers, available from 
https://historicengland.org.uk/images-books/publications/heritage-crime-guide-for-law-enforcement-
officers/  (last accessed October 2018)   
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cooperation wherever possible’.175  The Strategy draws on two key principles, 
integration and collaboration as being instrumental in the success of enforcement 
measures offshore. An assessment of the potential contribution that could be made by 
agencies with offshore capabilities is set out in the following sections.  
 
4.2 Statutory Basis 
Of the agencies with particular enforcement powers, the Maritime Security Strategy 
identifies the police, Border Force, the National Crime Agency (NCA) and the Royal 
Navy.  For the purposes of this report, the NCA is not considered, because, as noted 
above, crimes against UHA are not part of its current strategic focus, beyond a 
tangential reference to metal theft.  Other bodies with a presence on the water, though, 
such as Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authorities, The Maritime and Coastguard 
Agency (MCA), the Marine Management Organisation (MMO) and the Ministry of 
Defence Police (MDP) are considered; along with the National Coastwatch (NCI) 
Institution, which although voluntary body with no statutory remit or enforcement 
powers or capability which may nonetheless facilitate more effective enforcement. 
 
 
4.2.1 - Police 
Structure Aims and Objectives 
 
The there is a geographical arrangement of police service provision in the UK.  In 
England, the focus of this report, there are 39 distinct forces, as illustrated in figure 1 
below.  Whereas 18 forces have a significant coastline,176 not all of them have a 
dedicated, specialist marine unit.  Currently ten of the coastal forces declare as having 
operational capabilities offshore, although some of these specialised teams are pooled 
between more than one constabulary, and the range of equipment and capability 
varies considerably between forces.177 The area-specific focus of the police means 
that each police force has its own senior management team, budgetary autonomy and 
operational priorities.  The operational aspect is, however, somewhat centralised and 
coordinated by the Home Office, so that there is a degree of homogeneity in the way 
forces approach their policing function.178  
 
In respect of this report, the police are probably the enforcement body whose role and 
function has traditionally been the most appreciated by Historic England, although 
more recently a developing relationship has emerged between Historic England and 
other agencies including the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and the Marine 
Management Organisation.  Outside of some broad consideration of their powers and 
                                            
175 The UK National Strategy for Maritime Security, paragraph 1.4 
176 The Gloucester and Metropolitan forces are limited to an estuarine presence.  
177 Northumbria, North Yorkshire, Humberside, Essex, Kent, Hampshire, Dorset and Devon and 
Cornwall, Merseyside and greater Manchester (specialist dive and marine unit) 
178 Jones, M and Stockdale, K, ‘The Police’, in Harding (et al) An Introduction to Criminal Justice, 
2017, Sage, London, p.210.   
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a more detailed consideration of the contemporary extension of the operation of those 
powers in recent legislation, this section does not provide exhaustive detail as to their 









Basic Enforcement Powers 
The police have a primary function to maintain law and order.  In order to facilitate this 
they are granted a number of powers, the majority of which are set out in statute. The 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Police Act 1996 are the principal 
regulatory mechanisms as to the police’s role and function. The specific detail of this 
                                            
179 Image courtesy of http://www.countrysidewatch.org.uk/policeforces.asp A higher resolution map is 
available from Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, 




legislation is vast and beyond the scope of this report,180 however, with the detail 
stripped away, the basic powers afforded to a police officer include:   
 the power to detain  
 the power to stop and search people/vehicles 
 various powers of entry  
 the power to seize and retain property  
 the power to arrest people with or without warrant for any offence  
 the power to direct the behaviour of persons and vehicles on highways and in 
other public places 
 
The police are the principal enforcement body for heritage offences, and a suite of 
offences that are not specifically heritage related, but may be aggravated by the fact 
that there is a lost or damaged heritage component to them.  In this respect significant 
and valuable work has been undertaken around the development of Guidance for 
Sentencers in heritage crime cases181 and there are a number of instances where 
there have been successfully integrated working arrangements between police 
investigators and Historic England.182 The majority of these arrangements have been 
in respect of terrestrially based initiatives, such as: unlawful metal-detecting (night-
hawking), metal theft, anti-social behaviour and vandalism at heritage sites and the 
like. 183  In response to the greater visibility of heritage crime as a result of these 
initiatives, the role of Heritage Crime Liaison Officer (HCLO) has been created for the 
various forces to coordinate effective responses to heritage crime. 
 
On the basis of interviews with stakeholders, including Historic England and a number 
of police services, the HCLO role appears to be somewhat inconsistent.  The issues 
identified by the research are considered in Chapters 5 and 6 of the report. Aside from 
a terrestrial setting, it is obviously a far more difficult enterprise for the HCLO to 
effectively police offshore as a result of the difficulties with access to potential crime 
scenes, evidence gathering and expertise in the nuances of the law that applies.  
Significantly, in the last year, the police have gained a suite of investigatory powers 
offshore to match those they have onshore.  This important contemporary 
development in the law is examined below.  
 
 
Maritime Enforcement Powers 
The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (PACA) has significantly re shaped the enforcement 
powers of the police insofar as they relate to maritime activities. The long title of the 
Act notes one of the purposes of PACA is to extend the powers of the police in relation 
to maritime enforcement.  Essentially, this means the augmentation of police powers 
to investigate offences committed on vessels operating at sea. The basic territorial 
                                            
180 Interested readers are directed to Rowe, W, Introduction to Policing (2nd. Ed), 2014, Sage London. 
181 See for example, Historic England (2017) Guidance for Sentencers: Heritage Crime, available at 
https://historicengland.org.uk/images-books/publications/heritage-crime-guidance-
sentencers/heag054a-guidance-for-sentencers/  (last accessed October 2018) 
182 See, for example,  in this respect the NPCC’s:  Heritage and Cultural Property Crime National 
Strategic Assessment,  2017; Heritage Crime, A Guide For Law Enforcement Officers 
183 Although as noted previously Operation Birdie is the name given to as national campaign to 
prevent and enforce crime in the maritime environment, leading to successful prosecutions. 
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extent of the powers is confined to 12nm, broadly mapping onto the definition of 
English inshore waters. 
 
Part 4 PACA grants the police so called “maritime enforcement powers” for the 
purposes of “preventing, detecting, investigating or prosecuting offences under the law 
of England and Wales” in a maritime context.184 This means that for certain, specified, 
categories of ship, enhanced powers are available to the police.  The ships are defined 
in the following categories: 
 
 a UK ship in territorial, foreign or international waters; 
 a foreign ship in England and Wales waters, and international waters; 
 a ship registered in a relevant territory;185 
 or a ship without nationality186 
 
While Part 4 PACA primarily applies to the police, s.84(3) extends the definition of law 
enforcement officers to include other officers (see for example the section on Border 
Force below). 
 
The maritime enforcement powers are elaborated in ss.88-90.  They include the 
powers to stop, board, divert and detain;187 the power to search for evidence and 
obtain information; 188  and the power of arrest and seizure.189  In each case the 
threshold necessary to trigger the use of the powers is that the law enforcement officer 
has reasonable grounds to suspect an offence is being or has been committed on a 
ship; that the ship was otherwise involved in the commission of a crime; or that there 
is evidence of the commission of an offence on a ship. In terms of a search, the officer 
may search the ship, persons on the ship and anything found on the ship – which may 
include the cargo.  
 
Limits are imposed on the exercise of the powers in s.85.  These primarily relate to 
issues of spatial and national jurisdiction and require the Secretary of State for the 
Home Office’s authorisation before the enforcement powers may be applied. The 
Secretary of State authorise in circumstances where they are contemplated as being 
used on: 
 
 UK ships in foreign waters -  authority may only be granted if the state (which 
includes ‘relevant territories’) where the enforcement would take place 
consents) 
 a foreign flagged vessel in UK waters - unless the flag state has asked the UK 
intervene, or has authorised the UK to Act, or that the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea permits an intervention  
 
Part 4 of the PACA applies primarily to England and Wales waters, but does enable 
to exercise of maritime enforcement powers following hot pursuit of vessels into 
Scottish waters 
                                            
184 Section 84(1) Policing and Crime Act 2017 
185 Defined in s.85(1) Policing and Crime Act 2017 
186 Defined in s.85(1) Policing and Crime Act 2017 
187 Section 88 Policing and Crime Act 2017 
188 Section 89 Policing and Crime Act 2017 
189 Section 90 Policing and Crime Act 2017 
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Table 1. below sets out the powers, their triggers and limitations. 
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Seizure: anything 
which appears to be 













Offences relating to UHA arising under the PWA and AMAA would clearly fall within 
the definition of an offence in England and Wales, enabling an enforcement response, 
as would the offences relating to marine licensing under MACCA.  As is discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6, offences related to the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (MSA) relating 
to reporting of wreck finds to the Receiver of Wreck would also be included.190 
                                            
190 Sections 236 and 245 Merchant Shipping Act 1995 
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Aside from the general application of the marine enforcement powers, s.93 creates 
offences should a person obstruct the police or fails to comply with a requirement in 
the performance of their functions under Part 4 PACA.  The offence provides for the 
power of arrest without warrant191, with the penalty on conviction being a Magistrate’s 
Court fine according to s93(4) PACA. 
 
4.2.2 - Border Force 
Structure Aims and Objectives 
Border Force (BF) has significant assets in the English inshore marine area and as 
such is an important focus for any consideration of cross-party collaboration and 
working in the inshore area. It was established in 2008 as part of the (now defunct) UK 
Border Agency, which was created by the merger of the Border and Immigration 
Agency with those parts of HM Revenue & Customs responsible for border security. 
In 2012, against a background of criticism of UKBA and the discovery that it had acted 
without ministerial authority, the Home Secretary removed BF from the UK Border 
Agency and transferred it to the Home Office.192 
 
This history of BF means that, unlike the other agencies, bodies and organisations 
studied for this report, BF has no statutory basis and no constituting legislation. Instead 
of a separate entity, BF is an integral part of the Home Office.193 Indeed, it is described 
by the government as “a law enforcement command within the Home Office”.194  This 
structural identity means that there is no enabling legislation setting up the BF and 
setting out its powers and responsibilities. Instead, powers are given directly to the 
members of staff of BF as immigration officials and/or customs officials under various 
enactments (considered below).  
Again, as it lacks enabling legislation, there are no statutory aims and/or objectives for 
BF. However, the Home Office has published “priorities” for BF, which are to:   
 deter and prevent individuals and goods that would harm the national interests 
from entering the UK; 
 facilitate the legitimate movement of individuals and trade to and from the UK; 
 protect and collect customs revenues for trade crossing the border; 
 provide excellent service to customers; and 
 provide demonstrable effectiveness, efficiency and value for money.195 
 
 
                                            
191 Section 93(3) Policing and Crime Act 2017 
192 National Audit Office, The Border Force: Securing the Border (The Stationery Office, 2013) - 
https://www.nao.org.uk/report/border-force-securing-uk-border/ (last accessed October 2018) 
193 See Home Affairs Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2012-13, The work of the Border Force, HC 
523, paragraph 2 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmhaff/523/52302.htm 
(last accessed October 2018) 




Protection of UHA does not fit into these priorities. Similarly, it does not fit within the 
remit of the responsibilities of the Home Office196 (which is no surprise given that 
heritage protection falls within the remit of the Department for Digital, Culture, Media 
and Sport), although it could be aligned with one of the published priorities for the 
Home Office, being to “cut crime”.197 
 
Enforcement Powers 
As noted BF itself has no powers or duties. Instead, the staff of BF (as immigration 
officials and/or customs officials) operate pursuant to powers granted by various 
enactments. These are outlined below, insofar as they are relevant to UHA. 
 
Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 
Under this Act (the BCIA) functions of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) 
that are exercisable in relation to “general customs matters” are deemed to be 
exercisable also by the Secretary of State.198  He or she may delegate such functions 
to immigration officers (or anyone else in BF or the Home Office) by designating such 
persons as general customs officials,199 who are then answerable in respect of such 
functions to the Secretary of State (and not HMRC).  
 
General customs matters are defined in the negative in the BCIA,200 but can be 
summarised as the non-revenue functions of HMRC. In the debate of the preceding 
Bill in the House of Lords, it was stated that the intention was for the customs role of 
immigration officers (then part of UK Border Agency, but now part of BF) to focus on 
“border-related matters, such as the importation and exportation of goods”.201  
Included in these non-revenue functions of HMRC are certain powers and 
responsibilities set out in the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (CEMA). Of 
particular interest in relation to UHA protection are the provisions of section 68(1) of 
the CEMA, which provides that:  
“If any goods are— 
(a) exported or shipped as stores; or 
(b) brought to any place in the United Kingdom for the purpose of being 
exported or shipped as stores, 
and the exportation or shipment is or would be contrary to any prohibition 
or restriction for the time being in force with respect to those goods under 
or by virtue of any enactment, the goods shall be liable to forfeiture and the 
exporter or intending exporter of the goods and any agent of his concerned in 
                                            
196 https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/home-office/about (last accessed October 2018) 
197 Ibid. 
198 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, section 1 
199 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, section 3(1) 
200 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, section 1(2) 




the exportation or shipment or intended exportation or shipment shall each be 
liable on summary conviction to a penalty of three times the value of the goods 
or level 3 on the standard scale, whichever is the greater.” (emphasis added) 
 
As well as the offence created by section 68(1) and set out above, section 68(2) of the 
CEMA provides that where a person is knowingly concerned in the export or shipment 
as stores of anything that would contravene section 68(1), then they are guilty of an 
offence which is subject to more severe penalties.  
General customs officials have all the powers of HMRC officials and so, in relation to 
the export provisions above, they have the power under section 163(1) of the 2009 
Act to stop and search any vessel where there are reasonable ground to suspect that 
it is or may be carrying any goods which are “in the course of being unlawfully removed 
from or to any place”,202 which would include being unlawfully exported.  
 
Application to UHA 
Putting together the pieces of legislation detailed above, if the export of material 
recovered from an underwater heritage asset such as a wreck would be prohibited, 
then the provisions of the BCIA and the CEMA mean that BF officials would be 
empowered to take action.  
The export of material recovered from a wreck in the English inshore area is prohibited 
in certain circumstances under both EU law and English law - as set out below. Before 
considering the relevant prohibitions, it must be noted that section 68(6) of the BCIA 
provides that there will be no offence committed under section 68(1) or (2) where the 
legislation prohibiting the export makes it an offence punishable by fine or other 
penalty. In other words, there is no double counting of offences and if something is 
punishable under the legislation that provides the prohibition, then there is no need to 
apply the BCIA. 
1. Council Regulation (EC) No 116/2009 on the export of cultural goods (the 
“Regulation”) 
The Regulation sets out limits on the export of certain “cultural goods” by requiring 
an export licence to be obtained prior to their export. Under Article 1, cultural goods 
are defined as those listed in Annex 1 of the Regulation.  This list includes 
“archaeological objects more than 100 years old which are the products of: - 
excavations on land or under water; - archaeological sites; - archaeological 
collections”. There is no financial threshold applicable to this category of cultural 
goods and so no minimum value below which the regulation ceases to apply. This 
means that any material recovered from a wreck or other UHA in English waters 
would be cultural goods under the Regulation, provided that the object is more than 
100 years old.  
                                            
202 Customs and Excise Management Act 1979, section 163(1)(b) 
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Under Article 2, the export of cultural goods outside of the EU requires an export 
licence (issued by the relevant member state). The relevant member state has 
authority to dispense with the requirement for a licence for archaeological objects 
that are of limited archaeological or scientific interest, are not a direct product of 
excavations, finds or archaeological sites within a member state, and whose 
presence on the market is lawful. However, as any material from UHA within 
English Inshore Marine Planning Area would be a direct product from a site within 
a member state, which would include territorial waters, this exception would not 
apply.  
The Regulation does not make it an offence to export cultural goods without an 
Export Licence, instead leaving it to the various Member States to lay down 
appropriate penalties for infringements of the provisions of the Regulation.203 As 
such, section 68(6) BCIA will not apply and the export outside of the EU of relevant 
cultural goods without an Export Licence will be an offence under section 68(1) or 
(2) of the BCIA.  
 
2. The Export of Objects of Cultural Interest (Control) Order 2003 (the 
“Order”) 
Under English law, export licences are also required for the export of certain 
cultural goods. The Order requires any object of cultural interest that is over 50 
years old to have an Export Licence for export to any country (including any EU 
country).  
There is an Open General Export Licence which permits export without licence for 
certain objects below certain thresholds, but the threshold for archaeological 
material found in UK soil or UK territorial waters is zero and so any archaeological 
material of more than 50 years age going for export anywhere, will require an 
Export Licence (from the Arts Council England).204 
The Order creates several offences (such as breaching the terms of an Export 
Licence or giving misleading or incorrect information when applying for a licence), 
but it does not make exporting relevant cultural goods without an Export Licence 
an offence. Therefore, again, section 68(6) of the BCIA is not triggered and so the 
export of cultural goods without an Export Licence in contravention of the Order 
will be an offence under section 68(1) or (2) of the BCIA.  
The combined effect of the Regulation and the Order is that any material recovered 
from an UHA in English Inshore Marine Planning Area that is more than 50 years old 
cannot be exported to anywhere outside of the UK without an Export Licence. 
Furthermore, for objects more than 100 years old being exported outside of the EU, a 
European Export Licence will also be required before export is permitted. Thus the 
                                            
203 Council Regulation (EC) No 116/2009 on the export of cultural goods, Article 9. 
204 See http://www.artscouncil.org.uk/sites/default/files/download-
file/Guidance_for_exporters_2015_issue_3.pdf (last accessed October 2018).  
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export or attempted export of any such material without the necessary licence(s) will 
be a breach of section 68(1) (and potentially section 68(2)) of the BCIA).  
As stated above, Export Licences are issued by the Arts Council for England on behalf 
of the Secretary of State. BF is responsible (under the BCIA and the Partnership 
Agreement between HMRC and the Home Office relating to the operation of customs 
controls by BF)205 for the enforcement of export controls.  
BF therefore already has a role that permits some involvement in the protection of 
UHA. However, this role is extremely limited. The export restrictions set out above will 
only be of assistance in the protection of UHA when material is removed from wrecks 
(or other UHA) and exported to another country without an appropriate Export Licence. 
Removing the material itself is not an offence under any of the legislation set out above 
and neither is exporting it with the correct licence in place. Therefore the legislation is 
only likely to be of assistance with regard to the protection of UHA where BF becomes 
aware that material taken from UHA is being exported without a licence or being 
prepared for such exportation. Simply finding material taken from UHA on a vessel is 
unlikely to be sufficient evidence of an intention to export the material without the 
required licence(s).  
Furthermore, and as noted above, removing the material itself is not an offence under 
any of the legislation set out above. Therefore any involvement of BF could only come 
at some point after the removal, at which point any damage to the UHA and the 
surrounding site will already have been done. In addition, any deterrent effect provided 
by BF’s involvement would be to deter the export of material without an appropriate 
Export Licence and not to deter the act of taking the material from the UHA site. Thus 
the protection afforded to UHA sites by this involvement of BF is arguably limited.  
 
Potential for Collaboration on Enforcement of UHA Protection 
At present, the only direct statutory powers that BF has that could be of assistance to 
Historic England in the enforcement of protections for UHA are under the BCIA, as set 
out above.  
However, its status as an integral part of the Home Office and its lack of enabling 
legislation mean that BF is not limited by statute with regard to the purpose for which 
it can use its assets. This explains the current assistance provided by BF to the 
Receiver of Wreck with regard to potentially illegal salvage activity taking place in 
English waters as discussed above.  
The willingness to assist other government bodies and agencies shown by Border 
Force suggests that they may be amenable to an approach for assistance with 
enforcement of UHA protections. Indeed, such assistance would be in line with the 
commitment in the UK National Strategy for Maritime Security that the government 
“…will build the evidence base for greater flexibility, interoperability, cost-effectiveness 
and coherence in relation to maritime security. This will include identification of new or 
                                            
205 See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/partnership-agreement-between-hmrc-and-
border-force ( last accessed October 2018) 
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shared capability requirements and investigation of the feasibility and benefit of 
delivering common systems, equipment and platforms”.206 
 
The Powers of Border Force Officials  
The assistance that BF officials would be able to offer in relation to the protection of 
UHA will depend upon their powers in relation to any vessels they come across. Simple 
monitoring of UHA sites considered at risk and persons of interest to Historic England 
would provide a certain level of deterrence (as official presence is likely to provide 
some discouragement of illegal activity).207 Nonetheless, to have a significant effect, 
both in terms of enforcement and deterrent, BF officials would need suitable powers 
to stop, board and search vessels of interest.  However, the powers of BF officials are 
determined by the nature of legal protection that any particular underwater heritage 
asset benefits from.  
The UK Marine Policy Statement208 (adopted under MACAA section 44) provides a 
certain level of protection for all UHA regardless of any designation under any of the 
protective Acts or otherwise. As explained earlier in this Report, it do so by obliging 
“all public authorities taking authorisation or enforcement decisions that affect or might 
affect the UK marine area” to take due consideration of all heritage assets and noting 
that “[t]he absence of designation for such assets does not necessarily indicate lower 
significance and the marine plan authority should consider them subject to the same 
policy principles as designated heritage assets”.209 However, while public authorities 
(such as BF and Historic England) are obliged to consider all heritage assets, the 
powers that BF officials have in relation to the protection of UHA will greatly depend 
upon whether such UHA benefit from the protection of one or more of PWA, AMAAA, 
PMRA and MACAA.  
 
Marine Enforcement Powers 
The PACA, s.84(1) sets out additional powers.  It provides that a “law enforcement 
officer” may, exercise any of the “maritime enforcement powers” set out in the PACA 
in relation to vessels in English and Welsh territorial waters.210 Taking each of the 
noted terms in turn;  
 “Law enforcement officer” includes any designated customs official under Part 
1 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009.211  
                                            
206 UK National Strategy for Maritime Security (2014), p 41   
207 Russell G Smith and Katherine Anderson, ‘Understanding Non-compliance in the Marine 
Environment’ No. 275 in Trends and Issues in crime and criminal justice series, Australian Institute of 
Criminology (2004), 3 and 4 
208Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, UK Marine Policy Statement (30 September 
2011)   https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-marine-policy-statement (last accessed 
October 2018) 
209 Ibid., 4 and 22 
210 To be done for the purpose of preventing, detecting, investigating or prosecuting an offence under 
the law of England and Wales.  It is also possible, although not relevant in the context of this project, 
to apply to  some vessels in international waters (which includes within the UK’s Exclusive Economic 
Zone). 
211 Policing and Crime Act 2017, section 84(3) 
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 “Maritime enforcement powers” are set out at section 84(1) of the PACA and 
consist of the following:  
o The power to stop, board, divert and detain a vessel.212 
o The power to search a vessel and anyone or anything on that vessel and 
obtain information.213 
o Powers of arrest and seizure.214 
 
Therefore, BF customs officials have wide-ranging powers to stop and board vessels 
that they suspect may be involved in the commission of an offence under English law. 
This would include offences under s.1(3) of PWA  offences under s.2(1)  AMAAA , 
s.2(1)  PMRA and s.85 MACAA.  
In addition, offences under the MSA relating to reporting of wreck finds to the Receiver 
of Wreck would also be included. These include offences under sections 236, and 245 
of the MSA. However, finders of wreck have up to 28 days to report their finds to the 
Receiver of Wreck, which then would necessitate satisfying an evidential burden such 
that the powers would not be used.   
 
Limits on the Marine Enforcement Powers 
Unless BF officials are able to satisfy themselves that they need to use the marine 
enforcement powers, they will be limited to monitoring sites and vessels. This means 
that for undesignated UHA there would be a requirement that activity either was in 
breach of an existing marine licence or is being carried on without a marine licence.  
The use of any of the maritime enforcement powers in relation to a foreign vessel (or 
any vessel of the Isle of Man, the Channel Islands or any British overseas territory) in 
English and Welsh territorial waters requires the prior authorisation of the Secretary of 
State.215 This authorisation can only be given where the foreign state has either 
requested or consented to the involvement of the UK authorities or where UNCLOS 
provides authorisation to UK officials to exercise the relevant powers.216 This 
requirement will limit the effectiveness of BoF officials, particularly in relation to foreign 







                                            
212 Policing and Crime Act 2017, section 88 
213 Policing and Crime Act 2017, section 89 
214 Policing and Crime Act 2017, section 90 
215 Policing and Crime Act 2017, section 85(3) 
216 Policing and Crime Act 2017, section 85(4) 
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4.2.3 - Inshore Fisheries Conservation Authorities  
Structure, Aims and Objectives 
The ten regional Inshore Fisheries Conservation Authorities (IFCAs) cover the whole 
of the English coastline (see figure 1), established under the MACAA) In addition, the 
ten regional IFCAs have established a separate body known as the Association of 
Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authorities (AIFCA), which represents the 
majority of the IFCAs’ joint interests at a national level.  
 
 
Figure 1: Map of IFCA districts217 
Structure: Statutory Framework 
The Secretary of State (Defra) established the new Inshore Fisheries and 
Conservation districts (IFC districts),218 each by separate Order in 2010.219 The 
districts extend from coastal baselines out to six nautical miles (unless limited by non-
English waters). For each of these districts, section 150 MACAA provides for the 
establishment of an IFCA. The statutory duty of each IFCA is to “manage the 
                                            
217 Association of IFCAs, ‘The Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authorities 2011-2015: 
Achievements and success in delivering fisheries and conservation management’ 
(http://www.association-ifca.org.uk/Upload/Reports/The%20IFCAs%202011-
2015%20Achievements%20and%20Success%20Report.pdf  last accessed October 2018) 
218 Established pursuant to powers in s. 149 MACAA 
219 The Cornwall Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Order 2010, the Eastern Inshore Fisheries and 
Conservation Order 2010, etc.  
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exploitation of sea fisheries resources” within its district.220 In its performance of that 
statutory duty, each IFCA must (inter alia) “seek to balance the social and economic 
benefits of exploiting the sea fisheries resources of the district with the need to protect 
the marine environment from, or promote its recovery from, the effects of such 
exploitation”.221 The phrase “marine environment” is defined in MACAA as including 
“features of archaeological or historic interest in marine or coastal areas” and therefore 
includes all UHA, whether protected by any of the relevant Acts or not.222  
The IFCAs therefore have a duty to consider the need to protect UHA, albeit that the 
duty is limited in two ways. Firstly, the IFCAs remit only extends to six nautical miles 
and so it does not cover a significant amount of the English territorial waters. Secondly, 
the duty is to consider the need to protect UHA from the effects of exploitation of sea 
fisheries resources within the relevant district, in other words, a duty limited to 
considering the effects of fishing activities on UHA.   
Each IFCA is run by a committee comprised of members of the local councils within 
the district, representatives from the Environment Agency, Natural England and the 
Marine Management Organisation (MMO), and persons appointed by the MMO. To be 
appointed by the MMO, a person must either be “acquainted with the needs and 
opinions of the fishing community of the district”, or have “knowledge of, or expertise 
in, marine environmental matters”, which includes UHA.223 At the time of writing this 
report, from the information publicly available from each of the IFCAs, it appears that 
only two (Devon and Severn and Sussex) have a member connected to UHA in some 
way.  
 
Aims & Objectives: Vision, Success Criteria and High-Level Objectives  
The vision for the new IFCAs was set by DEFRA, in conjunction with the previous Sea 
Fisheries Committees, prior to the establishment of the new IFCAs.224 Subsequently, 
five high-level objectives have been identified for the IFCAs,225 with success criteria 
identified for each objective. It is then up to the individual IFCAs to set their own 
working-level objectives in order to achieve these success criteria (they are set in each 
IFCA’s Annual Plan and then progress is reported in the corresponding Annual Report 
for the relevant year). The relationship and content of these criteria and objectives is 
shown at fig. 2.  
                                            
220 Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, s.153(1) 
221 Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, s.153(2)(b) 
222 Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, section 186(1) 
223 Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, section 151(2) 
224 Lowther J and Rodwell, LD, ‘IFCAs: Stakeholder Perceptions of roles, and Legal Impact’  
Environmental Law Review 115 (2013) pp11-26 
225 There had been seven higher level objectives, but this was reduced to five in a review of the 
objectives in 2015 in order to bring them into line with the UK Marine Policy Statement ,see AIFCA 
Annual Plan 2016/17 - http://www.association-ifca.org.uk/Upload/Reports/A-





Figure 2: Relationship of IFCA Vision, Objectives and Success Criteria226  
 
Success Criterion 1 is that “IFCAs are recognised and heard, balancing the economic 
needs of the fishery whilst working in partnership and engaging with stakeholders”. 
One of the actions the AIFCA has identified to achieve this success criterion is to 
“engage with NGOs and other interest groups to promote the IFCA role and seek 
common visions and ways of working together”.227 Similarly, the individual IFCAs all 
refer to collaborative working in satisfaction of this criterion. For example, the Annual 
Report of the Kent & Essex IFCA 2016-17 includes as an action “work through the 
National Inshore Marine Enforcement Group (NIMEG) to coordinate IFCA and partner 
organisation compliance activities”.228 While the Annual Plan for the Devon & Severn 
IFCA for 2017-18 notes that “[a] joint national intelligence programme is being rolled 
out between the MMO and the IFCAs during the next twelve months to enable better 
                                            
226 Vision statement, high-level objectives and success criteria all set out in the AIFCA’s Annual Plan 
2016/17 http://www.association-ifca.org.uk/Upload/Reports/A-IFCA%20Annual%20Plan%202016-
17%20v3.pdf (last accessed October 2018) 
227 AIFAC Annual Plan 2016/17 , 8 
228 Kent & Essex IFCA, Annual Report 2016-17 (15 September 2017), 10 https://www.kentandessex-
ifca.gov.uk/about-us/corporate-publications/annual-report/ (last accessed October 2018) 
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and safer sharing of intelligence between not only the two fisheries organisations but 
also other marine based partner organisations”.229  
This collaboration is rooted in the statutory duty placed on the IFCAs to “take such 
steps as [they consider] appropriate to co-operate with—… (c) any other public 
authority that exercises functions relating to— (i) the regulation of activities carried on 
in any part of the sea lying within that district, or (ii) enforcement in that part of the 
sea.”230 As the public bodies responsible for the management and enforcement of 
protections for UHA, both Historic England and other public bodies involved in joint 
working with it would fall within this section. This statutory duty to cooperate will not of 
course, of itself, oblige the IFCAs to take part in any form of joint-working between the 
themselves and Historic England on the enforcement of UHA protections. However, it 
provides a background requirement for cooperation and collaboration for each of the 
IFCAs. DEFRA’s initial guidance to the new IFCAs was for each IFCA to develop MOU 
with certain key partner organisations. As well as formal agreements recorded in 
Memoranda of Understanding, IFCAs work on a local level with a wide variety of 
partner bodies/agencies including, and as relevant to this project, the Police, HM 
Revenue and Customs and  BF.231 
 
IFCA Statutory powers 
Each IFCA is empowered by section 165 MACAA to appoint Inshore Fisheries and 
Conservation Officers (IFCOs) to undertake the IFCA’s management and enforcement 
activities.  Their powers are considered below.  
In addition to the powers granted to IFCOs, the IFCA itself is granted various powers 
relating to collaborative working. Of possible relevance to the protection of UHA is the 
power granted by s.173(1) MACAA to “enter into arrangements with another person 
or body for the provision by the [IFCA] of services that are required by the person or 
body in connection with the exercise of the person’s or body’s functions”. The section 
goes on to state that this power “includes” a power to enter into various arrangements 
in respect of shellfish fisheries created under the Sea Fisheries (Shellfish) Act 1967.232 
This qualification seems to suggest that the power might have been envisaged as a 
way for IFCAs to provide help to other parties in respect of fisheries, yet the wording 
“includes” means that other arrangements are not precluded. Indeed, the Annual 
                                            
229 Devon & Severn IFCA, Annual Plan 2017-18 (2 November 2017), 12 
(http://www.devonandsevernifca.gov.uk/4a-role-function-and-management-of-the-authority- ( last 
accessed October 2018) 
230 Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, section 174 
231 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Inshore Fisheries and Conservation 
Authorities: Conduct and Operation 2010-2014 (2015) – Report presented to parliament pursuant to 
s183(1) MACAA 2009, 17 http://www.association-ifca.org.uk/about-us/ifcas-conduct-and-operations-
2010-2014 ( last accessed October 2018) 
232 Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, section 173(2) 
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Reports produced by each IFCA provide many examples of this power being used 
(see discussion below). 
It should therefore be possible for an IFCA to use its power under s.173(1) to enter 
into an arrangement with Historic England and other public bodies regarding the 
enforcement of UHA obligations. It is important to note at this stage that s.173(3) 
provides that the terms of any arrangements made with other parties “may” include 
provision for payment for services by the party requesting the assistance of an IFCA. 
It is therefore possible that any such arrangement would involve a budget commitment 
on the part of Historic England, although it is arguable that the ability to charge for 
services provided in s.173(3) is more likely to be aimed at non-publicly funded parties 
requesting the assistance of an IFCA (such as the private owners of regulated 
shellfisheries  
 
IFCO Statutory Powers 
 As with any other parties active in the marine area, the benefit, in terms of the 
protection given to UHA, of any formal or informal arrangement with an IFCA will 
depend upon what powers the IFCA’s staff have in relation to third parties.  
MACAA grants fairly wide enforcement powers to IFCOs, but there are several limits 
on the use of these powers which may present obstacles to any arrangement between 
Historic England and any IFCA in respect of the protection of UHA. IFCOs have the 
following “common enforcement powers”;233  
1. Power to stop, board and inspect vessels and marine installations.234 
2. Power to enter and inspect premises235 or vehicles.236 
3. Powers of search and examination of persons, vessels, marine installation, 
premises and vehicles.237 
4. Powers of seizure.238 
5. Power to record evidence of offences by using any device for the purpose of 
taking visual images of anything in, on, attached to, forming part of, or controlled 
from (inter alia) any vessel or marine installation.239 
6. Power to direct a vessel or marine installation to port where it is not reasonably 





                                            
233 Granted by Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, section 166 
234 Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, section 246 
235 Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, section 247 
236 Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, section 248 
237 Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, section 250 
238 Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, sections 252 and 253 
239 Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, section 255 
240 Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, section 259 
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Limits on Powers of IFCOs 
The above wide-ranging enforcement powers are limited in several key respects. 
Firstly, they are granted only for the purpose of enforcing the obligations set out at 
s.166(1)  MACAA. These include varies fisheries obligations, such as IFCA byelaws, 
MCZ designations etc., but are not wide enough to include any obligations under any 
of the UHA Acts, nor the marine licensing provisions of MACAA. The Secretary of 
State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs has the power, by order, to amend 
section 166(1). This power would enable the Secretary of State to add the obligations 
under the UHA Acts and the marine licensing provisions of MACAA to the list of 
obligations the enforcement of which IFCOs can use the common enforcement powers 
set out above for. However, it is by no means certain that the Secretary of State would 
be willing to make such an order. Aside from the general restrictions of time (and 
possibly budget), UHA protection is within the remit of the DCMS and not DEFRA and 
so may be considered a low priority for the Secretary of State for the Environment, 
Food and Rural affairs.  
The other key limitation relevant to UHA protection in English territorial waters is that 
the powers granted to IFCOs can only be exercised in certain areas. An IFCO may 
only exercise any powers granted by MACAA: 241 
1. Within the IFC district for which the IFCO has been appointed or in any adjoining 
district. 
2. In any UK waters (apart from Scottish and Northern Irish), but only in relation 
to an offence committed (or which the IFCO reasonably believes has been 
committed) within the IFC district for which the IFCO has been appointed.  
 
Given that the remit of the IFCAs only extends to six nautical miles from coastal 
baselines (and not the full twelve nautical miles of the territorial waters), the limitations 
set out above mean that in practical terms, the powers granted to IFCOs are only of 
use in the near half of English Inshore Marine Planning Area. This means that they 
would be unable to be of much assistance in relation to any UHA between six and 
twelve nautical miles from coastal baselines.   
 
Cooperative and Collaborative Working 
As explained above, IFCAs place considerable importance on collaboration. Their set 
up involves collaboration between statutory bodies such as local councils, the MMO, 
Natural England and the Environment Agency, and those involved in fishing activities. 
This was summed-up in DEFRA’s 2015 report to Parliament on the first four years of 
IFCA operation:242 
                                            
241 Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, section 166(4) 
242 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Inshore Fisheries and Conservation 
Authorities: Conduct and Operation 2010-2014 (2015) – Report presented to parliament pursuant to 
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IFCAs are local authorities for clearly defined Districts, yet they deliver 
local, national and international obligations. Joint working with other 
agencies at local and national level is essential…  All public bodies 
should make optimal, co-ordinated use of the assets and resources 
available to them, minimising the overall burden on taxpayers at 
national and local level. Joint use of resources between IFCAs and 
other agencies particularly the use of patrol vessels, is an 
established, albeit local, practice. Cross-warranting exists between 
some IFCAs and other agencies and might usefully be rolled-out 
elsewhere. The IFCAs own Category 2 and Category 3 seagoing vessels 
capable of ranges out to sea up to 60 nautical miles. IFCAs already co-
operate with neighbouring Authorities, EA, MMO, HM Revenue & 
Customs, Police, Environmental Health and Border Force personnel. 
Further opportunities should be explored and developed. (emphasis 
added) 
This passage shows the acceptance of (and indeed promotion of) cooperation and 
collaboration with a wide range of public bodies, not limited to those within the remit of 
DEFRA. More recently, in the position paper published by the AIFCA following the 
Brexit referendum, the IFCAs repeated their willingness to work with other bodies and 
agencies:  
 “IFCAs have demonstrated that effective partnerships and collaboration can be 
developed with statutory partners, NGO’s, academia and the fishing industry. 
Opportunities exist for the IFCAs as inshore managers to develop and expand 
these partnerships, playing a greater role in coordinating statutory enforcement, 
management research and monitoring duties in inshore waters, which could 
avoid unnecessary duplication of effort and prove considerably more cost-
effective than existing practices.”243 
 
Current Collaborative Working 
Working in partnership with other bodies is a success criterion that each IFCA is 
required to plan for in its Annual Plan and report on in its Annual Report (see above 
for further details). Therefore it is not surprising to find many examples of the IFCAs 
working collaboratively. Indeed, the Southern IFCA and Sussex IFCA, for example, 
both host pages on their websites dedicated to working in partnership.244 
                                            
s183(1) MACAA 2009 http://www.association-ifca.org.uk/about-us/ifcas-conduct-and-operations-
2010-2014  (last accessed 1/12/2017) 
 
243 Association of IFCAs, ‘Opportunities for Inshore Fisheries Management and Marine Environment: 
Future Management in England’ (Post Brexit Referendum position paper) (7 March 2017) 
http://www.association-ifca.org.uk/Upload/IFCA%20future-management-Final%20.pdf – accessed 
8/12/2007 
244 http://www.southern-ifca.gov.uk/partnership-working (last accessed October 2018) and 
http://www.sussex-ifca.gov.uk/partnerships (last accessed October 2018) 
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All IFCAs work, to a greater or lesser extent, in cooperation with the MMO and the 
Environment Agency. As well as their close relationships with the MMO and the 
Environment Agency, the IFCAs all cooperate and collaborate with other bodies and 
agencies that are relevant to their district.  
 
Potential for Future Collaborative Working in connection with UHA 
The IFCAs are prime candidates for joint working with Historic England in relation to 
UHA. Although protection of UHA is not within the direct remit of the IFCAs to manage 
the coastal fisheries resources of England, it fits fairly happily245 into the wider remit of 
conserving the marine environment, which includes the historic and archaeological 
marine environment.  
 
 
Alongside the level of formality of joint working, the level of assistance available needs 
to be considered. As noted above, without an Order from the Secretary of State, IFCOs 
cannot use their common enforcement powers in relation to enforcing UHA obligations 
under the various Acts, nor can they enforce any obligations under the MSA. Certain 
IFCOs are cross-warranted by the MMO (under s.235(1) of MACAA) for certain 
purposes and so may be able to use the common enforcement powers to enforce 
obligations relating to marine licensing in MACAA, but this will need to be checked on 
an IFCO by IFCO basis. Subject to any relevant MMO cross warrant, IFCOs will 
therefore be limited to observing sites and vessels and taking photographs from a 
distance.  
However, the effectiveness of such non-intervening enforcement assistance should 
not be downplayed. As well as providing a deterrent effect simply by being present in 
a particular area, IFCOs should be able to gather important intelligence which can be 
provided to the police. The police enforcement responsibility is reactive: UHA is not a 
priority thus increased intelligence would justify their involvement – as perhaps with all 
such additional agency involvement. The opportunities for joint working are set out in 











                                            
245 The qualification being that the IFCAs’ remit is to protect the marine environment from the effects 
of fishing activities and so it could be argued that many of the activities that put UHA at risk (such as 












Agreement or other 
formal arrangement 
(Authorised by s173 
MACAA) 
IFCA and Historic 
England  
A formal arrangement with either the 
AIFCA (on behalf of each of the 10 
IFCAs) or with one particular IFCA 
detailing the services the IFCAs are 
willing/able to provide to HE and any 
obligations/responsibilities on the part 
of HE.   
As the agency primarily responsible for 
enforcement of UHA obligations, it may 
be deemed appropriate to include the 
police in any formal arrangements with 
one or more IFCAs.  
MoUs are not agreements with legal 
force, but instead are statements of 
intent to work collaboratively. They are 
subject to agreement by the members 
of the IFCA Committee before they can 
be signed by the IFCA Chair and/or 
CEO.  
MoUs can be supplemented with ad 
hoc arrangements between HE and 
particular IFCAs in relation to particular 




authorised by s174 
MACAA) 
As above Ideal for particular sites of concern or 
areas in which vessels of concern are 
known to operate. Ad hoc approaches 
can be made to the relevant IFCA for 
assistance in monitoring such sites and 
areas during the course of the IFCA’s 
own patrols.  
This could be backed up with a formal 
or informal agreement to share 
information on upcoming tasking on an 
agreed periodical basis (e.g. weekly or 
monthly) in order to enable HE to 
identify any areas likely to be of 









4.2.4 - The Marine Management Organisation  
 
Structure, Aims and Objectives 
The MMO was established under the MACAA.  As a non-departmental public body, it 
works at arm’s length from Government, but remains accountable to Ministers. The 
DEFRA is the main sponsor of the MMO and provides its Grant in Aid funding (see 
below),  
As the Government’s principal regulator in the UK Marine Area, the MMO is 
responsible for a wide range of matters relating to activities in the UK Marine Area. 
These include “planning and licensing for marine construction, deposits and dredging 
that may have an environmental, economic or social impact” and “producing marine 
plans to include all marine activities, including those [it doesn’t] directly regulate”.246  
The MMO is the principal regulator in UK waters and “is tasked with delivering the 
Government’s vision for clean, healthy, safe, productive and biologically diverse 
oceans and seas”.247  
Its statutory duty (under section 2, MACAA) is to exercise its functions so as to 
manage, regulate or control the activities carried on in UK waters “with the objective 
of making a contribution to the achievement of sustainable development”248 and taking 
into account all matters the MMO may consider appropriate, including evidence 
“relating to the social, economic or environmental elements of sustainable 
development”.249 The UKMPS confirms that the historic environment (the policy term 
for UHA) is one of a number of elements that may have social, economic and/or 
environmental implications that a marine plan will need to consider (see below for 
further consideration of the UKMPS).250  
As well as its statutory duties, the MMO is subject to a framework of governance 
documents, policies and plans. This framework is shown at figure 1. Each of the levels 
provides governance objectives and responsibilities for the MMO. The overarching 
statutory duty of the MMO under MACAA has been considered above.  
 
Statutory Directions and Guidance 
Under s.2(4)  MACAA, the Secretary of State shall give guidance to the MMO as to 
how it should “seek to secure that the contribution to the achievement of sustainable 
development... is made”. Furthermore, under sections 37 and 38 MACAA, the 
Secretary of State may give directions or guidance to the MMO on any other matter 
relating to its functions. As suggested by their titles, directions require compliance on 
                                            
246 https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/marine-management-organisation/about  (last 
accessed October 2018) 
247 Ibid., 8 
248 MACAA, section 2(1)(a) 
249 MACAA, section 2(3)(b) 
250 HM Government, Northern Ireland Executive, Scottish Government and Welsh Assembly 
Government, UK Marine Policy Statement (2011) https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-
marine-policy-statement (last accessed October 2018) 
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the part of the MMO, while guidance must be given regard by the MMO in carrying out 
its functions.  
Draft guidance with regard to the MMO’s contribution to sustainable development, as 
required by s.2(4)  MACAA, was published by DEFRA in 2010.251 As at the time of 
writing, no final guidance has been published by DEFRA or the MMO. The guidance 
is based around the five principles of sustainable development set out in the 
Government’s Sustainable Development Strategy252 and labelled, for the marine area, 
as the ‘high level marine objectives’.253 These include “ensuring a strong, healthy and 
just society”. In addition to the high level marine objectives, the draft guidance lists a 
set of additional principles that the MMO should have regard to when exercising its 
functions. Included in this list is “participative working”, requiring the MMO to 
“collaborate effectively with... Government, other authorities and regulators, and other 
stakeholders”.254 
Elaborating on the requirement for “participative working”, the draft guidance requires 
the MMO to “work closely with a range of other organisations, not only to achieve its 
own outcomes but to assist others to achieve theirs and together to contribute to the 
achievement of sustainable development”.255 Included in the list of organisations to 
which this requirement applies is Historic England (then English Heritage).  
The draft guidance is therefore broadly supportive of a collaboration with the MMO in 
respect of increasing the protection for UHA in English territorial waters.  
                                            
251 DEFRA, Draft statutory guidance to the Marine Management Organisation on its contribution to the 
achievement of sustainable development (March 2010) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/243567/978010850903
2.pdf (last accessed October 2018) 
252 HM Government, Securing the Future: The UK Government Sustainable Development Strategy 
(March 2005) 
253 Draft Statutory Guidance (n251), 3 
254 Ibid., 7 




Figure 3: Governance Structure of the MMO  
 
 
The UKMPS and other national policy statements 
The UKMPS provides a policy context for the MMO in its task of preparing its marine 
plans. In addition, it provides a framework for all public authorities that take decisions 
that could affect the marine environment. With regard to the latter, MACAA makes it a 
statutory duty on the part of all such public authorities to consider the UKMPS and any 
relevant marine plan when taking any decision that might affect the marine 
environment, including any authorisation or enforcement decisions.256 The MMO, 
                                            
256 MACAA, section 58 
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Historic England and most other potential parties to joint working are public authorities 
under MACAA and are thus obliged to consider the UKMPS (and give reasons should 
they choose to depart from its guidance) when making decisions that may affect the 
marine environment.  
As noted above, within the UKMPS, the historic environment is listed as one of the 
elements that may need to be considered by public authorities. In relation to the 
MMO’s role, the MPS specifically provides that the MMO must take into account the 
“significance of any identified heritage assets (or the potential for such assets to be 
discovered),257 and consider how they are managed.”258 Indeed, the UKMPS requires 
a presumption in favour of the conservation of designated UHA,259 as well as a 
recognition by all public authorities that the absence of a designation for any UHA 
“does not necessarily indicate lower significance” than designated assets.260 With 
regard to undesignated UHA, the MMO is required to “consider them subject to the 
same policy principles” as designated UHA, subject to advice from any relevant 
regulator and/or advisor (which would include Historic England).261 
As well as the UKMPS, the MMO must align its activities with National Policy 
Statements for matters such as ports, energy, renewable energy, gas and oil supply 
and nuclear power. These have not been reviewed, but are not anticipated to contain 
any matters relevant to collaboration with the MMO in respect of the protection of UHA.  
 
 
Memoranda of Understanding, Service Level Agreements, etc. 
The MMO has relationships with a wide variety of Government departments, many of 
the relationships being defined by a MOU.  
A MOU between the MMO and Historic England (then English Heritage) was signed 
in 2010. Under it the parties agreed “a coordinated approach to sustainable 
development and sustainable heritage in our seas and oceans, based on active 
engagement, shared information and effective marine planning and management by 
the MMO and [Historic England]”.262 Although this document was entered into in 
connection with Historic England’s role as a statutory consultee in respect of the 
historic environment, the MOU states that “[t]he MMO and [Historic England] will 
explore further opportunities to expand shared working and reduce duplication of 
effort. This aspect will be enhanced by exchanging information, collaborating on 
research, data and evidence gathering at national and local levels, sharing 
environmental issues and intelligence and pooling expertise and resources.”263 
                                            
257 The existence and/or location of many heritage assets are often unknown prior to investigation 
preceding development as part of an archaeological assessment. 
258 UKMPS, paragraph 2.6.6.6 
259 Ibid., paragraph 2.6.6.8 
260 Ibid., 2.6.6.5 
261 Ibid. 
262 Memorandum of Understanding, Marine Management Organisation (1) English Heritage (2), 2010, 
paragraph 1) 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140305092758/http://www.marinemanagement.org.uk/ab
out/mous.htm (last accessed October 2018) 
263 Ibid., paragraph 4.3 
59 
 
Furthermore, both parties committed to twice yearly meetings “to review the shared 
wider strategic context of the environment in which they operate and actively explore 
opportunities for the improvement of joint working practices”.264 
The MOU therefore requires both the MMO and Historic England to consider how they 
could avoid duplication by adopting joint working practices. Set against this backdrop, 




Possibilities for Joint Working between Historic England and the MMO  
Although the MMO itself has no marine assets, it contracts with the Ministry of Defence 
for the services of the Fisheries Protection Squadron of the Royal Navy (RNFPS) for 
a certain number of days per year in order to carry out patrolling and enforcement in 
UK waters. The main possibility for collaboration and joint working with the MMO is 
therefore in respect of the RNFPS.  
There is no provision in MACAA enabling the MMO to take on the functions of another 
body (unlike in relation to the IFCAs, which are enabled by s.173 MACAA to enter into 
such arrangements). However, there is also no provision in MACAA preventing the 
MMO from collaborating with other public bodies in respect of activities in UK waters. 
Indeed, the MMO is required by the various parts of its governance framework to 
actively consider opportunities for such collaboration, as discussed above. As such, 
the MMO would be permitted under its statutory and governance framework to 
collaborate with Historic England by authorising the RNFPS to monitor sites and 
vessels of interest during its patrols and other activities for the MMO.  
One of the synergies of the work of the MMO and Historic England’s attempts to 
increase protection for UHA is the intersection of UHA and Marine Conservation Zones 
(MCZs). A recent study, also carried out for Historic England, considered in detail how 
UHA and activities in connection with them can impact upon MCZs and the features 
for which such areas are designated.265 This study noted that while many historic 
environment activities are non-intrusive and generally temporary and of short 
duration,266 certain activities in respect of the historic environment pose a ‘significant’ 
risk to the favourable condition status of MCZs that such historic environment features 
are located within.267 In such instances, greater protection of UHA could therefore also 
achieve greater protection of any MCZ that such UHA intersects with. 
 
 
The powers exercisable by the RNFPS  
As noted in the section of this Report on the Royal Navy, the officers of the RNFPS 
have certain marine enforcement powers mainly as a result of their role as Marine 
                                            
264 Ibid., paragraph 6 
265 Firth, A, Salmon, P and Snaith, E (2017) Historic Environment Projects and Activities in Marine 
Conservation Zones. Historic England Project Number 7364. 
266 Ibid., 28 
267 Ibid., Appendix C 
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Enforcement Officers under MACAA, but also under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and 
the Immigration Act 1971 (as amended by the Immigration Act 2016). None of these 
powers are capable of use in respect of matters relating to UHA protection and so at 
present any involvement of the RNFPS in UHA protection will be limited to observing 
and collecting intelligence in respect of possible offences to pass to Historic England 
and the Police or Border Force. As discussed elsewhere in this Report, the presence 
of an official (and in this case, military) observer overseeing sites of interest to Historic 
England should also provide a certain level of deterrence.  
 
Enforcement work separate from the Royal Navy Fisheries Protection Squadron 
Although the RNFPS carries out the main element of enforcement work for the MMO, 
the MMO does carry out other enforcement work in collaboration with other bodies 
active in the marine area.  
For example, collaboration on the part of the MMO and other parties in order to carry 
out marine enforcement work relate to matters that fall squarely within the MMO’s remit 
(fisheries and marine licensing). Nonetheless, the MMO is clearly accustomed to joint 
working in order to achieve its enforcement objectives and this provides opportunities 
for Historic England to seek to involve the MMO in more general enforcement of UHA 
protections.  
Further, an instance of boarding by a joint team 
of the MMO and the Kent Police (using a RIB 
belonging to Kent Police) in the summer of 
2017 was reported to the research team by a 
diving contractor carrying out archaeological 
explorations on The Rooswijk, a Dutch vessel 
that sank in the Goodwin Sands area off the 
Kent coast in 1740.268 The two MMO Marine 
Enforcement Officers and the Police officer 
boarded the vessel and checked the paperwork 
of the contractor in order to ensure they had the 
necessary marine licence and project plan for 
the works being carried out (see figure 2).  
Figure 2: Mark James, MSDS Marine and   








                                            
268 Personal Communication from Mark James of MSDS Marine (September 2017) 
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4.2.5 - The Ministry of Defence 
 
The Ministry of Defence (MOD) currently has some involvement with the protection 
of UHA, both through the Ministry of Defence Police (MDP) and through the work of 
the RNFPS for the MMO. In addition, there is potential for further involvement both 




4.2.6 - The Ministry of Defence Police 
 
 
IMDP launch and rigid inflatable. (Image: © Crown Copyright 2017) 
Overview 
The Ministry of Defence Police (MDP) is a civilian police force, established under the 
Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987 (MDPA) and forming part of the MOD. It has 
significant marine assets, indeed, it describes itself as having the “largest marine 
policing capability in the UK”.269 The MDP acts primarily as a police force for the 
military, but since the Anti-Terrorist Crime and Security Act 2001, the MDP has also 
had the ability to exercise its police powers to assist other police forces, where such 
assistance has been requested.  
 
                                            
269 Ministry of Defence Police, Policing Plan 2017-18 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ministry-of-defence-police-policing-plan-2017-to-2018 
(last accessed October 2018) 
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Structure, Aims and Objectives 
The MDP is a statutory police force that forms part of the civilian police. As the MDP 
is a UK-wide police force, it comprises both site-based units protecting key defence 
sites and also a range of specialist units that can be deployed around the country. The 
marine units form one part of these specialist units and are discussed in detail below.  
In its military function, the MDP has three objectives:  
 
 “the protection of defence people, assets, information and estate;  
 the secure and uninterrupted operation of the UK nuclear deterrent; and  
 achieving success in overseas operations.”270 
 
In order to achieve these objectives, the MDP is required to maintain six “Core 
Capabilities”.271 These include “territorial policing and security”,272 and “the provision 
of specialist civil policing support to Defence and other international policing 
commitments in support of UK Government policy”.273  
 
As noted above, in addition to its military function, the MDP may provide policing 
support to “other Government Departments and customers”.274 Although this support 
is required to be “on a full repayment basis”.275 
The MDP is responsible for investigating and prosecuting offences under the PMRA 
1986. This responsibility falls under the Core Capability of “territorial policing and 
security”.  
 
The Marine Units of the MDP  
The MDP has three marine units; Plymouth Devonport, Portsmouth and the Clyde. 
Each of these units is based at a Naval Base and their main task is “to provide overt 
counter-terrorism policing to ensure the protection of HM Naval Bases, which includes 
undertaking high-profile armed patrolling of the waterfront”.276 As might be expected, 
the MDP marine units have the largest number of marine vessels of any police force 
in the UK.277 As well as security patrolling, the officers of the marine units assist with 
wider fleet tasking such as escorting Naval warships and submarines in home waters 
and also providing additional security for special events such as the NATO Leaders’ 
Summit held in Cardiff in 2014.278 Additionally, it is the marine units that exercise the 
responsibility to enforce the PMRA 1986 in UK waters.  
 
                                            
270 Ministry of Defence, ‘Guidance. MDP: Governance and Accountability’  
271 Ministry of Defence Police, Policing Plan 2017-18 ,7 
272 Core Capability 2 
273 Core Capability 5 
274 Ministry of Defence Police, Policing Plan 2017-18 , 7 
275 Ibid. 
276 http://www.mod.police.uk/specialist/marine.html -(last accessed October 2018) 
277 Ministry of Defence, ‘Guidance: Ministry of Defence Police: Specialist Units’ (21 May 2014) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/mod-police-specialist-units/mod-police-specialist-
units#marine-policing – (last accessed October 2018) 
278 Ibid. and http://www.mod.police.uk/specialist/marine.html - (last accessed October 2018) 
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When can MDP Powers be exercised?  
Members of the MDP have the same powers and privileges as constables in the 
regular police forces of the UK, but these powers and privileges can only be used in 
certain places or for certain purposes or in relation to certain people.279 These 
restrictions are set out in Table 2 below. In addition to these restrictions, where the 
assistance of the MDP has been requested by a police force, the members of the 
MDP that provide such assistance will have the same powers and privileges as 
constables in the requesting police force, for the purposes of providing the 
assistance requested.280 
  
                                            
279 Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987, section 2(1) 
280 Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987, sections 2(3A) and (3B) 
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 Area, Asset or Person in respect of 
which Powers can be used 
 
Qualifications on use of Powers 
Any person Provided MDP member is in uniform or has 
documentary evidence of their status and 
has reasonable grounds: 
 to suspect that an offence has been, 
is being or will be committed; and  
 to believe that they need to use 
police powers to save life or prevent 
personal injury. 
Land, vehicles, vessels, aircraft and 
hovercraft 
(Subject to below) must be in possession, 
or under control of, or used for purposes of: 
 Secretary of State for Defence, 
Defence Council or any defence 
organisation. 
 Visiting forces. 
 Ordnance company and used for 
purposes of making ordnance for 
military purposes. 
 Dockyard contractor and used for 
purposes of providing services for 
military purposes. 
 In relation to land only, need not satisfy 
above criteria if Secretary of State for 
Defence has agreed to provide services of 
MDP and published notice of this in the 
appropriate Gazette.  
Crown property None 
International defence property None 
Ordnance property None 
Dockyard property None 




Table 2: Restrictions on use of police powers by members of MDP 
 
Section 2(4) MDPA provides that the powers of MDP members (as set out in Table 1 
above) can be used in the UK’s territorial waters. 
UHA as a general class of assets would not come within any of the instances in which 
the MDP have jurisdiction. However, certain types of UHA individually might. Wrecked 
British military vessels and aircraft remain the property of the Ministry of Defence and 
so clearly fall within the class of property over which the MDP can exercise their police 
powers. The wrecks of military vessels and aircraft of other countries (and of 
commercial vessels and aircraft that perished on military service) and that are subject 
to controls under the PMRA could feasibly be described as “under the control of” the 
Ministry of Defence (on the basis that it is responsible for the administration and 
enforcement of PMRA) and so would be assets in respect of which the MDP could 
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exercise their police powers (provided such wrecks are within territorial waters). 
Certainly the MDP are responsible for investigating all potential offences under the 
PMRA and so it is logical that their police powers would extend to cover the assets 
protected by that Act. 
 
 
What police powers could MDP members use?  
The PACA gives to law enforcement officers (which includes all constables in England 
and Wales) certain maritime enforcement powers.281 These maritime enforcement 
powers are considered in detail in the section of this Report on the Border Force. In 
brief they permit those authorised to use them to stop, board, divert, detain and search 
a vessel and anyone on that vessel for the purpose of preventing, detecting, 
investigating or prosecuting an offence under the law of England and Wales.  
Subject to the limits set out in the 2017 Act, members of the MDP would be authorised 
to use the maritime enforcement powers within English and Welsh territorial waters in 
order to prevent, detect or investigate a potential offence under the PMRA.  
 
Enforcement of the Protection of Military Remains Act 1986  
The MDP have been responsible for enforcing the PMRA since it came into force. 
However, it was not until 2002 that any wrecked vessels were designated under the 
Act.282 Prior to that, the Government had carried out a public consultation in respect 
of the Act and designations under it, acknowledging the difficulties of enforcement and 
seeking views on how enforcement could be improved.283 The Consultation Report 
published by the Ministry of Defence concluded that the respondents generally agreed 
that the PMRA 1986 was difficult to enforce, but that the majority of respondents felt 
that the act of designation should provide sufficient deterrent.284 
Since that time, enforcement activity appears to have been carried out at a very low 
level,285 but there is some evidence of collaboration on the part of the MDP with other 
marine bodies in order to enforce the PMRA. In 2011, then Detective Chief 
Superintendent Stuart Mace declared (following a successful prosecution under 
PMRA  of a diver for taking material from a protected wreck)286 that the MDP “... act 
as the gatekeeper force for the investigation of offences under the Protection of Military 
Remains Act. Working with the Ministry of Defence, the Maritime and Coastguard 
                                            
281 Policing and Crime Act 2017, section 84(1) 
282 The Protection of Military Remains Act 1986 (Designation of Vessels and Controlled Sites) Order 
2002 
283 Ministry of Defence, ‘The Military Maritime Graves & the Protection of Military Remains Act 1986: A 
consultation document by the Ministry of Defence’ (February 2001) 
http://www.divetheworld.com/library/GovPapers/maritime_graves.pdf (last accessed October 2018) 
284 Ministry of Defence, ‘Military Maritime Graves and the Protection of Military Remains Act 1986: 
Consultation Report (November 2001) http://www.jnapc.org.uk/PMRA%201986%20-
%20Consultation%20Report%20by%20MoD%202001.pdf (last accessed October 2018) 
285 There was only one successful prosecution under the PMRA 1986 in the period of five years up to 
September 2013 (Hansard, 12 September 2013, col 796W - 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm131008/text/131008w0002.htm  
286 Navy News, ‘Diver fined for WW1 war grave theft’ (23 November 2011) 
https://navynews.co.uk/archive/news/item/2731 (last accessed October 2018) 
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Agency and [Historic England] we aim to stop the illegal plundering of military wrecks 
in waters around the United Kingdom and prevent the disturbance of war graves”.287 
 
 
Potential for Joint-Working in respect of UHA Protection 
At present, the MDP is responsible for enforcing the provisions of the PMRA, but has 
no responsibilities towards the wider class of UHA.  
It might be possible to argue that UHA protection in general could fall within the MDP’s 
strategic objectives on the basis of its commitment to consider collaboration with other 
forces and to ensure the efficient and effective use of MDP resources (see discussion 
above). However, it is considered unlikely that the MDP would be willing to take on 
any extra responsibilities in regard to UHA not protected by the PMRA.  
Firstly, the purpose behind the PMRA, as suggested by its name, was the protection 
of the remains of military personnel and others that perished whilst on military service. 
The reading of the bill preceding the PMRAconfirms that heritage was not a 
consideration in relation to the bill; the primary concern being “to protect the sanctity 
of wrecks that contain human remains”, with “safety and security” being secondary 
concerns.288 Therefore, although the Act does not require the presence of human 
remains before a vessel can be designated, the reason behind this is primarily to avoid 
the need to disturb any human remains in order to determine their existence, which 
would be required if their existence was  a precondition of an offence.  
In addition, the budget of the MDP has been substantially reduced in recent years, 
with the head of the Defence Police Federation289 suggesting that “there’s nothing left 
to cut” and that the latest reduction in the annual budget can only be met by reducing 
the numbers of officers.290 Set against this background, it is submitted that it will be 
difficult to get the MDP to agree to carry out work outside of their remit, such as 
patrolling heritage sites that are not designated under the PMRA.  
For the reasons discussed above, it is therefore considered unlikely that the MDP will 
be able to assist Historic England with wider protection of UHA in English waters. 
However, there is scope for further collaboration between the two bodies in order to 
increase enforcement of the PMRA and thereby aim to increase the deterrent effect of 
the legislation. The budgetary constraints currently existing at the MDP mean that 
additional speculative patrols are unlikely to be within their capacity. However, it is 
suggested that intelligence that may flow from collaboration with other bodies as a 
result of this Report, where relevant to UHA designated under PMRA, could be fed to 
                                            
287 Ministry of Defence, ‘War Grave Thief Convicted’ (Defence Policy & Business News, 22 November 
2011) 
288 HC Deb 31 January 1986, vol. 90, cols 1227-34 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1986/jan/31/protection-of-military-remains-bill (last 
accessed October 2018) 
289 The body that represents the members of the MDP 
290 David Bond and Robert Wright, ‘UK defence secretary under pressure over military police cuts’ 
(Financial Times, London, 14 November 2017) https://www.ft.com/content/bf70264a-c94d-11e7-ab18-
7a9fb7d6163e (last accessed October 2018) 
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the MDP in order to build a case for the use of MDP resources to provide active 
enforcement where intelligence suggests offences are likely to be taking place.  
 
 
4.2.7 The Royal Navy 
 
Overview 
The Royal Navy forms part of the armed forces of the United Kingdom. In this Report, 
its role in three areas potentially relevant to UHA will be considered; the patrol ships 
of the surface fleet, the specialist Fisheries Protection Squadron and the United 
Kingdom Hydrographic Office.  
 
Aims and Objectives of the Royal Navy 
The Royal Navy is guided by a multitude of strategies and policy documents. At the 
top, sits the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 
2015 (SDSR),291 which sets out the government’s approach to national security for the 
period from 2015 to 2020. The SDSR and the UK National Strategy for Maritime 
Security 2014 (NSMS)292 form the basis of the UK’s strategy and policy with regard to 
security in the maritime zone. The NSMS adopts the two key principles of integration 
and collaboration in setting out a maritime strategy for the UK, stating that “we will 
bring together the instruments of government, driving cooperation and efficiency; and 
we will work globally with allies and partners, including industry and the public, in 
pursuit of our mutual goals”.293 
Sitting underneath the SDSR and the NSMS are a number of different strategy and 
policy documents that have some impact upon the Royal Navy. These are linked by 
the Future Navy Vision (“NV), a strategy published by the Royal Navy setting out its 
“path towards the Royal Navy of 2025”.294 The FNV (part of the MoD’s wider Strategy 
for Defence) sets out the three core roles of the Royal Navy: 
1. Warfighting – conduct, or be ready to conduct, warfighting at sea and from the 
sea. 
2. Maritime Security – protect the free, safe and lawful use of the sea where it is 
vital to UK prosperity and security. 
3. International Engagement – Promote UK interests by developing international 
partnerships.295 
 
                                            
291 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 
(November 2015) https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-security-strategy-and-
strategic-defence-and-security-review-2015 (last accessed October 2018) 
292 HM Government, The UK National Strategy for Maritime Security (May 2014) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-strategy-for-maritime-security (last accessed 
October 2018) 
293 Ibid., 10 
294 Royal Navy, Future Navy Vision: The Royal Navy Today, Tomorrow and Towards 2025 (undated)  
295 Ibid., 4 
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Maritime security is described as required in order to “protect UK citizens, territory, 
and trade from terrorists, criminals, piracy, state sponsored insurgents and unlawful 
restrictions on freedom of navigation”.296 The protection of the UHA of the United 
Kingdom from unlawful activity would come under the maintenance of maritime 
security.  
Detail is added to the FNV’s high level strategic position in the Navy Command Plan. 
This has not been reviewed for this Report as it is a classified document.  
Maritime security is upheld by the Royal Navy in a multitude of ways. Those possibly 
relevant to UHA protection are (i) the Royal Navy Fisheries Protection Squadron, (ii) 
the patrol ships of the surface fleet that are active in waters adjacent to the UK, and 
(iii) the UK Hydrographic Office function. Each of these will be considered in turn in 
this Report.  
 
4.2.8 - The RN Fisheries Protection Squadron  
Overview 
As noted elsewhere in the report, the Royal Navy Fisheries Protection Squadron 
(RNFPS) has three River Class vessels active in British waters, which will increase to 
four once the replacement fleet for these vessels has been fully commissioned.297  
The main function of the RNFPS is to enforce fisheries legislation and regulations 
within the United Kingdom’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This is in pursuance of 
a MOU between the MMO and the Royal Navy, under which the RNFPS agrees to 
carry out enforcement work (pursuant to MACAA) on behalf of the MMO. The MMO 
pays an annual fee for these services.  
A freedom of Information request reveals that for the period of three years from 2013, 
the MMO paid an annual charge of £2,000,000 for a total of 500 days service.298 In 
response to a previous Freedom of Information request, the Royal Navy confirmed 
that the annual charge to the MMO for the services of the FPS in 2010 was expected 
to be approximately £6,100,000.299 The considerable difference in the two figures is 
accounted for by the different levels of service provided during the two periods. Prior 
to 2013, the RNFPS was entirely focussed on fisheries protection work within the 
Exclusive Economic Zone of the United Kingdom,300 whereas in April 2013, it was 
agreed that the MMO would contract for a certain number of days service, and that 
outside of those agreed days, the RNFPS vessels could be used for other purposes.301 
                                            
296 Ibid. 
297 https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2017/august/31/170831-hms-forth 
(last accessed October 2018) 
298https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/157126/response/389275/attach/3/20130508%2011%20
04%202013%20144907%20004%20Andrew%20U.pdf (last accessed October 2018) 
299 https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/fishery_protection_squadron (last accessed October 
2018) 
300 Except for HMS Clyde, which is a dedicated FPS vessel for the waters around the Falkland Islands 
301 Damian Carrington, ‘Admiral calls plan to police post-Brexit fishing waters ‘amazingly complacent’’ 
(The Guardian, 3 July 2017) https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jul/03/admiral-calls-plan-
to-police-post-brexit-fishing-waters-amazingly-complacent (last accessed October 2018) 
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The decrease in the amount of time the RNFPS have available to carry out fisheries 
enforcement work is illustrated in the steady decline in the number of boardings carried 
out by RNFPS officers. 2016/17 saw the lowest annual number of boardings in 18 
years, which represents a decrease of 84% since 1999/2000.302  
The broader focus of the RNFPS has the potential to be both an opportunity for and a 
threat to the possibility of the RNFPS assisting Historic England and the Police in the 
protection of UHA. The Royal Navy are clear in their communications that the RNFPS 
are available for a wider range of work than just fisheries protection and enforcement. 
For example, in describing the RNFPS vessels, they state that “[t]hese versatile ships 
are able to operate with helicopters, and could be utilised in the maritime counter 
terrorism, counter-drug surveillance or pollution control role in addition to their core 
tasking of fishery protection”.303 Similarly, in a page dedicated to HMS Tyne, one of 
the RNFPS vessels, it is stated that “[HMS] Tyne has also been designed to carry out 
a number of other tasks including – but not limited to – environmental protection, 
search and rescue and maritime security”.304 This clear indication of a willingness to 
take on other work provides a potential opening for collaboration between Historic 
England and the Royal Navy with regard to UHA protection.  
However, this willingness on the part of the Royal Navy must be set against the time 
limited nature of its fisheries protection and enforcement work since 2013. As noted 
above, the MMO are paying a significant sum of money for a fixed number of days 
service from the RNFPS. If the RNFPS were to collaborate with Historic England in 
some way in order to try and enhance the level of enforcement of protections for UHA, 
it is likely that this may need to be carried out during the MMO’s fixed allowance of 
days. During this period the vessels will already be in British waters, whereas outside 
of the fixed allowance the vessels may be deployed overseas; for example, in 2014/15 
HMS Severn was deployed to the Caribbean for eight months in order to visit all of the 
British Overseas Territories there.305 Furthermore, the MOD appears to be planning 
further overseas deployments, noting on its website that the new vessels will be larger 
than the current River class vessels and as such “will be able to conduct all of the 
fishery protection and domestic security duties currently undertaken by the squadron 
but will now also provide far more capable platform for deploying overseas such as 
when Mersey provided support to migrant operations in the Mediterranean or Severn 
and Mersey on Atlantic Patrol North."306 As such, if assistance from the RNFPS 
vessels is to be given it is possible therefore that the MMO may not look favourably 
upon any suggestion that may be perceived to involve watering down the level of 
                                            
302 Ministry of Defence, ‘Military Aid to Civil Authorities’ 2016/17 (15 June 2017) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/618864/Military_Aid_to
_Civil_Authorities_2017.pdf (last accessed October 2018) 
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service they receive from the RNFPS by adding extra responsibilities to the RNFPS’ 
role. 
General Powers  
Commissioned officers of any of Her Majesty’s ships307 are automatically designated 
Marine Enforcement Officers under MACAA.308 Table 2 shows the powers that flow 
from this designation and the purposes for which they can be used.  
The structure of the grant of powers is that they are given for specific purposes. 
General UHA protection does not fall under any of these specific purposes. The 
powers given to enforce the marine licensing regime have the potential to be used to 
assist with UHA protection, but only where activities are taking place in respect of UHA 
that breach the terms of a marine licence or that are being done without a licence 
where one is required under the marine licensing regime. This by no means covers all 
activities done in respect of UHA.  
If the marine licensing enforcement powers are available to MEOs, then under section 
236 MACAA, they can be used in respect of any ship, whatever nationality, within the 
‘UK marine area’. For the purposes of MACAA this includes internal and territorial 
















                                            
307 Officers with a royal commission (now signed by the Secretary of State for Defence) and starting at 
Sub-Lieutenant level  
308 Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, section 235 
309 Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, section 42 
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 power to board 
and inspect 
vessels (s246) 
 search powers 
(s250) 
 powers of seizure 
(s252)  
 power to record 
evidence of 
offences (s255)  
 power to direct 











Power to require 
information relating 
to substances and 
objects (s263) 
  
None  Power to inspect and 
seize objects at sea 
(s264) 
 Power to seize fish 
(s268) and fishing gear 
(s268) 
 Power to detain vessels 
in connection with court 
proceedings (s279) 





Table 3: Powers of commissioned officers of the Fisheries Protection Squadron 
 
Commissioned officers of the Royal Navy also have maritime enforcement powers 
under the Immigration Act 1971 (as amended by the Immigration Act 2016)310 and the 
Modern Slavery Act 2015.311 Again, these powers are similarly given for limited 
purposes which do not have any application to UHA protection.  
The general marine enforcement powers of the PACA (see sections on police and BF 
for detailed discussion) are not currently available to Naval officers (whether 
commissioned or otherwise) as they do not appear in the list of “law enforcement 
officers”.312 Section 84(3)(g) PACA provides that the Secretary of State can add one 
or more classes of people to the list of “law enforcement officers” by specifying so in 
                                            
310 Sections 28M and 28Q 
311 Sections 35 and 39(1) 
312 Policing and Crime Act 2017, section 84(3) 
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regulations. Therefore, it would be possible for commissioned officers of the Royal 
Navy to be granted the general marine enforcement powers set out in PACA, which 
would enable them, in certain circumstances (as discussed in the section on Border 
Force), to stop, board and search vessels in UK waters. However, it is submitted that 
the time and resources required to pass a statutory instrument may mean that this is 
not a practical option in order to achieve greater protection of UHA, though Historic 
England may wish to investigate, through DCMS, the possibility 
 
Powers under the Protection of Military Remains Act 1986 
Under section 6 PMRA, “authorised persons” are entitled to board and search vessels 
in UK waters and seize articles on board. In respect of British ships, the power to stop 
and board can be used where the authorised person has reasonable grounds for 
believing that an offence under PMRA is being, has been or is to be committed. 
However, in respect of non-British ships, the powers can only be used where the 
authorised person has reasonable grounds to believe such an offence is being 
committed at present.  
 
PMRA defines an “authorised person” as “a person authorised in writing by the 
Secretary of State... or a person of a description of persons so authorised”.313 Any 
authorisations made by the Secretary of State have not been published, however the 
MDP are responsible for investigating offences under the PMRA and so they have 
presumably been authorised. If commissioned officers of the Royal Navy have not also 
been authorised, then it would be possible for the Secretary of State to provide such 
written authorisation, which would then allow any patrol of the Royal Navy to use the 
enforcement powers granted by PMRA in respect of possible offences affecting 
designated military UHA.   
 
Current and Future Joint Working on the Part of the RNFPS 
As detailed above, the RNFPS is the contracted enforcement service for the MMO in 
respect of fisheries legislation and regulations. The RNFPS and the MMO therefore 
have an extremely close working relationship. This is built upon daily communication 
and sharing of data between the two organisations, with the MMO initiating the 
boarding process by highlighting areas and/or vessels of concern with the RNFPS.314  
In addition, the RNFPS also work with other bodies and organisations whilst at sea. 
For example, Lieutenant Commander George Storton, the Commanding Officer of 
HMS Mersey (one of the three River Class FPS vessels based in UK home waters) 
has commented that “[a]ll the squadron’s vessels are kept fully up to date of any 
regional issues. We recently worked with the Maritime Coastguard Agency 
Communications Centre at Fareham, where we assisted with a medical emergency 
after a gas cylinder exploded, injuring a fisherman”.315 Indeed, Lt Commander Storton 
notes the unique position of the RNFPS vessels and their crew and the benefits this 
                                            
313 Protection of Military Remains Act 1983, section 6(8) 
314 Fishing News, ‘On Patrol with the Royal Navy’s Fisheries Protection Squadron’ (Fishing News, 1 
September 2017) http://fishingnews.co.uk/features/on-patrol-with-the-royal-navys-fisheries-protection-




can have for maritime security: “[w]ith HMS Mersey doing 320 days a year at sea, we 
see a lot happening around our coastline. For example, we know what is going on 
from a ferry crossing to a localised yacht race. By spending so much time at sea, 
patrolling our waters, we can understand the difference between what is normal and 
what is not normal.”316 
This knowledge of UK waters is something that Historic England could benefit from in 
order to increase the detection of offences under the various protective Acts taking 
place. If the RNFPS vessels are spending such significant amounts of time in UK home 
waters, then consideration could be given to whether the remit of their patrols could 
be extended to include UHA sites (or at least those sites of greatest concern as being 
at risk to Historic England). Depending on the locations of such sites, this could 
possibly be achievable without extending the actual patrols much themselves. After 
all, (as noted by one interviewee for this Report), an organisation might for its own 
purposes need to be in a particular area for a certain period of time, but it has to get 
there and to get back and “people might be interested in what you can see whilst you’re 
getting to it.”317 
 
The Patrol Ships of the Royal Navy Surface Fleet 
As noted elsewhere in the Report, the Royal Navy has 14 inshore patrol boats 
available in the waters adjacent to the UK.318 Each of the 14 vessels are affiliated to a 
University Royal Naval Unit (URNU)319 and therefore based in locations spread around 
Great Britain. They are all part of the 1st Patrol Boat Squadron. 
The primary role of these vessels is to provide training and maritime experience for 
University Royal Naval Unit students. These are students studying at a range of 
universities around the UK, who have chosen to study also with the Royal Navy on a 
part time basis during their evenings, weekends and university holidays. Whilst the 
students are not members of the Royal Navy, each of the vessels is commanded by a 
commissioned officer of the Royal Navy and crewed by a number of members of the 
Royal Navy.  
It is unlikely that the vessels could be used for any purpose of assisting in the 
protection of UHA during the periods in which they are being used for URNU training. 
However, such training tends to take place only at weekends and during the Easter 
and summer university holiday periods,320 therefore there is a substantial period of 
time when the vessels are not used by the URNU. The Royal Navy website confirms 
that as well as providing training for the URNU students, the 14 vessels also “provide 
                                            
316 Ibid. 
317 IFCA Chief officer, pers. comm. 
318 Although they are not all continuously in UK waters, with vessels often being deployed to foreign 
waters – for example see https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-
activity/news/2017/april/26/170426-entire-1st-patrol-sqn-join-for-exercise (last accessed October 
2018) 
319 A Royal Navy training establishment connected to a university or a group of universities 
320 http://www.bristolurnu.org/training/sea-weekends/ (last accessed October 2018) 
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support to wider Fleet tasking and exercises around the UK and [European] waters”.321 
It  appears that this wider tasking is primarily still for training purposes. However, other 
activities such as community engagement events, activities where presence is needed 
in vicinities into which larger naval vessels cannot reach (such as PR events at ports) 
and “security and maritime patrols”322 are all mentioned on the official web pages for 
each of the vessels 
It is thus possible that those of the 14 patrol vessels that operate in English Inshore 
Marine Planning Area may be available during certain periods (predominantly 
weekdays outside of university periods) to assist with the protection of UHA in the 
English Inshore Marine Planning Area.  
 
4.2.9 - The United Kingdom Hydrographic Office (“UKHO”) and the 
Royal Navy Hydrographic Squadron 
Structure and Relationship to the Ministry of Defence 
The UKHO is a trading fund owned by the MOD set up to collect and supply 
hydrographic and geospatial data to both the Royal Navy and to merchant shipping in 
order to protect lives at sea.323 Historically, the UKHO function was an integral part of 
the Royal Navy, with the collection of survey data being carried out by Royal Navy 
commissioned vessels.  
Today, while the UKHO function has been separated out from the Royal Navy 
somewhat into its current form, the surveying function is still carried out by the Royal 
Navy Hydrographic Squadron (supported by data collected by contract survey 
companies and other contractors and developers).324 The Hydrographic Squadron 
consists of five vessels; HMS Enterprise, Echo, Protector, Scott and Gleaner. Only 
HMS Gleaner (the smallest commissioned ship in the Royal Navy)325 is consistently 
active in UK waters, with the other, larger, vessels tending to be deployed on lengthy 
overseas surveying operations. HMS Gleaner is due to be decommissioned in 
December 2017, with its replacement due for commissioning in May 2018.326  
Although a separate entity in law, as the UKHO has no sea-going vessels or aerial 
resources of its own, it has been considered in conjunction with the Royal Navy for the 
purposes of this Report.  
 
                                            
321 https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/the-equipment/ships/patrol-and-mine-hunters/fast-patrol-boats (last 
accessed October 2018) 
322 http://www.surnu.co.uk/hms-blazer.html (last accessed October 2018) 
323 www.gov.uk/government/organisations/uk-hydrographic-office (last accessed October 2018). See 
also The Hydrographic Trading Fund Order 1996, SI 1996/773 
324 UK Hydrographic Office, ‘The UKHO Archive’ (2015) (https://www.gov.uk/guidance/the-ukho-
archive (last accessed October 2018) 
325 http://www.armedforces.co.uk/navy/listings/l0020.html (last accessed October 2018) 
326 Samuel Corby, ‘Details released on HMS Gleaner replacement’ (UK Defence Journal, 23 August 




Potential for Collaboration with regard to UHA 
With only one vessel consistently in UK home waters, the Hydrographic Squadron is 
of limited interest with regard to joint working in order to increase the protection for 
UHA. Furthermore, that one vessel does not appear, from publicly available 
information, to undertake any security or maritime patrols, focusing instead entirely on 
surveying work both for the UKHO and also for the wider fleet of the Royal Navy (such 
as surveying the dredging works carried out in order to enable the new aircraft carrier 
to enter certain ports).327 The vessel has therefore not been considered further in 
respect of any potential joint working initiatives with the Royal Navy.  
 
 
4.2.10 - Military Aid to Civil Authorities 
Overview 
If the Royal Navy, in any of the roles described above, is willing to help enforce UHA 
protections in English Inshore Planning Area, then it will be providing Military Aid to a 
Civil Authority (“MACA”). Often, MACA is given by way of military assistance at 
emergencies such as large scale flooding incidents. However, the MOD’s published 
policy on MACA notes that it can also include “[m]ilitary support…  provided to civil law 
enforcement agencies, such as the police or Border Force, in the maintenance of law, 
order and public safety”.328 As such the work of the RNFPS in enforcing fisheries 
legislation and regulations for the MMO is an example of MACA. 
 
Legal Basis 
The legal basis for MACA depends upon the type of assistance being provided to the 
civil authority.329 Where military tasks are being carried out as a support for civil 
authorities and in addition to their capabilities, the legal basis for MACA is the Royal 
Prerogative. However, where the support provided is non-military and is provided 
instead of the civil authorities capabilities, MACA is actioned by a Defence Council 
Order made pursuant to the Emergency Powers Act 1964. 
There is no set definition for ‘military tasks’, however the MOD’s guidance on MACA330 
suggests that indicators that a task is a ‘military’ one “can include where service 
personnel have been trained by the military, where service personnel undertake that 
work as their ‘day job’, and for work which traditionally has been seen as military work. 
This type of work is usually, but not exclusively, requested by law enforcement 
agencies, most commonly the police, the Border Force and Her Majesty's (HM) 
                                            
327 Ibid. 
328 Ministry of Defence, Policy Paper: 2015 to 2020 government policy: Military Aid to the Civil 
Authorities for activities in the UK (4 August 2016) https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2015-
to-2020-government-policy-military-aid-to-the-civil-authorities-for-activities-in-the-uk/2015-to-2020-
government-policy-military-aid-to-the-civil-authorities-for-activities-in-the-uk (last accessed October 
2018) 
329 Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Publication 02 – UK Operations: the Defence Contribution to 
Resilience and Security (Third Edition, February 2017), 32  
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/operations-in-the-uk-a-joint-doctrine-publication (last 
accessed October 2018)  
330 Joint Doctrine Publication 02 – UK Operations: The Defence Contribution to Resilience and 
Security, Third Edition 
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Revenue and Customs.”331 It is arguable that law enforcement work in the territorial 
waters assisting the Police or Border Force could be described as a ‘military’ task, 
especially if it is carried out during military patrols.   
 
Procedure & Cost Recovery 
MACA is requested by the civil authority requiring assistance and must generally be 
authorised at ministerial level (except in the event of an emergency situation in which 
life is endangered). Unless the assistance is required as a result of an emergency 
situation, MACA will generally only be provided when the four principles set out by the 
Ministry of Defence are satisfied. These are that:  
1. There is a definite need to act and the tasks the armed forces are being asked 
to perform are clear. 
2. Other options, including mutual aid and commercial alternatives, have been 
discounted; and either 
3. the civil authority lacks the necessary capability to fulfil the task and it is 
unreasonable or prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one; or 
4. the civil authority has all or some capability, but it may not be available 
immediately, or to the required scale, and the urgency of the task requires rapid 
external support from MOD.332 
 
For UHA protection, HE and the Police or Border Force would need to satisfy principles 
1, 2 and 3.  
 
Most importantly however, is that MACA must be paid for by the civil authority or 
government department requesting the help. This is required as a result of the rules 
of HM Treasury that government departments must charge for services that do not 
form part of their funded tasks.333 The MoD charges full costs for non-emergency, 
planned and routine support to civil authorities, unless there is a military benefit that 
offsets the cost.334 Full cost recovery is presumably not an option for Historic England 
and/or the Police or Border Force, however, if naval vessels that are already out on 
patrol in the English Inshore Marine Planning Area were to be tasked with also keeping 
an eye on sites and vessels of interest with regard to UHA, then it is submitted that 
this would fall within the ‘military benefit’ exception and thus the cost recovery should 
be greatly reduced.  
 
 
                                            
331 Ibid., 32-33 
332 Ibid., 27-28 
333 Ibid., 36 
334 Ibid., 38 
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4.2.11 - Queen’s Harbour Master: Plymouth and Portsmouth 
 
Structure, Aims and Objectives 
The Dockyard Ports of Plymouth and Portsmouth operate under the statutory control 
of the Queen’s Harbour Master (QHM).335  There are differences between the Ports, 
in terms of geographic area, size, type and frequency of military and other traffic. 
Though focused on the operation and protection of Naval ports, the dockyard port 
areas tend to cover a significantly larger area. For example, the Dockyard port of 
Plymouth extends to one and a half miles south of Plymouth Sound breakwater and 
encompasses the extent of the tidal reach of the Rivers Tamar, Tavy and Lyhner.  
Similarly, the dockyard port of Portsmouth covers a much wider area than the Naval 
Base, as shown at Figure 1 below. In common however, is the aim to enable the 
optimum opportunities for the enjoyment of legitimate water-based activities. Both of 
the Port areas under the control of the QHMs host significant UHA.  
 
 
Figure 1: Chart annexed to the Dockyard Port of Portsmouth Order 2005 depicting the extent 
of the dockyard port area 
                                            
335 One additional UK QHM is in post for the Clyde Dockyard Port, but is outside of the geographical 
focus of the report. 
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Powers Granted to QHM 
The basic responsibility is to ensure safe and orderly passage and activity for all 
vessels within the waters of the Dockyard Port; and the protection of the port, the Royal 
Navy and its vessels and other government assets. The statutory purpose of the QHM 
is to “superintend the execution of [the Dockyard Ports 1865 in], and otherwise to 
protect” the dockyard port for which they are appointed.336 The QHM is therefore the 
de facto Harbour Authority for the area within their Dockyard Port. The QHM’s primary 
role as protector of the port leads to a principal responsibility to ensure the safe and 
orderly passage of all vessels and activities within it, as both Naval and civilian.  
However, their statutory purpose is drafted broadly and gives a wide remit to QHMs, 
which is described by the Ministry of Defence as including “the preservation of life, 
protecting the environment, property and the continuity of business whilst overseeing 
Ministry of Defence primacy”.337 In practice, the QHM oversees the running of their 
port area and has responsibility for everything that happens within it, carrying out 
certain functions on behalf of the Commander of the Naval Base within their dockyard 
port area.338  The two QHMs draw their authority from specific legislation.  Both are 
initially subject to the 1865 Act, and the, respectively The Dockyard Port of Plymouth 
Order 1999; and The Dockyard Port of Portsmouth Order 2005.339  The legislation 
does not contemplate heritage, although the 1865 Act empowers the QHM to remove 
wreck in the case of its being an obstruction to the port or its approaches.340  
 
Powers 
In order to carry out their statutory functions, QHMs are granted certain powers by the 
1865 Act. These include powers to moor and unmoor vessels,341 powers to search 
vessels for certain purposes,342 and powers to remove wreck and unserviceable 
vessels.343 None of these powers can be used for heritage protection.  
The marine enforcement powers contained in the PACA are granted to a wide range 
of individuals and classes of individual. Included in this are “port constables” within the 
meaning of section 7 Marine Navigation Act 2013 or section 16 Harbours Act 1964.344 
QHMs do not appear to fall into either of these categories at present, but the 2013 Act 
makes reference to various Acts that permit the appointment of port constables by two 
justices of the peace. It is therefore possible for individual QHMs to be appointed as 
port constables and thereby given the ability to exercise the marine enforcement 
powers within their area.  
 
                                            
336 Dockyard Ports Regulation Act 1865, section 4 
337 https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/queens-harbour-master/about (last accessed 
October 2018) 
338 https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/qhm-portsmouth (last accessed October 2018)  
339 The Dockyard Port of Plymouth Order 1999 (SI 1999/2029) and The Dockyard Port of Portsmouth 
Order 2005 (SI 20065/1470) 
340 Dockyard Ports Regulation Act 1865, s.13. 
341 Dockyard Ports Regulation Act 1865, section 11 
342 Dockyard Ports Regulation Act 1865, section 12 
343 Dockyard Ports Regulation Act 1865, sections 13 and 14 




Potential for Collaboration on Enforcement of UHA Protection 
In the case of Plymouth, the Dockyard Port is part of and contains significant natural 
environmental and heritage assets, including PWA and PMRA, designated wrecks.345 
QHM recognises heritage as part of its wider environmental remit and includes 
heritage considerations within the management plans for the area.346  The Portsmouth 
QHM area also has significant natural environmental designations within its area; and 
includes PWA sites – notably the Mary Rose and HMS Invincible – as well as 
considerable other designated and undesignated UHA both within and in close 
proximity to its area of influence.347  Although it is the location of a significant onshore 
heritage collection comprised in the Portsmouth Historic Dockyard, there is no overt 
heritage consideration in the broader regulatory remit.  
Both Ports have means to report maritime issues of concern to an incident control 
centre:  each has a dedicated telephone number and an online reporting form 
available.348  It is in this respect that QHM is able to offer collaborative potential.  In 
both Ports, QHM, either personally or through the Port Conservancy Officer, has 
knowledge of the designated UHA in the area.349  The QHMs will be notified of any 
diving operations as or routine.  As a point of contact to all regular water users QHM 
provides a hub for reporting of incidents or suspected non-legitimate interventions by 
those on the water.350  Where resources permit, the ability to task the MDP to 
investigate, or keep a watching brief, if reports are made represents a further  
opportunity to capitalise on existing functions for the benefit of UHA protection. A 
greater heritage presence, for example through the provision of links to Historic 
England’s appropriate UHA online materials, or a general statement in respect of the 
presence of UHA in the curtilage of the Dockyard Ports, would represent a low-cost 
means by which to notify visitors to the site of the fact it is a recognised matter.   
 
 
Limits on QHM Powers 
The limits as exist are concerned with the fact that this is in essence an additional 
dimension to the basic statutory function of the QHM.  In both Dockyard Ports, 
competing interests are regulated to the end of the safety of navigation, the safety of 
the Dockyards and the Navy.     
 
                                            
345 Includes the Coronation (inshore and offshore), the Cattewater wreck and the nearby A7 
submarine amongst others.  See for example 
https://historicengland.org.uk/advice/planning/consents/protected-wreck-sites/; and the SHIPS project 
http://www.promare.co.uk/ships/ (both last accessed October 2018)  
346 See for example, https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/qhm/plymouth/port-information/environment (last 
accessed October 2018) 
347 A more recent discovery being HM LCT 427, see for example, 
http://www.southseasubaqua.org.uk/diving-projects (last accessed October 2018) 
348  The Longroom at Plymouth, https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/qhm/plymouth/report-an-incident; and 
Semaphore tower at Portsmouth https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/qhm/portsmouth/report-an-incident 
(last accessed October 2018)  
349 QHM/Port Conservancy Officers, pers.comm. 
350 QHM/Port Conservancy Officers, pers.comm. 
80 
 
4.2.12 Maritime and Coastguard Agency  
 
An Agency of the Department for Transport, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency 
(MCA) in the UK’s Maritime Authority.  It has a number of functions –such as being the 
safety regulator for UK flagged shipping, co-ordinating search and rescue at sea and 
on the coast and operating the automatic identification system (AIS) used by ships 
around the UK coastline. 351 It’s remit includes pollution prevention and control and in 
terms of wreck the most important aspect lies within the powers and duties in respect 
of salvage that are discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
The potential for, and contemporary examples of examples of, the MCA to assist in 




4.2.13 - The National Maritime Information Centre 
 
Structure, Aims and Objectives 
Established in 2010 as an output of the Strategic Defence and Security Review the 
National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC) provides information across government 
departments on a range of activities in the maritime domain. The UK National Strategy 
for Maritime Security  notes that it “brings together information and intelligence 
provided by Border Force, the MCA, the police, Armed Forces, the MMO…”, to provide 
the UK with “unified situational awareness” of the range of activities going on in UK 
and international waters. 352 
NMIC provides an information hub, which is then able to inform tasking decisions for 
enforcement authorities.  Originally conceived to serve a basic security function, the 
role has grown to enable the protection of UK interests and assets to the extent of UK 
territorial jurisdiction and beyond.  NMIC has input from the principal government 
departments, and their agencies with a maritime focus. The Department of Culture, 
Media and Sport is involved, but Historic England not so.  NMIC is not directly 
responsible to any one government Ministry. It sits outside all of its sponsoring 
departments, nested within the National Maritime Security Committee.  This mean that 
NMIC is funded across and between those ministries and agencies that take part.  
Many of the staff at NMIC are secondees from partner agencies.353 
 
NMIC describes its mission in the following terms: 
                                            
351 See for example the MCA website https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/maritime-and-
coastguard-agency (last accessed October 2018) 
352 National Strategy for Maritime Security, p.22 
353 See for example 




“Citizens, business and government can enjoy the full benefits of a clean, 
safe, sustainable, secure and resilient maritime domain: working together, at 
home and globally with partners, to understand and address the risks… and 
to seize opportunities in the maritime domain to enhance the UK’s overall 
maritime development, safety, security and resilience.”354  
 
Potential for Collaboration on Enforcement of UHA Protection 
The shared expertise of the constituent members has been noted in evidence given 
to the Common’s Defence Select Committee. NMIC was described as "a fantastic 
organisation [which] will enable us to provide a single picture for maritime activity, with 
input from numerous agencies. The principle of it is superb".  Another contributor 
stated "the principle is extremely sound in that what may in the normal pattern of life 
make perfect sense to my organisation will be of interest for a completely different 
reason to another".355 It is this latter comment in particular that suggests NMIC’s 
potential in the case of UHA. In terms of securing UK assets, the loss of UHA 
constitutes a loss to the nation, and the monetary value of certain of the higher end 
prosecutions for salvage activity –aside from irreplaceable cultural loss - , pushes it 
into the territory of serious crime that should merit intervention.  The ability of Historic 
England to feed into the NMIC ‘family’ would enable better coordination in this regard.  
NMIC’s ability to track vessel movements, to GIS map features of interest and to flag 
vessels if interest are all of potentially significant assistance to means by which UHA 
protection might be enhanced.  The information is a two-way flow, with NMIC receiving 
and disseminating the information from and to its contributing departments. 
 
Limits 
NMIC’s role is necessarily limited to information gathering and sharing.  It may use 
that information to task resource to suspicious activity, for example around known 
UHA.  In that respect, it is possibly of more use to those UHA that are the subject of 
existing designation.  Alternatively, patterns of behaviour, such as dimming of AIS, or 
the same ships entering into the same areas might be suggestive of illicit salvage.  The 
principal limitation on NMIC’s assistance to Historic England, at the time of writing, 
would seem to be the fact that Historic England is not fully engaged.  
 
4.2.14 - National Coastwatch Institution 
Structure Aims and Objectives 
Established in 1994, the National Coastwatch Institution (NCI) is a registered charity 
overseen by the Charities Commission. It was originally set up as a means to gap-fill 
the loss of Coastguard lookout stations along the coast.  Essentially focused on 
maritime safety, and specifically that of saving lives around the coast the NCI provides 
                                            
354 National Maritime Information Centre, Information Guide 2011, available from 
http://www.nautinstlondon.co.uk/nautinstlondon/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/NMIC-information-
booklet.pdf (last accessed October 2018) 
355 Ibid, at paragraph 105 
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reassurance to water users noting that “Wherever there is an NCI station a 
watchkeeper will be looking out for danger and ensuring your safety on the water”.356 
With 41 stations located around the English coast (there are a further 8 in Wales) 
equipped with telescopes, radar, charts and telecommunications equipment, the NCI 
is clearly able to live up to its claim to be the ‘Eyes along the Coast’. 
The NCI has a safety of life at sea focus, and is well linked in with the MCA so as to 
be of benefit and to fit within the national search and rescue structure.357  In that 
regard, there is no direct link to heritage protection. Volunteers, though, have used 
their skills in incident monitoring and management to perform useful reporting 
functions in respect of UHA.  Interviews with QHM/Port Conservancy Officers, MDP 
and coastal police services have all indicated contact with NCI stations where there 
has been knowledge of the presence of nearby UHA.  In all cases passed onto the 
report authors, the UHA were the subject of a designation and the fact of local 
knowledge was a key advantage in the ability to appreciate what was there and the 
likely legitimacy of the visit by a surface vessel to the site. 
The technical capability of the service coupled with the local knowledge and maritime 
passion of the volunteers is a potentially significant resource were HE to be able to 
provide some further technical support or information to enable better reporting. NCI 
provided in excess of 262,400 hours of coastal surveillance in 2017 with no public 
funding.358  In that same year, the casualty analysis breakdowns show that around 12 
incidents were for illegal/anti-social activity, but there is no additional breakdown as to 
type.  It is notable that there is no heritage category for reporting however.359  There 
is certainly an inshore potential for NCI as an eyes and ears asset for the early 
discovery of unwanted interventions.360  
 
4.2.15 - Environment Agency 
 
Structure Aims and Objectives 
The Environment Agency (EA) is a non-departmental public body sponsored by 
DEFRA.  It was created by the Environment Act 1995 through a merger of the National 
Rivers Authority, waste regulation authorities and Her Majesty’s inspectorate of 
Pollution.361  The EA was effective from April 1996.  So far as is relevant to the project, 
the EA has powers in respect of certain fisheries – specifically related to migratory 
                                            
356 See for example https://www.nci.org.uk/content/our-work (last accessed October 2018) 
357 As to which, see the Strategic Overview of Search and Rescue in the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, 2017, UK Search and Rescue, available from 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/59
3127/mca_uksar.pdf (last accessed October 2018) 
358 https://www.nci.org.uk/ (last accessed October 2017) 
359 NCI Incident Analysis 2017, available from https://www.nci.org.uk/files/incident_analysis_sheet_-
2017v3.pdf (last accessed October 2018) 
360 It is understood that work is underway to integrate NCI within the Heritage Watch scheme (Mark 
Harrison, pers comm.) 
361 Environment Act 1995, s2(1), and Schedule 1 
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fish, bathing, and general coastal, water quality and flood defences and coastal 
erosion. 
Enforcement Powers the EA’s powers of enforcement arise under a number of 
measures, which are not particularly relevant in the context of UHA, and not explored 
here; and is governed by the Regulator’s Code.362 This notes at 4.2 that “When the 
law allows, regulators should agree secure mechanisms to share information 
with each other about businesses and other bodies they regulate, to help target 
resources and activities and minimise duplication.”  There is a difference in 
regulatory approach, perhaps between the EA and Historic England in terms of 
focus, but the clear steer towards information sharing where possible has potential. 
 
Potential for collaboration on Enforcement of UHA Protection The EA’s main 
potential would be appear to be limited to that of a reporting, information gathering 
body.  The EA’s limited on-water presence does, though, offer some capability. 
 
 
4.2.15 - Natural England 
 
Structure Aims and Objectives 
As with the EA above, Natural England (NE) is a non-departmental public body under 
the sponsorship of DEFRA. It was established by the Natural Environment and Rural 
Communities Act 2006,363 by merging, along with their powers, the Countryside 
Agency, English Nature and the Rural Development Service.  NE is tasked with a 
general purpose to “to ensure that the natural environment is conserved, enhanced 
and managed for the benefit of present and future generations, thereby contributing to 
sustainable development”. 364  According to NE’s Corporate Plan, delivering on this 
purpose necessitates working closely “with other agencies such as the Environment 
Agency, Marine Management Organisation, the Forestry Commission and English 
Heritage to achieve better outcomes for people and the environment, to improve 
efficiency in our operations”.365 Although the specific focus is the natural environment, 
the general purpose is elaborate to include, “conserving and enhancing the 
landscape”. 366 In 2010, NE’s functional sphere of operation was extended by MACAA 
to include, “where the context requires, the territorial sea adjacent to England”.367  NE 
does not own any sea-going vessels and contracts the use when necessary.  There is 
thus not systematic on water presence, although NE conducts numerous coastal and 
shore-based assessments in order to fulfil their statutory objectives.  
                                            
362 BIS, The Regulators Code (2014), available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/30
0126/14-705-regulators-code.pdf (last accessed October 2018) 
363 Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006, s.1 
364 Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006, s.2(1) 
365 Natural England Corporate Plan 2014-2019, available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/30
0746/ne-corporate-plan-2014-2019.pdf (last accessed October 2018) 
366 Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006, s.2(1)(b) 
367 Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006, s.1(3), as amended by the Marine and 




Enforcement Powers  
The enforcement powers available to NE are conferred on wildlife officers and 
contained within the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 (as amended).  There is a 
specific focus on the natural environment, and in conjunction with the Habitats 
Regulations368 offences are created around the disturbance or destruction of 
protected features of habitats and of fauna and flora.  The habitats regulations as 
well as the MCZ obligations may necessitate investigation offshore, which would 
then trigger the enforcement powers. 
 
Potential for collaboration on Enforcement of UHA Protection 
So far as is relevant to the focus in this report, NE’s priorities promoting nature 
conservation and protecting biodiversity in a marine context, where those 
responsibilities align spatially with the English Inshore Marine Planning Area are 
potentially where any enforcement synergies could exist.  Work in respect of the 
relationship between UHA and features protected though the designation of Marine 
Conservation Zones (MCZ) identified the potential for overlapping issues in 
designation and potential impacts.369  Given the commitment to inter-agency working, 
a corollary of the relationship building in circumstances where UHA and MCZ features 
coexist might enable additional monitoring of a UHA site. Interventions in foreshore 
situations might also enable, at least, a reporting function from NE to Historic England 
where appropriate. 
  
                                            
368 The Conservation of Habitats and Species Regulations 2017 (SI 2017:1012) 
369 Firth, A. Salmon, P. and Snaith, E. (2017) Historic Environment Projects and Activities in Marine 
Conservation Zones. Project Number 7364, available from 
https://www.nauticalarchaeologysociety.org/sites/default/files/u13/HE%20MCZ%20Main%20Report_





The key points extracted from Chapter 4 are summarised below: 
 
 
 Numerous public (and other) bodies with a significant range of primary 
responsibilities operate in the English Inshore Marine Planning Area. 
 
 In order to further their powers and duties, these bodies are granted a variety of 
enforcement powers.  These are necessarily different and limited depending on the 
issue to be regulated, although there examples of generic enforcement powers 
available to certain bodies. 
 
 The wider use of collaborative working and use of the generic powers could bring 
significant benefit in the context of UHA protection; and a coordinated intelligence 
gathering capability would provide the opportunity of focused and effective targeting 
of physical resources. 
 
 Regardless of the ‘legal’ enforcement capability and resource, the availability of 






 Legal Resources: 
 
 The range of powers is significant.  The marine enforcement powers 
contained in the Policing and Crime Act 2017 along with those available to 
marine enforcement officers (including IFCOs) in the Marine and Coastal 
Access Act 2009 offer interdiction potential. 
 
 The Home Office police forces, MDP, BF, IFCOs and the RNFPS have the 
greatest range of direct legal powers to intervene in respect of criminal 
activity offshore. 
 
 Other than the Home Office Police Services, the remaining organisations 
shown above have the potential to use their powers beyond their specific 
areas of concern and for the protection of UHA in some circumstances. 
 
 Powers to stop and search in particular have significant potential within the 
English Inshore Marine Planning Area (and beyond, although this report is 
concerned solely with the EIMPA). 
 
 Greater awareness of the extent of the powers available, and their triggers 
might prove useful to some agencies. 
 
 
 Physical resources:  
 
 Availability of physical resources on the water is also limited.  Some bodies, 
by their very nature, have significant assets at their disposal in respect of 




 Not all English Home Office coastal police forces have a marine unit. There 
are, though, examples where more than one constabulary has access to a 
specific marine unit. 
 
 Both BF and the Royal Navy are expanding their presence offshore. 
 
 Airborne resources are both costly and limited.  None of the contributors 
indicated their use in UHA settings. 
 
 The availability and use of drones and/or other unmanned autonomous 
resources is very limited at present. 
 
 While consideration of any changes to the provision of physical resources in 
the English Marine Inshore Planning Area consequent on the UK’s potential 
exit from the European Union in 2019 was not part of the project focus, it was 
noted by some interviewees as suggesting at a change of role and addition 




 Information and intelligence resources:  
 
 The NMIC provides a real-time, round the clock oversight of the English 
Inshore Marine Planning Area (and beyond).  As a multi-agency collaborative 
venture between a number of stakeholder departments it is ideally placed 
strategically to coordinate information and tasking in respect of UHA 
 
 Of the many other bodies on the water, the potential exists to develop 
protocols in respect of information gathering and incident reporting if actually 
enforcement intervention is not possible pursuant to that body’s statutory 
powers 
 
 The National CoastWatch Institution offers a considerable opportunity to 
















5.  PROBLEMS OF ENFORCEMENT 
 
“ … in terms of maritime heritage crime, a lot of it happens underwater. So you could 
say that even if you came over a protected site, that you weren’t actually diving on it, 
you were over there and you drifted. So because so much of what goes on is 
unseen, it’s just not visible, then it is very difficult to prove … you don’t know what 
was going on under the water, you only have a snapshot of what was going on 
above it.” 370  
 
It is beyond dispute that the enforcement of any regulatory regime in the marine 
environment poses challenges that are unique to that environment and far more 
onerous than those presented in the terrestrial environment.  The challenges posed in 
enforcing the statutory regimes protecting UHA are additionally challenging, even for 
the marine environment. The reasons for this are manifold, some being obvious, whilst 
others are less so. In the following sections  the specific challenges of protecting UHA 
are examined in the context of potential cross-party working.  
 
 




Perhaps the most obvious challenges arise from the physical marine environment.  
UHA are located not only in a sparsely populated marine environment but they are 
also underwater, making observation and monitoring very difficult.  Added to this, 
human presence in the English marine environment is very seasonal, in particular the 
recreational boating and diving seasons are relatively short, usually lasting from April 
to the end of September.  Thus even where sites have licensed teams assigned to 
them or are protectively ‘adopted’ by divers,371 human presence, including diving 
presence, is very limited. To this can also be added the fact that such human presence 
is not evenly spread within that environment. Some area of the coast and territorial 
waters tend not be visited or transited by marine users and are often backed by a rural, 
sparsely populated coastal hinterland.  This compounds the difficulties considerably.    
 
The Nature of Diving Activity and a Fragmented Regulatory Framework 
 
While some unauthorised activities on land, for example vandalism, metal theft and 
even metal detecting, might be relatively easy to spot, it is extremely difficult, by 
                                            
370 Marine and Coastguard Agency official, pers. comm. 




uninformed observation alone, to discern whether or not an underwater  activity 
constitutes a heritage crime.  Although the presence of divers is usually denoted by 
the presence of a surface craft supporting the diving operations, once the divers have 
descended it is impossible to observe exactly where they are diving or what specific 
activity is occurring. Even more difficulty is imposed by the fact that some designated 
or scheduled UHA’s have authorisations issued for visiting, survey or intrusive activity 
with recoveries. Additionally, undesignated UHA can be subject to lawful salvage by 
recovery of artefacts by hand, without requiring authorisation under the marine 
licensing system. Consequently, the fragmented and complex regulatory framework 
complicates protection of UHA and limits the understanding of this framework by 
professional maritime agencies and the Police,372 yet alone the general public.  Even 
where the mode of recovery of objects from the bottom of the seabed requires 
authorisation it is not possible to readily ascertain if such authorisation exists. 
Consequently, at present, the input into the protection of UHA’s by the Police, maritime 
agencies present at sea, diving groups or the general public is thus very limited in 
potential.373   
 
‘Rescue from the Deep’ –  A Cultural Mindset 
The removal of lead from a church roof, or artefacts from within a church or museum 
would be instantly condemned as a heritage crime by the majority of the public. 
However there appears to be a cultural mindset that material lost at sea should be 
recovered, sometimes irrespective of an economic value or any functional need.374 
Various motivations appear to be at play here. In part, for divers, there is a technical 
challenge in recovering a historic artefact intact, or relatively intact.  This adds a new 
challenge and dimension to diving for those for whom ‘look, don’t touch’ is no longer 
a sufficiently fulfilling experience. Souvenir hunting, comparable to the taking of 
souvenirs from terrestrial tourist heritage destinations, is also a factor, as is a public 
association with recovery of treasure from the seabed. The latter seems quite 
cemented in the public psyche and can probably be traced back to the recovery of 
Spanish silver from the Nuestra Senora de la Concepcion by William Phips in 1687.375 
Subsequent recoveries of bullion cargoes, both historical and contemporary, have 
continued to feed this very strong association in the public mind between diving and 
treasure recovery.376 
                                            
372 Even when such understanding is sought it is difficult to access the regulatory framework due to its 
fragmented nature 
373 This is a problem shared for example with IFCA’s in areas where some types of netting for sea fish 
resources is permitted. Members of the public are unable to discern between lawful and unlawful 
netting  
374 ProMare, SHIPS Project, Peter Holt (pers comm.) 
375 See further Earle, P. ‘The Treasure of the Concepcion. The Wreck of the Almiranta’ (1980) Viking 
Press New York 





These factors may be further reinforced by what is a tradition originating in early history 
of diving. From the earliest days of hard hat diving in the early 19th century the salvage 
divers have had a tradition of gathering, displaying and selling, artefacts recovered.377 
Such was and remains the public fascination with such recoveries from the seabed 
that entire museums are devoted to such material, as are auctions thereof.378  Clearly 
this fascination with the recovery of what are, often, unremarkable items which on land 
would probably be regarded as disposable refuse, remains strong in the public’s mind. 
With the emergence of recreational SCUBA diving in the 1950’s this tradition was 
evidently carried over and became a significant threat to underwater cultural heritage.  
 
All these factors created a cultural mindset, both within the general public and the 
recreational diving community, which instinctively drives recovery of items from the 
seabed and in which there is no recognition of the principle or benefits of in situ 
preservation. For an illustration as to how deeply this cultural mindset is embedded 
within the public psyche one only has to look at the relatively recent events surrounding 
                                            
377 See further Bevan, J, ‘The First Treasure Divers’ (2010) Aqua Press Essex. For a later, 20th 
century illustration of this culture see Grosset, H. ‘Down to the Ships in the Sea’ (1953) Hutchinson & 
Co. London   
378 See for example http://museum.maritimearchaeologytrust.org/  and   
https://www.shipwreckcharlestown.com/ and http://www.numa.net/2017/06/nanking-cargo-riches-
from-the-orient/ (last accessed October 2018) 
Sometimes the public 
stereotype of divers 
and gold is justified. 
c.400 gold coins 
ranging in date 
between 1106 and 
1635 with Marrakech as 
the dominant mint were 
recovered from the  
Salcombe Cannon site 




the ‘real’ treasure of the 
find is that the British 
Museum had only 
approx. eight coins of 
the type found and that 
the Arabic script (no 
images) records the 
family history of the 
rulers of the area and 
therefore contributes to 
the cultural history of 
the period. Now in the 
British Museum and 
forming  part of the 546 
artefacts collection of 
the ‘Salcombe Cannons 






the grounding of the timber cargo of the Kodima379 and of the bulk container vessel 
the Napoli.380  Both instances saw considerable numbers of the public gathering to 
recover items of cargo, sometimes at considerable physical risk to themselves, the 
economic value of which probably did not warrant the time and effort expanded and 
certainly not the risks taken. What occurred was more an expression of cultural values 
than exploitation of an economic opportunity. With the creation of a single Receiver of 
Wreck for the United Kingdom as an official of the Marine & Coastguard Agency (MCA) 
in 1992, a concerted drive was made by the Agency to educate the recreational diving 
community as to the merits of in situ preservation and to raise awareness of the 
obligation to report recoveries of wreck. From the late 1990’s  significant resources, 
led by the United Kingdom’s diving organisations, the ROW  and the Joint Nautical 
Archaeology Policy Committee (JNAPC), were  devoted to a public education 
campaign to educate divers to ‘Take only photographs, leave only bubbles’ and to 
report any recoveries to the Receiver of Wreck.381 
 
While there is compelling evidence that these educational initiatives have substantially 
changed attitudes within the diving community, it is unclear as to what extent they 
remain alive. There is anecdotal evidence that in some regions of England they 
remain, albeit as a minority view, within the diving community. Concern has risen that 
resources for the continuation of these educational initiatives are no longer available, 
so its continuation has been scaled back and that such educational efforts need to be 
refreshed and resourced again to forestall a resurgence of such activities.382  
Furthermore, concern has been expressed by MCA officials that parallel, non-
statutory, voluntary reporting schemes for the recovery of wreck and other heritage 
material are confusing the public,383  who may not realise that they are also legally 
obliged to report wreck recoveries to the ROW. . Clearly these officials would prefer 
that such voluntary avenues did not exist.   
 
 
                                            
379 The Kodima grounded in Whitsand Bay, South Cornwall in 2001. Much of her  cargo of cheap 
timber washed overboard before the ship was pulled clear and local persons went to extraordinary 
efforts to bring what was timber of little monetary value up cliff faces. See further:   
http://www.looe.org/kodima.html (last accessed October 2018). 
380 The container ship Napoli was deliberately beached off Branscombe, South Devon in 2007. 
Multiple containers came ashore and hundreds of persons descended upon the beach, breaking open 
sealed containers and causing public disturbance. See further 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MSC_Napoli#Beached_at_Lyme_Bay (last accessed October 2018) and 
‘Salvage, Pollution or Looting: The Stranding of the Napoli’s Cargo’ Glover, M. Lowther, J. & Williams, 
M.V  Journal of International Maritime Law  (2009) 15(1) pp. 65-98. 
381 The initiative was entitled ‘Respect Our Wrecks’ and received wide support from heritage 
organisations, agencies and government departments. It published leaflets such as ‘Underwater 
Finds’ and ‘Underwater Finds Guidance for Divers’ and continues online 
https://www.bsac.com/advice-and-support/respect-our-wrecks/respect-our-wrecks-policy/  (last 
accessed October 2018). 
382The view was echoed in interviews that such educational initiatives highlighted issues for a while, 
then funding diminishes or stops, so the next ‘generation’ of users come through without that 
educational information. Continuity of funding is regarded as essential by these interviewees.   
383 Although not expressly identified it is reasonable to assume the reference made was to the 
Portable Antiquities Scheme https://finds.org.uk/, the Marine Antiquities Scheme 
https://marinefinds.org.uk/ and the Fishing Industry Protocol for Archaeological Discoveries 
https://fipad.org/ (last accessed October2018). 
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5.2 Enforcement Challenges 
 





Picture Credit: Hampshire Constabulary – one of the craft from the marine unit on Patrol 
 
 
While management of UHA in the English Inshore Marine Planning Area  is the 
responsibility of Historic England, investigation and prosecution of offences under the 
PWA and AMAAA is, as noted above, the responsibility of the relevant coastal Police 
Service 384  The problem of protecting UHA for these  coastal Police Services  are 
manifold. The challenges of protecting UHA due to the physical environment have 
already been noted above. It is also a given that protection cannot be pro-active in 
terms of ‘standing patrols’ to any large extent or indeed at all in the future, due to lack 
of resources. Rather the gathering of intelligence, protection, investigation and 
prosecution has to be predominantly preventative, reactive, and intelligence led. Even 
then a lack of resources, training and perceived priority are significant constraints.  
 
Half of the coastal Police Services  interviewed lack a dedicated marine unit and those 
that do have a very limited capacity. Noticeable exceptions to this are the Hampshire 
& Isle of Wight Constabulary, who proactively patrol, were aware of protected UHA’s 
and conduct educational outreach to local sailing and diving clubs; and Kent Police,, 
who also proactively patrol. To a large extent, the former’s educational and outreach 
activities appear to be the initiative of a single officer who is interested in heritage and 
in any event due to funding constraints the Unit is scheduled to be disbanded in March 
                                            
384 Enforcement relating to Marine Licensing is the responsibility of the Marine Management 
Organisation, while enforcement under the Protection of Military Remains Act 1986 is the 
responsibility of the MOD Police.   
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2019. In the case of the Kent Police, although several members had a degree of 
knowledge of the regulatory frameworks surrounding UHA, this was not felt to be 
sufficiently developed and the Force does not appear to conduct educational outreach. 
Elsewhere Police capacity for protecting UHA was significantly more limited. 385 
 
Of the Police Services interviewed none reported having a designated Heritage Crime 
Liaison Officer (HCLO) as such. This seems to be a label that does not actually exist 
on the ground despite what we had previously heard. All the services were covering 
this role with one or more Rural Crime team members within that team taking 
responsibility for heritage crime but the tasking was covered by the rural team as a 
whole rather than a designated person with the job title of ‘HCLO’.386  This seems to 
be an approach that is working, although it appears that there is insufficient 
development of specialist knowledge and awareness of the regulatory framework for 
UHA. Undoubtedly this is a reflection of Policing priorities and a lack of sufficient 
specific training, coupled with the fact that since the responsibility for crime against 
UHA is relatively new to the remit of Rural Crime teams it means they are still finding 
their feet in this respect.  In all cases, with the exception of the Hampshire & Isle of 
Wight officer, all members of the Rural Crime Team interviewed readily conceded a 
lack of specific knowledge of the regulatory framework surrounding UHA’s, were not 
aware of any specific training on the matter387 and felt that if they or colleagues were 
confronted by a UCH issue, they have to seek basic information about that regulatory 
framework and whom to contact for help other than Historic England. This last point 
was underlined during the course of the Project when, following an interview with the 
Project’s authors, one coastal Police Force subsequently contacted the Project team 
seeking information relating to the regulatory framework for UHA, as  a potential 
offence relating to UHA’s had been brought to their attention and the Force was 
struggling to access that information.  
 
An easily accessible source of such information and of the location of UHA in a policing 
area was felt to be highly desirable but presently lacking, and  a potential obstacle to 
effective protection. In turn there was also a clear perception that this lack of UCH 
awareness led to a perceived lack of priority concerning UCH crime. In particular the 
absence of a perceived monetary value was felt to result in an assignment of a low 
priority to marine or terrestrial heritage crime. Crimes against terrestrial property 
frequently have  a tangible economic loss ascribed  to  them  and it was felt that Police 
Services were accustomed to that and were more comfortable when that was present,  
whereas UCH crime frequently, though not necessarily, involves material where 
economic values are low but cultural values, especially in terms of cultural information, 
can be high.  As one Police officer put it “The key to making it more of a priority is 
providing the context – what is the impact on the community?”. Set in the context of 
the National Strategic Assessment, this is perhaps indicative of the highlighted 
                                            
385 The position in respect of education and outreach is fluid and under development, Mark Harrison 
(pers comm.) 
386 Although this format is utilised in a range of crime types e,g, Wildlife Crime and so should  perhaps 
be viewed as a positive, Mark Harrison (pers comm.) 
387 Basic training on heritage crime in general has been provided by Historic England, in particular, HE 
has provided training to over 9,000 practitioners and community activists, with officers from Kent and 
Essex being particularly knowledgeable.  Mark Harrison (pers comm.) 
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dissonance between the operational realities and the policy imperatives identified in 
the Assessment.  
 
In effect a lack of training, contextual cultural awareness and resulting perception of 
low priority becomes a negative feedback loop. This is illustrated by the fact that there 
was very little or no awareness of the existence and potential of NMIC within the Rural 
Crime teams, although Police Forces are ‘plugged’ into NMIC, and no specific crime 
prevention is undertaken for UCA crime, with the noticeable exception of Hampshire 
& Isle of Wight Constabulary, despite the fact that Police Community Support Officers 
(PCSO’s) have a specific crime prevention role. At least two Police Officers identified 
the potential for PCSO’s in coastal forces to conduct an educational and crime 
prevention initiative with local diving and other recreational water user clubs, dive 
shops and charter boat skippers but conceded that they were unaware of such an use 





The problem appears to be compounded by the fact that there is no unique ‘tag’ within 
the crime recording system specifically for heritage crime per se, so that it is difficult 
to quantify the extent of the problem and the societal impact and to justify the 
expenditure of resources in relation to it. Additionally if heritage crime had a specific 
tag assigned to it then sentencing could be harsher as heritage crime carries harsher 
penalties. In turn this would potentially result in a higher priorities being assigned to 
heritage crime as a more serious offence and perhaps greater resourcing would be 
provided. Interestingly MCA officials made the same point, ascribing a lack of 
importance attached to UCH crime by the Police to a lack of economic loss being 
involved, which in turn resulted in a perception of low priority and disinclination to 
prosecute offences involving UHA. Conversely, the MMO appears to be very aware of 
A ‘strumenti con 
immanicatura a cannone’ 
from Salcombe ‘B’ 
Bronze Age Wreck Site.  
This class is peculiar to 
Sicilian late prehistory. 
The first secure Bronze 
Age object of 
Mediterranean origin to 
be found in North West 
Europe, its monetary 
value is probably very 
low, but as secure 
evidence of pan 
European trade in the 
Bronze Age its cultural 
value to present society is 
extremely high.   
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loss of cultural value where marine licensing offences have occurred and several 
prosecutions have featured this aspect.388  
While it appears that a change in mind-set within the wider Police Service would be 
beneficial, since the knowledge of underwater heritage crime is very limited, the 
overriding impression gathered is that the will of the Rural Crime teams to engage with 
the issues in respect of such crime is increasing as they are interested now that it is 
within their remit and Historic England has made valiant efforts in terms of Police 
liaison. However, these teams still appear to lack specific training and ease of access 
to specialised information and available resources, so that they tend to operate in 
something of a vacuum apart from contact with Historic England. While it would be 
entirely unrealistic not to acknowledge the restraints imposed by current public funding 
upon the service levels that the Police can provide and how this relates to operational 
Policing priorities,389 there are clearly adjustments and initiatives that could be 
undertaken within existing resources at little additional cost. These are discussed in 





                                            
388 See further:  https://www.gov.uk/government/news/man-found-guilty-of-marine-licensing-offences-
relating-to-salvage-of-shipwreck ;   http://thepipeline.info/blog/2018/06/23/wreck-divers-jailed-for-theft-
from-protected-wreck-of-wwi-hms-hermes/  ;   https://www.gov.uk/government/news/master-and-
owner-charged-for-illegal-salvage-of-sunken-vessel ;  https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-kent-
27426100 (last accessed October 2018).  
389 Currently these priorities were stated to be offences against persons, not property, which are 
considered to be high risk and high harm. Examples given included were child abuse and exploitation, 
modern slavery and people trafficking and counter terrorism.   
17th Century Clay Pipe from the Salcombe Cannons site, exhibiting a number of 
rare or unique features, provisionally dated to 1635-54 (Davey, 2003). Only a few 
other similar items of the period exist. The mouthpiece end is missing and a small 




Ministry of Defence Police 
 
Although the Ministry of Defence Police (MDP) has a large marine fleet of launches 
and rigid inflatables, its potential is limited by the relatively small geographical location 
of these units, presently being restricted to the three Naval Bases at Plymouth 
Devonport, Portsmouth and the Clyde. However since all three locations have 
important UHA’s located within their harbour boundaries the potential of the MDP to 
enhance protection of UHA’s is not insignificant.  
 
It is not surprising that the constraints facing the utilisation of the MDP for such 
enhancement mirror those in relation to coastal Police Forces. While the MDP 
continues to have a relatively large waterborne presence, a similar lack of familiarity 
with the regulatory framework surrounding UHA exists, as does a lack of provision for 
training or ease of access to information concerning location of UHA and potential 
‘escalation’ routes and communication points. Interestingly, a basic guide to the 
regulatory framework concerning fisheries is available to MDP officers afloat, which 
suggests that a degree of cross-party working is already underway and clearly MDP 
have no reservations about such working, subject to the customary caveats 
concerning operational priorities and resource implications.  MDP reported no aerial 
assets and informed the authors that if such were needed that they would approach 















Of all the ‘sister’ agencies Border Force (BF) appears to have the greatest potential 
for enhancing protection of UHA at sea, due to its extensive maritime capability, extent 
of its presence at sea, which, as one officer put it, leads to an appreciation of local 
situational awareness and what is “normal at sea”. These capabilities, combined with 
the fact that, as noted above, BF has marine enforcement powers under the Policing 
and Crime Act 2017 (PACA) that can be  exercised at sea in respect of  protected UHA 
under the PWA, AMAAA  and PMRA does more than put ‘eyes and ears’ on the 
water.390  This has the potential to directly enhance protection of UHA in English 
waters. Moreover, BF has a strong cross party working institutional ethos, already 
working closely with the MCA, the MMO and IFCA’s, as well as having a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) with National Coastwatch Institution (NCI). Joint working 
                                            
390 These marine enforcement powers can be exercised by virtue of s.84 Policing and Crime Act 
2017. When interviewed BF officials were unaware of the full implications of s.84 and were under the 
impression that BF officers could only observe and gather evidence. Clearly s.84 empowers direct 
intervention where a BF officer suspects a criminal offence is being committed under the PWA and 
AMAAA.    
CPV NIMROD  
Border Force’s fleet of Coastal Patrol Vessels (CPV’s)  engage with the local 
maritime public and act as a highly visible deterrent to those who would engage 




therefore is clearly a strong ethos within BF. Nevertheless there are legal and resource 
limitations presently facing the utilisation of BF for enhancing the protection of UHA’s.   
Unless BF officers are able to satisfy themselves that they need to use the marine 
enforcement powers in order to prevent, detect, investigate or prosecute an offence, 
they will be limited to monitoring sites and vessels and, where possible, taking photos 
from afar. This means that for those UHA not  protected  under the PWA,  AMAA  or 
PMRA , the marine enforcement powers  detailed above will only be available to BF  
officials where the damaging activity suspected by Historic England and/or BF officials 
is either in breach of an existing marine licence or is being carried on without a marine 
licence where one should be in place, or is in potential breach of the provisions of the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (MSA) because it is suspected that no report to the 
Receiver of Wreck has been or will be made of any material recovered from any 
unprotected UHA site. 
Further limits on BF officers’ powers under the PACA  are the Flag State of any vessel 
it encounters and the area of waters in which such a vessel is encountered. These are 
summarised at Figure 1 below.  While the maritime enforcement powers are available 
to BF officers  without any prior authority in relation to UK vessels (and vessels with 
no flag state) within English and Welsh territorial waters, the prior authorisation of the 
Secretary of State for the use of any of the maritime enforcement powers in relation to 
a foreign vessel (or any vessel of the Isle of Man, the Channel Islands or any British 
overseas territory) in English and Welsh territorial waters is required.391  This 
authorisation can only be given where the foreign state has either requested or 
consented to the involvement of the UK authorities or where the Law of the Sea 
Convention (LOSC) provides authorisation to UK officials to exercise the relevant 
powers.392 This requirement will limit the effectiveness of BF  officials, particularly in 
relation to foreign ships found within English waters. Given that the protection of UHA 
would be a marginal activity for BF,  it is open to question whether they will want to 
commit the resources and time to acquiring prior authorisation from the Home Office 
and, further, whether the Home Office will be willing to do the same where the consent 
of the Flag State is required. In addition, the prior authorisation of the Secretary of 
State is also needed where the maritime enforcement powers are to be used in respect 
of a UK ship in foreign waters. Such authorisation will only be given where the relevant 
foreign state has consented to the use of the powers. This limit on the maritime 
enforcement powers in the main will fall outside the scope of this Report, which is 
focused on matters within the English Inshore Marine Planning Area. However, this 
limitation may be important to note in instances where any UHA is sited or vessel is 
encountered close to the edge of English territorial waters. If the vessel is in fact 
stopped outside of territorial waters then prior authorisation might be needed in the 
limited instances where England’s territorial waters border foreign waters (such as in 
                                            
391 S.85(3) PACA.  
392 S.85(4) PACA.  
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the English Channel and by the Isle of Man, which is treated as a foreign state for the 
purposes of the 2017 Act).393   
Additionally there are also problems facing the utilisation of BF for enhancing the 
protection of UHA that relate to logistical deficiencies. As with the coastal Police 
Forces there is no training provided as to the context of UCH nor the regulatory 
framework surrounding it. Sites designated under the PWA  are marked on Admiralty 
charts, but the information is just one aspect amongst many other features, which does 
not make it readily accessible. Nor are BF made aware of any undesignated or 
unscheduled UHA that are of particular interest, unless specific information or tasking 
relating to unauthorised activities on such sites comes through the MCA or the MMO 
via NMIC and JMOCC. In many ways these deficiencies mirror those highlighted with 
coastal Police Forces and their Rural Crime teams. However, notwithstanding these 
problems, the utilisation of BF’s marine capability to enhance protection of UHA has 
significant and, as yet, untapped potential.   
 
                                            
393 As are the Channel Islands and British Overseas Territories (s.95(1) Policing and Crime Act 2017)  
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At the time of writing, Inshore Fisheries & Conservation Authorities (IFCA’s) 
possessed approximately 34 Category 2 or 3 boats, which are regularly used to patrol 
within their statutory Districts. This marine presence, together with a statutory duty 
under s.174 MACCA to co-operate with any public authority regulating activities in the 
sea within an IFCA District, and an existing facility for being tasked via NMIC and 
JMOCC, offers significant potential for enhancing the protection of UHA. After BF, 
IFCA’s offer the second largest potential for enhancing protection of UHA at sea.  
This potential is not as great as that of BF, since IFCA officers lack marine enforcement 
powers under the PACA that BF officers possess and an IFCA District only extends 
seaward out to 6 nautical miles from the Baseline, which covers only half of the 12 
nautical mile seaward extent of English Inshore Marine Planning Area Historic England  
operates. This means that IFCA officers could only observe, acting as ‘eyes and ears 
on the water’394 within half of the seaward distance of territorial waters.395   
Furthermore, other current limitations are present, which mirror those noted in respect 
of coastal Police Forces and BF. While IFCA’s are regularly tasked through NMIC and 
JMOCC for co-operative tasks, such as observation on vessels of interest to the MMO 
in respect of marine licensing offences, it appears that Historic England does not fully 
avail itself of NMIC’s resources and no tasking comes through JMOCC to IFCA’s upon 
behalf of Historic England. Additionally, there is no training provided to IFCA officers 
in relation to the context of UCH nor the regulatory framework surrounding it and, while 
sites designated under the PWA  are marked on Admiralty charts, the information is 
just one aspect amongst many other features, which does not make it readily 
                                            
394 A view endorsed to the authors by the Association of Inshore Fisheries and Conservation 
Authorities (AIFCA).  
395 Though with the formulation of a new UK Fisheries policy post Brexit it is possible that the inshore 
remit of IFCA’s will be extended to encompass all UK territorial waters, i.e. up to 12 nautical miles off 
shore.  
Devon & Severn IFCA 
Enforcement Officer Dan 
Cresswell undertaking a 
routine patrol in Plymouth 
Sound. This is one of 
several patrol vessels 
operated by Devon & 
Severn IFCA and in Autumn 
2018 the Authority will take 
delivery of a large RIB patrol 
vessel with enhanced 
‘standoff’ infra-red 
surveillance capability. In 
future this surveillance 
capacity may be augmented 
by the use of Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles .  
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accessible. Consequently, the presence of protected sites under the PWA  is neither 
readily accessible to IFCA officers nor is it highlighted to them. Also IFCA’s are not 
made aware of any undesignated or unscheduled UHA that are of particular interest. 
The intelligence gathering capacity of IFCA’s, which given the local nature of their 
knowledge and work within specific Districts, is considerable, does not therefore 
appear to be currently utilised by Historic England or DCMS. Each IFCA also 
possesses a website, which is heavily utilised by both commercial and recreational 
sea users and could be a valuable outlet for both disseminating information and 
receiving it. Given the government’s policy drive to greater cross departmental and 
cross agency working this must represent a considerable opportunity to enhance 
protection of UHA, at least out to 6 nautical miles.  This would not be without 
challenges and some interviewees felt that what they termed as the ‘silo approach’ 
typical of regulatory frameworks meant that any cross party working could be 
potentially constrained by a lack of inter-departmental communication between 
DEFRA (the IFCAs’ parent department) and DCMS (Historic England’s parent 
Department). However, it was observed that the current ‘line from the Treasury’ was 
for innovation, rather than any increase in resources, and the principle of ‘better 
together’ could facilitate cross-party working in enhancing protection for UHA provided 
that issues of inter-departmental communication could be overcome and such cross-
party working was incentivised.  
  
Marine Management Organisation (MMO) 
 
As detailed previously Historic England has inherited a MOU with the MMO and it 
appears that a close working relationship exists, with Historic England acting as 
statutory adviser to the MMO in relation to UCA. Historic England frequently provides 
advice relating to marine license applications and has acted in an expert witness 
capacity in relation to the recent prosecutions the MMO has conducted in respect of 
marine licensing offences committed on unprotected UHA’s. In many ways the working 
relationship between Historic England and the MMO appears to be the closest of all 
the current working relationships. That said, inevitably it is not without some limitations 
which the MMO felt could be improved upon. Intelligence sharing was felt to be 
capable of improvement, as was real time electronic monitoring of vessels’ proximity 
in respect of UHA.  In this respect there was considered to be potential in developing 
an intelligence network. The MMO also questioned the extent to which Historic 
England had in-house intelligence analysis capability, as it appeared uncertain 
whether Historic England did. Additionally it is felt that awareness raising for MMO 
staff in respect of UHA’s could be beneficial. In many ways the working relationship 
between Historic England and the MMO is a template for other working relationships 
and while aspects requiring improvement can be identified the relationship appears to 















With a planned increasing sea presence from new vessels being commissioned, the 
RNFPS would seem to offer considerable potential for enhancing protection for UHA. 
Unfortunately foreign water commitments are likely to result in only three vessels being 
available to patrol UK waters. Additionally where these vessels concentrate within UK 
waters will be dictated by fisheries intelligence, seasonal fishing patterns and the types 
of fishing vessels being utilised. These parameters are likely to result in significant 
logistical restraints upon the ability of the RNFPS to enhance such protection.   
 
However, post Brexit UK fisheries policy may deliver extra RNFPS resources and 
within these limitations the RNFPS offers potential for cross party working, akin to that 
presently conducted by the RNFPS with the MMO in relation to fisheries and, to a 
lesser extent, marine licensing. Indeed the Squadron’s very existence is due to the 
need for such working and there is an expressed willingness and interest in doing so 
in terms of UHA. As with the coastal Police Forces and BF, the present constraints are 
centred upon a lack of knowledge of the context and regulatory framework surrounding 
UHA396 and a lack of clarity concerning appropriate procedures for reporting potential 
infringements, other than those related to marine licensing. Tasking of RNFPS vessels 
also comes through the MMO, not NMIC, though there appears to be an 
‘understanding’ these assets can be tasked in other activities. Nevertheless how 
                                            
396 Though interestingly the point was made that RN personnel have a higher than normal 
appreciation of the value of cultural heritage since heritage forms a core value of their training through 
RN history. 
HMS Forth a River Class 
Offshore Patrol Vessel of the 





intelligence led protection and enforcement would be tasked to RNFPS vessels may 




Along with the utilisation of BF’s marine enforcement powers the involvement of NMIC 
is the most effective step that could be taken to enhance protection of UHA. Currently 
some logistical and communicative difficulties present themselves but these seem 
surmountable without any undue difficulty.  NMIC confirmed that Historic England is 
not engaged with it and interviews with the Rural Crime teams of coastal Police Forces 
revealed few were aware of the role of NMIC or its potential in terms of marine heritage 
crime. Conversely BF is. NMIC has no database of protected UHA or unprotected ones 
and once again the issue of attaching a monetary worth to UHA was highlighted by 
NMIC, in that it would be helpful in providing justification for NMIC to engage in the 
enhancing of their protection. While such attachment is feasible, it may be more 
beneficial also to highlight the cultural value of UHA, which can often exceed that of 
monetary value, and the impact upon society of the loss of such cultural assets other 
than in monetary terms. This difficulty of regulatory systems affording priority, or even 
engagement, on the basis of monetary values is obviously a traditional method for 
evaluating operational priorities but it can be especially inappropriate for cultural 
heritage and is an issue which Historic England may well wish to consider in future 








































The Receiver of Wreck (ROW) is an official of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency 
(MCA), which has its own enforcement capabilities and brings its own prosecutions 
under the MSA  The MCA enforcement team and the ROW already work with the 
Heritage Agencies, the MMO, and coastal Police Forces and especially closely with 
NMIC and BF. Consequently, MCA officials appear reasonably satisfied with the 
present cross party co-operation in respect of heritage crime relating to wrecks. 
 
As noted previously, some concern was expressed over the apparent lack of 
understanding of coastal Police Forces in respect of the context of heritage crime and 
the potential impact upon society, which could not always be quantified in monetary 
terms, as well as the availability of voluntary parallel reporting schemes for recoveries 
from UHA, which were felt to be confusing to the public. The absence of Webcams in 
harbours was also felt to be an unfortunate omission, but otherwise no problems, other 
than those inherent in enforcing the regulatory framework surrounding UHA were 
identified and no new pathways for developing cross party working were identified.    
 
 
On 15th May 2014 two Kent divers, David Knight and Edward Hussey were 
convicted of not declaring multiple wreck recoveries to the Receiver of Wreck 
contrary to s.236 & s.237 Merchant Shipping Act A 1995. The MCA estimated the 














National Coastwatch Institution  
The National Coastwatch Institution (NCI), on an ad hoc local basis, often monitors 
diving activity on sites, especially where the presence of UHA is brought to the 
individual station’s attention.397 However, there is no institutionalised system for 
making such arrangements, nor does there appear to be any formal arrangement 
between Historic England and the NCI for bringing such sites to the NCI’s attention, 
sharing intelligence between Historic England and the NCI or a MOU between the two 
organisations. The potential of the NCI to monitor activity on UHA is constrained by 
the fact that there are areas where there is no NCI station and many protected UHA 
are not buoyed as such, making exact position fixing of diving activity difficult, which 
in turns limits the evidentiary value of such monitoring. Within these constrains though 
                                            
397 Such a site are the designated sites off Prawle Point, Salcombe in Devon, where the licenced 
diving group, the South West Maritime Archaeology Group, has entered into a site security 
arrangement with Prawle Pont NCI and Falmouth Coastguard. This is discussed further below.  
Copper ‘Bun’ Ingots and Tin ‘Plano-convex’ ingots from the Salcombe ‘C’ Bronze Age Site c. 1000-
850BC.  Copper and Tin are the two materials alloyed together to make bronze tools. These ingots 
do not visually appear to be very impressive or significant and would have little monetary value, but 
the Salcombe wreck provided the first secure evidence of a flourishing pan European Bronze Age 
metal trade, so they effectively wrote a new chapter in the Bronze Age history of the UK. Relatively 
low in monetary value in today’s society but culturally highly important in that they provided the first 
secure confirmation that European trading was taking place along the south coast of Britain. The 
ingots are all now in the British Museum and form part of the 390 artefacts Bronze Age collection 





the NCI could be a valuable resource for enhancing the protection of UHA if this 




Environment Agency and Natural England 
 
The Environment Agency (EA) and Natural England (NE) appear to offer very limited 
opportunities for cross-party working to enhance protection of UHA, principally due to 
their limited marine presence and capabilities.  
The EA is currently limited to small coastal vessels and 3 to 5 larger coastal vessels. 
These are quite specific in their location, engaged in water bathing quality monitoring 
and do not venture far offshore, sea based patrols no longer being conducted by the 
Agency.  It is doubtful that EA has any UHA awareness or knowledge of the regulatory 
framework surrounding UHA’s. From the EA’s perspective such awareness raising or 
training would have to be minimally invasive in terms of staff time and while EA staff 
could act as eyes and ears on the foreshore and, to a limited geographical extent, at 
sea the costs would have to be equally minimal to the Agency. All in all the 
opportunities for cross party working with the EA would seem very limited.   
Similar considerations apply to NE. NE has no sea going capability of its own and 
there is little awareness of UHA or the regulatory framework surrounding them. 
However, NE does have a presence on the coastal fringe and foreshore and protection 
is very much an organisational ethos, so some capacity exits for information sharing, 
with NE staff acting as ‘eyes and ears’, provided some training could be provided in 
relation to UHA and the regulatory framework with minimal impact upon staff 






The key points extracted from Chapter 5 are summarised below: 
 
 A degree of cross-party working already exists but often on a local, ‘ad hoc’ basis.  
 
 There is widespread institutional acceptance and even enthusiasm for further cross-
party joint working. 
 
 There are a number of very significant opportunities for cross-party working available 





 Parties with the potential to be involved in cross-party joint working lack an 
understanding of the context, nature and cultural importance of UHA. 
 
 These parties also lack easy access to information relating to the regulatory 
framework surrounding UHA, their location and the appropriate 
procedures/protocols to follow when in suspected cases of underwater heritage 
crime. 
 
 There is no national protocol for handling UHA crime. In particular this potentially 
leaves Marine Police Units and Border Force officers at an operational 
disadvantage. 
 
 As a result of the above, a focus upon financial values when assessing the 
seriousness of offences and no unique ‘tag’ for recording underwater heritage crime 
it is perceived as a low priority. 
 
 It appears insufficient advantage is being taken of the potential for crime prevention 
and reporting by use of stakeholders Volunteer Police Officers and PSCO’s. 
 
 These issues are a constraint and require addressing as a prerequisite to further 
joint working.  
 
 While Police marine assets are declining those of Border Force and RNFPS are 
increasing. 
 
 The Police and Crime Act 2017, with its conferment of marine enforcement powers 
upon Border Force officers, represents a highly significant potential enhancement to 












Enhancing protection for UHAs requires a multifaceted approach to build on the work 
already being undertaken by Historic England and others. Through this project, 
interviews have been conducted with representatives from a range of agencies and 
organisations whose work covers the marine environment (Table 1, Annex 1). The aim 
of these has been to determine what is currently being done and to identify ways in 
which protection could be enhanced at minimal cost through awareness raising and 
making better use of resources already in place.  
Some agencies/organisations are already involved in such work, and the ability of 
each organisation to engage varies depending on their remit and on the water 
presence as in Chapter 4. Some agencies, for example BF and the RNFPS have the 
ability to formally investigate vessels suspected of illegal activity through stop and 
search, whereas others such as the IFCAs and NE would have to take a more passive 
approach limited to intelligence gathering. All, however, have the potential to make 
valuable contributions to observation of activity and enhancing protection of UHAs. In 
order for this potential to be realised, awareness needs to be increased; if those 
working at sea have an understanding of what constitutes illegal activity and where 
protected sites are located then they have a far greater chance of investigating it or at 








It would appear that substantial will exists for making small changes to existing working 
practises to encompass more of a role for the protection of UHAs, particularly through 
joint working and intelligence gathering. This comes with the proviso that additional 
training and resources be made available such that the information required is clearly 
outlined as well as how and to whom it should be reported. If this can be achieved it 
should provide Historic England with a network for enforcement, intelligence gathering, 





Table 1: Joint working arrangements currently in place for all agencies/organisations interviewed and their future potential for engaging in the 
protection of UHAs. * NB. All expressed ability and willingness to help on the provision that adequate training and resources (e.g. Common 
Enforcement Manual (CEM), (see Chapter 5) be provided to them. Assessment of level of awareness has been made through questions asked 
to staff interviewed.  
Agency/Organisation Joint working arrangements Level of awareness of UHAs Potential* 
Border Force (BF) MMO, IFCAs, ROW, NCI 
Tasking & information sharing 
through NMIC 
- Low 
- Not a formal part of their remit  
- Eyes & ears.  
- Could check and talk to vessels of 
interest – information gathering & 
photography 
- Act as a deterrent by their very 
presence 
- Marine enforcement powers 
Environment Agency 
(EA) 
MMO, IFCAs, MOD Police, 
Police Forces, Defra 
- Low  
- Not a formal part of their remit 
and they are unlikely to interact 
with them through their daily tasks 
- Eyes & ears (limited scope as limited 
remit and water based assets) 





Other IFCAs, AIFCA, Chief 
Officers Group, MMO (Joint 
intelligence system), EA, NE, 
Police 
Tasking & Information sharing 
through NMIC via IFCA 
Enforcement Group 
- Low 
- Not a formal part of their remit  
- Potential for some interaction due 
to fishing activity around wreck 
sites and artefacts being 
recovered from fishing gear 
- Eyes & ears 
- Joint intelligence system run with 
MMO enables logging of UHA activity 
Marine Management 
Organisation (MMO) 
BF, IFCAs, RNFPS, Police 
Tasking & information sharing 
through NMIC & JMOCC 
- Medium 
- Dependent on role of staff. Those 
in the regional offices may have 
more awareness due to licencing  
- Eyes & Ears (regional offices already 
involved due to licencing 
- Able to investigate where required 
- Have been involved in some 





ROW, MMO, Police, HE 
(others as required through 
prosecutions) 
Tasking & information sharing 
through NMIC 
- High 
- UHA protection and investigation 
of crime relating to UHAs within 
their remit 
- Already heavily involved as protection 
of UHAs falls within their remit 




Agency/Organisation Joint working arrangements Level of awareness of UHAs Potential* 
Ministry of Defence 
Police (MDP) 
RN, QHM, Home Office (if 
requested), BF, Police.  
Some connection to NMIC but 
no direct communication 
channel 
- Low 
- No specific knowledge as not a 
formal part of their remit. 
- Some reports of following up 
leads from e.g. QHM and NCI in 
the past 
- Eyes & ears 
- Able to assist, enforce and take on 
monitoring and reporting 
- Marine enforcement powers 
MSDS Marine HE, Marine Consultancies, 
various project partners 
- High 
- As an archaeological consultancy 
all their work relates to heritage 
- Eyes & ears 




HM Coastguard, BF, HE, 
Protected Wreck Licensees,  
- Medium  
- Variation between watch stations 
due to location of protected wreck 
sites 
- Basic understanding heightened 
when protected sites are in 
proximity.  
- Some close working with HE 
licensees 
- Eyes & ears (can be requested to 




All government agencies (all 
government owned vessels 




- Act as a central hub for UHA 
intelligence gathering/information 
sharing 
- Incorporate UHAs into daily 
operational brief 
- Geofencing for protected sites to 
monitor vessel interaction 
Natural England (NE) EA, IFCAs, Cefas. Others on a 
site by site basis e.g. local 
councils 
- Low 
- Not a formal part of their remit 
and they are unlikely to interact 
with them through their daily tasks 
- Eyes & ears (limited to intertidal and 
occasional boat based fieldwork) 
                                            
398 The Protective Markings project is under development by MSDS Marine who are working to develop unique identifiers to mark protected wreck sites. The 
technology will mean that any diver who has touched the site and any artefacts removed from it will be marked with the identifier ensuring traceability and a 
proven link to aid prosecution (MSDS Marine, pers. comm.). 
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Agency/Organisation Joint working arrangements Level of awareness of UHAs Potential* 
Police Forces Other Police Forces, BF, 
MMO, HE, RN, local 
organisations 
- Medium 
- Variation between and throughout 
Forces depending on instance of 
crime 
- Awareness is increasing as now a 
formal part of the remit of Rural 
Teams 
- PCSOs able to be proactive in crime 
prevention 
- Control room increase recognition of 
UHA crime as heritage and log 
appropriately 
- Marine enforcement powers 
QHM Plymouth & 
Portsmouth 
Good working relationship with 
other water users/regulators  
IFCAs, MDP, NCI, RN 
- Medium 
- No CPD but awareness of wrecks 
within their waters. Port 
Conservancy Officers more aware 
- Eyes & ears 
- Conduit for information between 
different water users/regulators 
- Tasking of above 
Receiver of Wreck 
(ROW) 
MCA, MMO, Police, HE 
(others as required through 
prosecutions) 
Tasking & information sharing 
through NMIC 
- High 
- UHA protection and investigation 
of crime relating to UHAs within 
their remit 
- Already heavily involved as protection 
of UHAs falls within their remit 
- Supportive of ideas e.g. Online 
training, CEM 
Royal Navy Fisheries 
Protection Squadron 
(RNFPS) 
MMO, RN, BF 
Tasking through MMO or 
JMOCC 
- Medium 
- Some instances of investigation 
where fishing vessels have been 
engaged in salvage 
- General awareness of the 
importance of UHAs due to Naval 
history 
- Eyes & ears. Potential to routinely 
record all sightings of vessels at/near 
wreck sites 
- Intelligence gathering 
- Ability to board and search any 




6.1 Utilising Joint Working Arrangements 
 
The majority of agencies working in the marine environment are already engaged in 
joint working (Table 1), primarily due to the need to share resources and minimise 
expenditure.399 Some agencies e.g. MMO and MCA rely on joint working for access to 
the water as they have no waterborne assets themselves,400 but the majority have 
some waterborne assets and are therefore at sea (often on a daily basis). The main 
value in joint working would almost certainly come via increasing awareness and 
intelligence gathering through provision of additional eyes on the sea. Working with 
these agencies/organisations and therefore capitalising on the resources already 
present would provide a cost effective method for enhancing protection for UHAs. 
In most cases pre-existing joint working arrangements do not have a UHA component, 
but these arrangements provide a platform and lines of communication which could 
be utilised. Historic England has already established working relationships with many 
of the agencies/organisations interviewed, but it could be beneficial to formalise these 
arrangements and build on them further through making use of MOUs. 
There are some agencies whose involvement would have even greater value due to 
their remit and powers. The RNFPS for example has under MACCA the power to board 
all vessels, rather than only fishing vessels, meaning that they would be able to stop 
and search if required. The same applies for BF whose remit, although focussed on 
incidents relating to the Immigration Act 2017 and the Modern Slavery Act 2015 also 
have the ability to directly enforce protection of UHAs under the PWA and AMAAA 
Acts due to the marine enforcement powers given to them under the PACAt.401 
 
6.2 Memoranda of Understanding 
Whilst not legally binding, MOUs do carry a degree of weight and mutual respect, 
formalising the relationship that exists between organisations, and this may provide a 
catalyst for the inclusion of heritage concerns into the working of agencies on a more 
visible basis. An MOU already exists between Historic England and the MMO402 and 
it is suggested that this best practise should be expanded upon to encourage and 
engage agencies and organisations in the work of Historic England. In some instances 
there is pre-existing legal basis for these MOUs, for example with IFCAs through s.174 
MACAA and BF through s.84 PACA. 
MOUs could be drawn up between Historic England and all agencies/organisations 
mentioned here (Table 1) and this would give additional weight and formality to the 
process of protecting UHAs. By increasing the capacity for reporting through 
                                            
399 For example, the MMO, IFCAs and EA have cross warranting powers through the MCAA 2009 and 
often share patrols (EA/IFCA pers. comm.) 
400 MMO officers conduct fisheries patrols from Police vessels 
401 S.84 
402 The MMO also have MOUs relating to heritage with MCA and MoD (this relates to sustainable 
development and sustainable heritage) 
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formalising existing relationships in this manner it is more likely that were illegal activity 
occurring it would be reported through the correct channels.403 
 
6.3 Use of an Existing National Platform 
It is suggested that Historic England considers the value of NMIC as a central platform 
to utilise further the joint working arrangements already in place in the marine 
environment and expand them to encompass heritage protection. NMIC coordinates 
intelligence gathering and information sharing, providing a national platform which 
many agencies are already part of (Table 1) and through which joint working is 
facilitated, primarily for maritime safety and security. This could be capitalised on404 to 
encompass intelligence relating to UHA, providing a central point through which 
information could be passed to Historic England and other relevant bodies and through 
which tasking could be requested. Agencies such as BF view NMIC as an essential 
component of cross party working, proving its worth and potential for added value 
here.405  NMIC representatives suggested that intelligence relating to UHAs become 
part of their daily operational brief such that information would then be gathered 
systematically and routinely and reported back to Historic England.406 There would 
also be the possibility of establishing a database entry of protected UHA assets;407 an 
idea that has been supported by IFCAs, BF, Police Forces and the RNFPS as a useful 
resource. Furthermore, NMIC hold a list of vessels and individuals of interest compiled 
by the MCA/ROW which provides an additional useful resource.408 
NMIC use the CAMTES platform and geofencing, which permits easy identification of 
any vessel through AIS which has entered a determined perimeter around a feature. 
This could therefore be used around protected wreck sites (and indeed already is for 
the HMS Victory 1744 and HMS Warrior) to afford additional protection. Vessels are 
able to dim their AIS to avoid detection however, which may mean they can enter such 
sites unnoticed, but the process of dimming it is in itself likely to draw attention as in 
the case of Friendship Offshore BV.409 
Establishing this kind of relationship with NMIC would provide a gateway for Historic 
England to engage with a range of agencies and a channel for communication and 
awareness raising, increasing the likelihood of suspicious/illegal activity relating to 
UHAs being recognised and properly addressed. It is proposed that use of NMIC 
                                            
403 With time this approach could be expanded to include those likely to be spending time at sea e.g. 
divers, fishermen, charter boat operators, yachtsmen 
404 It was suggested by NMIC representatives that the best way to do this would be through DCMS as 
a relationship already exists in this respect for subsea cabling. Alternatively, BF representatives 
suggested tying heritage enforcement into Project Kraken as they would consider it to be an indication 
of criminality 
405 Border Force, pers. comm 
406 NMIC, pers. comm 
407 NMIC, pers. comm 
408 MCA/ROW, pers. comm. 
409 The vessel’s master Walter Bakker admitted he did not have the necessary marine licence for the 




would allow a clear structure and process to be followed and would likely come at 
marginal cost.410 
 
6.4 Prosecutions  
Joint working has already proved to be especially valuable to assist prosecutions, with 
agencies such as the MCA, MMO, Police Forces and Historic England coming 
together to develop cases. In particular there have been three landmark cases which 
have set a precedent not only for how joint working between agencies can result in 
successful prosecutions, but also for showing that illegal salvage can and will be 
prosecuted (Boxes 1-3).  
Box 1: David Knight & Edward Huzzey (prosecuted July 2014) 
The case of Knight & Huzzey was a result of successful joint working between agencies 
including the ROW, MCA, Kent Police, HE and the MMO and was a landmark case, being 
the first time that prosecution had been brought against divers for failing to declare their 
recoveries of wreck under the Merchant Shipping Act 1995. They had failed to report any of 
their recoveries of wreck  to ROW since they began salvaging in 2001, with artefacts in their 
possession taken from nine wrecks over a 13 year period and including eight bronze 
cannon, three propellers from German submarines, lead and tin ingots and other artefacts 
worth a total of more than £250,000. When they did report to ROW they were denied 
salvage.  
The prosecution was led by the MCA. The defendants were ordered to pay costs of £25,000. 
Knight was fined £7,000 and Huzzey £6,500. Following the prosecution Knight applied for 
salvage rights for some of the artefacts, including the bronze cannon and ingots. This was 
denied.  
 
Box 2: Vincent Woolsgrove (prosecuted September 2015) 
The case of Woolsgrove can be seen as another landmark prosecution and key example of 
successful joint working between the MCA, ROW, Kent & Essex Police and Historic 
England. Woolsgrove initially filed a Report of Wreck and Salvage form with ROW in 2011 
claiming the salvage of 3 cannon found outside UK territorial waters, to the north-east of 
North Foreland. ROW subsequently investigated and despite some doubts, did not have 
enough evidence to challenge the claim and awarded title to the cannon to Woolsgrave. 
The cannon were sold to an American collector. Renewed investigations were conducted 
by the MCA/ROW following fresh intelligence and the discovery of a further 61 undeclared 
artefacts.  Upon further consultation and the involvement of the Dutch Maritime Police, 
Dutch historians and the FBI it was confirmed that the cannon were from the Anglo-Dutch 
wars and their full history was traced from manufacture to being lost on the seabed. They 
had been aboard two Dutch vessels which were captured by the English, at which point the 
cannon were stored at the Royal Armoury and then issued to the HMS London which sank 
in 1665 on its way out to sea at Southend. The MCA and ROW were therefore able to prove 
that the cannon had been recovered from the Thames, and therefore had sufficient grounds 
for prosecution under the Merchant Shipping Act 1995. 
                                            
410 Where investigation is required and assets are already at sea it is expected that there would be no 
associated costs for tasking, with costs only incurred where vessels were tasked specifically to put to 
sea to investigate intelligence received 
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The defendant was charged with fraudulent misrepresentation contrary to s. 2 Fraud Act 
2006 and 61 TICs (taken into consideration) contrary to s.236 of the Merchant Shipping Act 
1995. He served a 2 year custodial sentence, was fined £51,000 under the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 2002 and ordered to pay £35,000 costs. The investigating team were awarded 
the Attorney General Prosecutors’ Convention Team of the Year award following the 
conclusion of the case, and their success set a precedent for future joint working, sending 
a clear message that prosecutions can and will take place.  
 
Box 3: Neil Ingram & John Blight (prosecuted June 2018) 
The case of Ingram and Blight began after they were spotted in the waters near to the site 
of HMS Hermes in the Dover Straight. Following investigation of the site and searches of 
their homes, Ingram and Blight were accused of failing to declare over 100 artefacts taken 
from the wreck of HMS Hermes, which sunk after being torpedoed by a German submarine 
in October 1914 with the loss of 44 lives. The artefacts were estimated to be worth £150,000. 
The investigative partners in this case were MCA, Kent Police, Essex Police, MMO, Historic 
England and ROW. 
The defendants were charged with fraudulent misrepresentation under s.2 Fraud Act 2006. 
Blight was charged with 4 counts of fraud and awarded a custodial sentence of 3.5 years 
and Ingram with 5 counts of fraud and awarded a custodial sentence of 4 years. 
 
In all three cases, namely those of David Knight & Edward Huzzey (Box 1), Vincent 
Woolsgrove (Box 2), and Neil Ingram & John Blight (Box 3) joint working was utilised 
to develop the case for the prosecution and to uncover the history of the artefacts. 
 
6.5 Provision of Resources to Support Joint Working 
 
In order for agencies/organisations to become more involved in the protection of UHA 
it is essential that awareness be raised so that their staff have a basic understanding. 
In most agencies/organisations there appear to be some individuals with at least a 
basic level of understanding of heritage in the marine environment (Table 1), but the 
majority of employees lack knowledge due to the ‘out of sight, out of mind’ nature of 
the problem and because they do not have to deal with UHA as part of their daily tasks. 
The interviews conducted here identified that whilst there was willingness to become 
more involved, this came with the caveat that training and information would need to 
be provided so that agencies/organisations could understand the type of information 
required and the steps to be taken to report it. 
It is therefore suggested that resources be developed in order to provide training and 
support in this manner. This could be achieved through the development of an online 
training package complemented with a Common Enforcement Manual which could be 
kept to hand and aboard vessels for quick reference when dealing with a situation. 
Further steps could also be taken, such as collating a database recoding all known 
incidents of activities directed at UHA such that emerging patterns and consistent 




6.6 Development of an Online Training Package 
 
 The training provided to date by Historic England has been most beneficial in 
providing a background understanding of heritage crime for those who have taken 
part, but it is suggested that more in depth training is required relating specifically to 
UHA, their importance,  the laws governing their protection and what can be done to 
enhance this. This appears to be desirable for the agencies working in the marine 
environment, and could form part of their ongoing CPD programs.411 In addition, rather 
than providing workshops and training days it is suggested that this training be 
provided as an online training package. With the budget limitations faced by all 
agencies/organisations this is thought to be a much more cost effective solution; 
training large numbers of staff rather than individuals attending a training day and 
sharing their knowledge.  
Training should cover aspects such as: 
 The regulatory framework surrounding UHA 
 The importance of UHA (stressing their cultural value) 
 The location of designated and scheduled sites 
 The role of the MMO regarding licencing 
 The role of ROW 
 What could be done to enhance protection (tailored to be specific for each 
agency/organisation) 
 The steps to take if intelligence is received or vessels are sighted conducting 
suspected illegal activity 
 
Such a training package could take the form of online tutorials, videos, podcasts and 
multiple choice assessment questions to prove learning. As part of the training 
package it is suggested that an easily accessible reference system be provided such 
that more information is available to those that need it.  
Training is of particular importance for the coastal Police Forces and BF. Currently 
many forces are expanding their work on heritage, but to date the majority have been 
focussed on land based heritage crime, in particular crimes such as nighthawking. It 
appears that few Police officers are aware of the laws surrounding UHA, the location 
of protected wreck sites or the seriousness of the cultural impact that crime can have, 
primarily as they have never dealt with crime related to UHAs. It is important that their 
understanding is increased such that they are better placed to recognise and respond 
to crime relating to UHA. In addition, training is also required for personnel working in 
the control room. They have the responsibility for logging crimes correctly, and often 
heritage crime is not recognised and does not receive the correct tag. This is of key 
importance as if correctly tagged then it will be passed to the appropriate team (usually 
the Rural Team) and if prosecuted will carry a harsher penalty.  
                                            
411 RNFPS stated that they run training courses for boarding officers and were happy to incorporate 
some UHA training within this 
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Given the potential offered by BF’s ability to utilise Marine Enforcement Powers at sea 
under the PACA, a similar imperative for training exists for BF officers. It is envisaged 
that the training package could be exploited by both coastal Police Forces and BF, 
thereby securing economy of resources. 
 
6.7 Develop a Common Enforcement Manual 
 
To complement the online training package it is proposed that a Common Enforcement 
Manual (CEM) be written to provide a document which can be referred to in the event 
of an incident relating to UHA crime. The interviews revealed that 
agencies/organisations would need to have information to hand in an easily accessible 
format such that when incidents occur they can quickly determine the action required. 
All interviewees unanimously expressed a very high degree of interest in the idea of a 
CEM and the level of support for taking this forward into the development of a 
document was very high. The CEM should therefore be available to all 
agencies/organisations whose remit covers the marine environment, to be kept aboard 
any vessels working at sea.  
The suggested content for the manual reflects the training package, namely: 
 The regulatory framework surrounding UHA 
 Maps of Protected Wreck sites and Scheduled Monuments412 
 Step by step guidance on what to do if a crime is suspected or observed (this 
would benefit from becoming a national protocol for UHA crime) 
 Contact details for key individuals such as the ROW, Police Forces, Historic 
England  
 Information about the cultural and economic impacts of UHA crime 
 Information about the process of prosecution and sentencing. 
 Asset register: A dedicated database giving details of protected assets 
(designated wrecks, scheduled monuments and any unprotected UHA of 
particular interest / importance). This would need to be dedicated so it is both 
quickly accessible and easy to digest 
 
The provision of a map of protected wreck sites413 is essential to ensure that their 
locations are known and any suspicious activity is correctly recognised. It is suggested 
that if possible these maps should be electronic and able to be added as a layer to the 
chart plotter of vessels at sea for quick reference when on the water, and also provided 
as pdf documents. Whilst maps of protected sites are available on the Historic England 
website, few individuals were aware of this, and inclusion of this information with the 
CEM was requested by those interviewed. 
Pending the creation of a working relationship with NMIC, this document could be 
made available through their network to the relevant agencies/organisations. 
                                            
412 NMIC suggest this could be provided via UKHO as a KLM file 
413 The RNFPS already have this information (for protected, scheduled and unprotected wreck sites) 
available on their plotters. Suggest the expansion of this to other agencies/organisations 
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6.8 Communication of the Impact of UHA Crime 
 
The awareness of the cultural impact that UHA crime can have is generally considered 
to be low across those working in the marine environment, especially with regard to 
the cultural value of artefacts and sites. The cultural value is, however, of great 
importance, as outlined in Chapter 5 and it is recommended that it is a focus when 
promoting the importance of UHA protection.  
 
When a case comes to court, it is often the financial value of the artefacts which 
shapes the scale of the impact of the crime as it is easier to communicate the 
implications of the theft to the jury,414 but this may result in the cultural value of some 
items being neglected. HE have provided impact statements for the ROW to form part 
of cases being prosecuted relating to UHAs and these have proved to be powerful in 
the outcome of the cases.415 It is recommended that this forms best practice for all 
cases going forward in the hope that with time the courts give a higher appreciation to 
the cultural impact of such crimes and less focus on the financial value of artefacts is 
required.  
A further consideration is that it is not always possible to place a financial value on an 
item, and where reliance is on monetary value this makes it difficult to communicate 
the true impact. For example, U Boat propellers will have a high cultural value, but 
rarely come up for sale meaning that when they do they are very difficult to value 
financially. In one such case investigated by the ROW the intrinsic value placed on a 
recovered propeller was approximately £5000, but the scarcity of such items meant 
that no accurate value could be determined as sale at auction would likely result in the 
item being sold for far more than its intrinsic value.416  
Despite these examples, the report on the sentencing of Ingram & Blight who 
recovered but failed to declare artefacts worth £150,000 from the wreck of HMS 
Hermes (see Box 1) stated that ‘Their failure to declare the metal in order to sell it on 
for profit not only meant that they were guilty of fraud but also resulted in irreparable 
damage to sites of historical importance’ (Crown Prosecution Service, 2018) providing 
a good starting point for cultural impact to be expanded upon. 
The coastal Police Forces and BF in particular may benefit from an increased 
understanding and focus on cultural value. Historically the focus of the impact of crime 
has been financial and the mindset across much of the Force is such that cultural value 
is not really considered, hence there is a lack of importance ascribed to the 
seriousness of the crime where there is a lack of economic loss as discussed in 
Chapter 5. With increasing focus on cultural impact, perhaps achieved through the 
materials delivered in the suggested online training package, this may be addressed 
and would be expected to have positive implications for sentencing. With time it is 
hoped that the penalties associated with heritage crime may themselves act as a 
deterrent. 
                                            
414 MCA/ROW, pers. comm 
415 MCA/ROW, pers. comm 
416 MCA/ROW, pers. comm 
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6.9 Potential for Agency/Organisations to be Involved  
Whilst the above solutions provide discussion of ideas that would be suitable to 
implement whilst working with all agencies/organisations in the marine environment 
the interviews also identified the potential for each agency/organisation to become 
involved and some specific solutions that they could (and appeared keen to) 




As noted in Chapter 5, BF appears to have the greatest potential for enhancing 
protection of UHA at sea, due to its extensive maritime capability, extent of presence 
at sea, which, as one officer put it, leads to an appreciation of local situational 
awareness and what is “normal at sea”. These capabilities, combined with the fact that  
BF has marine enforcement powers under  PACA that can be directly exercised at sea 
in respect of designated or scheduled UHA under the PWA and AMAAA417 does more 
than put ‘eyes and ears’ on the water.418 This has the potential to directly enhance 
protection of UHA in The English Inshore Marine Planning Area, though the marine 
enforcement powers could only be used to stop a vessel and search it on the basis of 
reasonable suspicion. BF is also able to act as eyes and ears and can gather 
intelligence but only if there is cause for concern. Due to the standing and reputation 
of BF it is thought that they could act as a deterrent just by their presence.  BF also 
have an arrangement for information sharing with NCI whose volunteers are asked to 




The scope of the EA is limited due to their basic statutory remit, their close 
shore/coastline focus and restricted asset base. They could however, act as eyes and 
ears and do have some on the water presence whilst conducting tasks such as 
fisheries protection work or sampling for bathing water quality. 
 
IFCAs 
The IFCAs have regular contact with fishers, recreational fishers and divers all of 
whom may need a permit to carry out their activities in an IFCA district. Information 
regarding permitting is accessed through the IFCA website which offers opportunity to 
Historic England to engage with the IFCAs to develop some information relating to 
                                            
417 And Protected Places or Controlled Sites under the Protection of Military Remains Act 
1986. 
418 These marine enforcement powers can be exercised by virtue of s.84 Policing and Crime 
Act 2017. When interviewed BF officials were unaware of the full implications of s.84 and 
were under the impression that BF officers could only observe and gather evidence. Clearly 
s.84 empowers direct intervention where a BF officer suspects a criminal offence is being 
committed under the 1973 and 1979 Acts.    
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UHAs to sit on their websites.419 This could include details of the steps to take if 
artefacts are removed from the marine environment, and what to do if illegal activity is 




The regional offices of the MMO are already involved to some extent with protecting 
UHA as they deal with licensing for removal of items from the seabed. They have also 
been involved with some of the successful prosecutions through joint working with 
other organisations such as the Police Forces, Historic England, ROW/MCA. The 
MMO do not have their own on the water assets but do regularly task vessels from 
others such as the Police to conduct routine fisheries patrols. They can and do 
therefore, act as eyes and ears on the water. The licensing aspect though, as has 
been discussed elsewhere in the report is a useful backstop provision for the 




The MCA/ROW are already heavily involved in the protection of UHAs through their 
remit. No further solutions were identified, but their representatives were supportive of 
the provision of training and a CEM so that other marine users knew how and who to 




Potential exists for the MDP to facilitate protection and this could be valuable due to 
their 24 hour waterborne presence. Their ability to respond is however constrained by 
the specific nature of the force and their tasking which centres on maintaining security 
around the dockyard and vessels therein. They have a list of priorities which can permit 
a more generalised policing function, but their military tasking will always take 
precedence. The MDP can provide eyes and ears on the water, and where possible 
do assist others as necessary. Were an incident to arise where UHA crime interfaces 
with security concerns, or with their role in protecting MOD property (to include PMRA 




MSDS Marine is an archaeological consultancy and are therefore heavily involved in 
the protection of UHA through its daily work. It can provide eyes and ears on the water 
whilst conducting survey work and also have a high level of awareness and 
understanding of sites. It also carries out research projects such as the protective 
markings project which may prove very valuable both as a deterrent and to aid 
                                            
419 This suggestion was made by IFCA representatives during the interviews 
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prosecution of any offences committed.420 It is expected that other consultancies 




The volunteers at the NCI are well placed to act as eyes and ears for intelligence 
gathering. NCI works closely with the MCA and has connections to BF and they are 
already involved with observing vessels of interest. The limitations that exist on their 
abilities relate to the distance they can see from their watch stations, with only wrecks 
within their view able to be observed. There are some good examples of joint working 
for protection of sites however, such as the Salcombe Cannon Site. It is suggested 
that this good practice be expanded to other watch station and awareness be raised 




Similarly to the EA, the scope for NE is limited due to their remit. They also have no 
on the water assets themselves. They do however, contract other organisations to do 
boast based survey work for them and would usually have a member of their staff 
aboard these vessels. They also do intertidal survey work, hence both provide 




Currently, heritage crime is low priority for the coastal police forces as their priorities 
lie with crimes against the person rather than crimes against property. To date, 
heritage makes up a very small proportion of their work, with heritage in the marine 
realm not something that the majority of coastal forces have any experience of. All 
forces now have heritage within their remit however, most commonly within their Rural 
Team and this has meant that in many cases policies are under development. This 
provides an opportunity for Historic England to assist, and to help shape these policies 
where appropriate through joint working with each force. It may also be beneficial if 
these were streamlined and nationalised where possible to develop a nationwide 
protocol for dealing with UHA crime. This could then be adopted by all coastal Forces 
and adapted as necessary providing standardisation in approach across the Force. 
In some instances, joint working was occurring between the Forces and organisations 
involved in heritage protection on land. Kent police, for example, have a Heritage 
Watch Group which works with local communities to raise awareness of heritage crime 
and encourage reporting of suspicious activity. Currently this has not been extended 
into the marine environment, but this is something that they would be keen to 
investigate.421 North Yorkshire Police also have an established land based heritage 
                                            
420 As detailed in footnote 1 above 
421 Kent Police (pers. comm.) Intended to raise the idea at their next meeting 
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network, including organisations such as York Heritage Watch, York Diocese and York 
Museums Trust giving the foundations for expansion into the marine realm. 
The role of Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) includes the prevention of 
crime. PCSOs may therefore be able to work pro-actively and engage with water users 
including dive clubs, shops an charter boats to increase public awareness of UHA and 
their cultural importance. This type of work may also be carried out by volunteers as 
in Cleveland where a team of volunteers work under a retired officer to monitor 
heritage 
 
QHM Plymouth & Portsmouth 
QHM are uniquely placed within their respective harbours to provide eyes and ears 
and a central hub for the passage of information between marine users.422 In terms of 
salvage, this would be passed on to the RN Salvage Unit. Both Plymouth and 
Portsmouth QHM areas have protected wrecks sited within them, hence they would 





The RNFPS are able to act as eyes and ears whilst on the water, and do already 
gather intelligence where salvage operations involve fishing vessels. They would be 
able to log observations of any vessels operating near/at wreck sites as part of their 
daily work and gather intelligence as required. The RNFPS also have the ability to 
board and search any vessel engaged in salvage operations, under the provisions of 
MACCA. 
 
Involvement of the dive community 
The dive community are key stakeholders for Historic England and a good working 
relationship has already been established with many individuals and clubs, especially 
those that are licensees for their Protected Wreck Sites. Protected sites have some 
additional protection afforded by the efforts of their licensees, but unprotected sites do 
not currently have formal surveys completed routinely and may therefore suffer from 
being more ‘out of sight, out of mind’ and consequently potentially more vulnerable to 
illegal salvage. Through involvement of the dive community through initiatives such as 
‘Adopt a wreck’ and ‘Respect our Wrecks’ however, it is suggested that there could be 
scope for some increased protection through increased access to the sites and 
increased awareness of those diving at them. 
 
 
                                            
422 This conduit works both ways, with marine users also reporting to QHM. For example, in Plymouth 




Historic England Protected Wreck Site Licensees 
Historic England’s Licensees provide an invaluable resource for enhancing protection 
of England’s Protected Wreck Sites. These individuals act as voluntary custodians for 
a site and are responsible for conducting surveys and investigations into the site and 
its history. The joint working arrangements can go further than partnership with Historic 
England however, with the Salcombe Cannon and Moor Sand Sites providing a best 
practice example. The Licensee for this site is a member of the South West Maritime 
Archaeology Group who have developed a Site Security document outlining the history 
of the site, its importance and clear guidance for the steps to take should illegal diving 
activity be suspected at the site. Primarily the point of contact is the licensee who then 
has responsibility for contacting the relevant bodies, all of whom have received a copy 
of the document and are aware of the procedure. At this site, one of the key partners 
is the NCI Prawle Point watch station which is situated on the cliffs above, providing a 
valuable observation point and potential deterrent for anyone visiting during daylight 
hours. The watch station has been involved in reporting unauthorised activity to the 
licensee in the past, proving the value of their approach to protection.423  
It is suggested that this best practise should become a mandatory element of the role 
of the licensee, ensuring that all local partners are engaged with the site and aware of 
the procedure should an incident occur. 
The key components of such documents should be: 
 Introduction to the site and its management 
 Introduction & details of the Licensee and their team 
 Details of site security arrangements (e.g. VHS channel for Coastguard/local 
Harbour Master/NCI watch station) 
 Protocol for authorised dive vessels 
 Steps to take if unauthorised activity IS suspected including information required 
and phone numbers for points of contact 
 Useful contact details (e.g. team members, local police, Harbour Master, NCI 
watch station, HE) 
 
Licensees may also benefit from receipt of a checklist of actions to take and contact 
details to use in the event of suspicious activity taking place which they can share with 
their volunteers as a quick reference guide. 
 
 
Expansion of ‘Adopt a Wreck’ 
The NAS ‘Adopt a wreck’ scheme could provide a method by which dive clubs monitor 
selected UHAs which are not protected. Since this would be voluntary, no 
remuneration would be required and it would therefore only require an administrative 
function from Historic England. Furthermore, it would serve as outreach and education 
for the dive community and would play a useful role in monitoring the condition of 
wreck sites, in effect acting as a neighbourhood watch. Recognition of the input of 
such volunteers would, however, be highly desirable and could be achieved by 
                                            
423 NCI, pers. comm. 
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undertaking such things as annual awards for volunteer input, a regular newsletter and 
an annual meeting in a similar vein to that arranged for the Association of Protected 
Wrecks Licensees.  
 
Diver trails 
HE has enjoyed a significant degree of success with its innovative programme of diver 
trails. Consideration should be given to expanding this programme on suitably robust 
sites to unprotected UHA. This would both fulfil an educational objective, instil a sense 
of ownership within the diving community as well as providing an economic benefit to 
coastal communities.424  
 
Refreshment of ‘Respect our Wrecks’ 
In addition to the ‘Adopt a Wreck’ scheme, it would be beneficial to strengthen and 
refresh the ‘Respect our Wrecks’ scheme, a partnership developed by the British Sub 
Aqua Club (BSAC), the Professional Association of Diving Instructors (PADI) and the 
Sub Aqua Association (SAA) working alongside JNAPC and ROW to update it and 
adjust it for the digital age. The scheme is based on the signing of an MOU by the 
partner organisations to implement best practice in matters of wreck (Box 4).  
 
Box 4: Respect our Wrecks Policy 
1. Respect war graves. Many wrecks are also war graves. Treat them with the respect you 
would give a churchyard 
2. Respect the wreck environment. Many wrecks make great habitats for marine life. Treat 
them with the care you would give to coral reefs 
3. Respect the future. Explore wrecks, where allowed, but don't damage or disturb them. Take 
photos rather than souvenirs, so that our wrecks remain for future divers to see 
4. Respect our history. Many wrecks have an important history and hold clues to our maritime 
past. If you find anything, report it to the Receiver of Wreck, who will pass on such information 
to archaeological experts 
5. Respect yourself. Make sure that you are appropriately trained for safe wreck diving 
6. Respect your family and friends. Some wrecks contain dangerous cargoes or live munitions. 
Don't disturb them or bring them ashore 
7. Respect the law. Know and respect maritime laws - and avoid a criminal record 
© BSAC 
 
Some suggested steps to take in order to strengthen and refresh this scheme 
include: 
  Revisit and update the materials provided under the scheme 
 Engage with dive organisations, dive shops, charter diving boat organisations and 
skippers to re-awaken interest in the scheme and highlight it as part of their work 
 Publicise any enforcement successes arising from the scheme 
                                            
424 HMS Coronation, Nautical Archaeology Society (2013), The Local Economic Value of a Protected 
Wreck, available from http://www.nauticalarchaeologysociety.org/content/local-economic-benefit-
protected-wreck (last accessed October 2018); see also James, A (2018) Review of the Virtual Dive 
Trails Scheme (7374): a big splash or a damp squib? Historic England, available from 




 Strengthen the connection between the ‘Adopt a Wreck’ and ‘Respect our Wrecks’ 
schemes  
 
Involvement of other marine users 
Whilst this project has not focussed on other marine users such as commercial and 
recreational fishers, yachtsmen, water sports enthusiasts etc. there would be benefit 
to increasing engagement with these sectors through outreach and education. This is 
already a focus of the work of Historic England, who have developed successful 
partnerships with other organisations resulting in projects such as the Marine 
Antiquities Scheme (MAS)425 and the Coastal and Intertidal Zone Archaeology 
Network (CITiZAN)426 which focus not only on protected but also unprotected and 
unscheduled sites. Projects of this nature will also form a key ongoing part of the 
solution to enhancing protection for UHAs through increasing awareness of the cultural 
value of sites. 
The ROW expressed concern that as there are numerous reporting channels in 
existence it is hard for individuals to know which to use, and often if they have reported 
through an unofficial channel they do not then want to report again to the ROW. It was 
suggested that consideration be given to strengthening the reporting by streamlining 
so that there were less channels but making these official channels so that reporting 
goes to the ROW would be beneficial. In addition to this it was suggested that Historic 
England consider establishing a 24 hour phone line for reporting. The majority of 
recreational diving takes place outside office hours and it is thought that individuals 
are less likely to report if they have to wait until the start of the working week than if 
they could contact someone immediately they see suspicious activity. 
 
Fishers 
Although not able to do more than observation and information gathering, fishers 
provide an additional source of eyes and ears on the water which could be utilised. 
Fishers have a very good local knowledge of their fishing grounds and with some 
guidance could be involved in information gathering especially at protected wreck sites 
if they were to observe anything whilst fishing. Currently some fishers report antiquities 
that come up in their fishing gear, but the majority would either throw them back or 
keep them but not be aware of the need to report finds to the ROW. IFCA websites 
could provide a location for information in this regard (as above). 
 
  
                                            
425 Encourages the recording of archaeological and historical objects that are found by marine users 
in the waters of England and Wales https://marinefinds.org.uk/ (last accessed October 2018) 
426 Promotes a standardised survey and monitoring methodology which can be used by volunteers to 
record, monitor and promote the importance of coastal and intertidal archaeological sites around the 





The key points extracted from Chapter 6 are summarised below: 
 
 Enhancing protection for UHA requires a multifaceted approach to build on the work 
already underway with Historic England and others.  
 
 It would appear that substantial goodwill exists for making small changes to existing 
working practices to encompass a greater role for the protection of UHA, particularly 
through joint working and intelligence gathering. This comes with the proviso that 





 Joint working: the main value in joint working would almost certainly come through 
increasing awareness and intelligence gathering through the presence of additional 
eyes on the sea. This could be achieved through the development of MOUs between 
Historic England and partner agencies/organisations; utilisation of pre-existing joint 
working arrangements in the marine environment through use of a central platform 
such as NMIC; and continuing to support joint working for prosecutions of illegal 
salvage activity. 
 
 Provision of resources: the interviews conducted identified that whilst there was 
willingness to become more involved, there was a caveat that training and 
information would need to be provided so that agencies/organisations could 
understand the type of information required and the steps to be taken to report it. 
This could be achieved through the development of an online training programme 
and a Common Enforcement Manual (a document to be referred to in the event of 
an incident relating to UHA crime – comparison was drawn to the information made 
available in respect of fisheries). The interviews revealed that 
agencies/organisations would need to have information to hand in an easily 
accessible format such that when incidents occur they can quickly determine the 
action required. 
 
 Communication of the impact of UHA crime: the awareness of the cultural impact 
of UHA crime is generally considered to be low across those working in the marine 
environment, especially with regard to the cultural value of artefacts and sites. The 
cultural value is, however, of great importance and it is recommended that it is a 
focus when promoting the importance of UHA protection. It may be of particular 
value to the coastal police forces and BF to establish a mechanism for ascribing 
equivalence of cultural loss and monetary value as indicators of the seriousness of 
crime relating to UHA. Were this to be addressed it is assumed it would have positive 





 Potential for agencies/organisations to be involved: all organisations have the 
potential to provide eyes and ears on the sea, but each has some individual 
potential. Most notably this applies to BF due to their marine enforcement powers, 
physical capability and reputation - perhaps meaning that they act as a deterrent by 
their very presence. The expansion of heritage awareness within the coastal police 
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forces should also increase their inclination and ability to react to heritage crime. 
There may also be scope for Police Community Support Officers to work pro-actively 
and engage with individuals to increase public awareness of UHA and their cultural 
importance. 
 
 Involvement of the dive community: the dive community are key stakeholders for 
Historic England and a good working relationship has established with many 
individuals and clubs, especially those that are licensees for their Protected Wreck 
Sites. Benefit may also come from an expansion of the NAS ‘Adopt a Wreck’ scheme 
and a refresh of ‘Respect our Wrecks’ both of which may provide additional 
protection for unprotected sites. 
 
 Involvement of other marine users: whilst this project has not focussed on other 
marine users such as commercial and recreational fishers, yachtsmen, water sports 
enthusiasts etc. there would be benefit to increasing engagement with these sectors 
through outreach and education. This will form a key ongoing part of the solution to 










7  Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
7.1 Conclusions 
Within the marine archaeological community, and one suspects within Historic 
England, the perception in relation to the protection of UHA’s is one of very limited 
resources and physical marine presence, both of which are presently declining due to 
continued financial constraints. This was certainly the perception of the authors at the 
commencement of the project. In fact, this perception is not entirely accurate. While 
the quantum of marine assets present at sea is changing, especially with the decline 
of some coastal police marine units, it is actually increasing, with the advent of new 
BF patrol vessels and new RNFPS vessels commissioning in the near future. 
Additionally the numbers of IFCA patrol vessels are stable or increasing. 
With the UK projected to become a more independent coastal State post its exit from 
the European Union this trend of increasing marine enforcement assets may continue. 
The overall conclusion therefore is that, provided effective cross-party working can be 
achieved in respect of the protection of UHA then that protection can realistically be 
enhanced, possibly substantially, from the present level. Moreover, the introduction of 
new technologies, such as Aerial Unmanned Vehicles (AUV’s) will further facilitate 
such enhancement.427 This enhancement will require the commitment of some 
resource, but, while  any such costing of this is beyond the parameters of this project, 
the authors anticipate that this cost will be relatively low and the benefits potentially 
securable will be very cost effective for Historic England. These conclusions are 
reached for the following reasons.  
The interview process established that there is a high degree of acceptance of the 
government’s current policy of increased cross-party working. Indeed this was seen 
as inevitable, desirable and many of the organisations interviewed are already 
engaging in such working practices, to a greater or lesser extent.   The principle of 
such working is thus accepted, not controversial and perceived as expanding across 
the public marine sphere.  
Interviewees universally also expressed an acceptance of the desirability of enhancing 
the protection of UHA’s, even when their functions did not encompass such protection. 
While one would never anticipate hostility to such an aspiration it is a truism that, 
compared to terrestrial heritage, the problems for maritime archaeology of public 
access, increased costs of investigation, excavation and conservation have led to a 
far lower public profile for the heritage presented by UHA. The highly innovative work 
of Historic England, using methodologies such as Diver Trails and Virtual Reality have 
done much to address this but an element of ‘out of sight, out of mind’ continues to 
present a problem for the public profile of maritime archaeology and UHA. Yet, despite 
                                            
427 At present the concept of UAV’s being introduced for marine law enforcement is at a 
scoping stage. A national project by DEFRA is presently due to complete this scoping stage 
in late November 2018 nand the project is being closely watched by maritime agencies. 
Within the next decade it is anticipate that this technology will add a substantial 
enhancement to marine enforcement in all spheres.  
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this, there was a ready, indeed often enthusiastic acceptance of the potential role other 
organisations could play in enhancing the protection of UGA’s. Given the relatively 
lower public profile of maritime archaeology and the fact that such cross – party 
working would, even at its most basic level, inevitably involve marginal costs and 
additional tasking for these organisations, this was not a reaction that the authors had 
anticipated. It may be that the organisations interviewed all had a maritime function of 
some description and/or a law enforcement function, directly or indirectly, but the 
overall impression was of a ‘Society of the Sea’ acknowledging genuine societal 
interest in protecting its own unique heritage. Inevitably this leads to the very 
encouraging conclusion that generally Historic England would not have to establish a 
rationale for such enhancement, nor its desirability, that these would by and large be 
a ‘given’ and that it is the implementation of such cross-party working that now 
predominantly confronts it.  
While these conclusions are in themselves extremely encouraging, the authors do not 
wish to understate the scale of the challenge faced by Historic England in achieving 
this implementation. Although the importance of protecting UHA and also enhancing 
it was recognised by the interviewees it was also recognised that this importance is 
not presently reflected in the current operational protocols, procedures and priorities 
of the organisations. The challenges facing Historic England therefore in securing any 
enhancement of protection for UHA principally relates to problems of logistics, 
especially those of communications, access to and collation of information, training 
and procedures. In effect meeting these challenges amounts to prerequisites for 
securing the enhancement of protection for UHA’s.  These problems are considered 
in more detail in Section 5 above and the Recommendations set out below are 





There is a degree of overlap with certain of these recommendations; however, they 
are presented within distinct sections with broad themes in order to reflect their 
essential character.  
 
1. Utilise Cross Party Working Arrangements and create new Arrangements   
 
 Since existing joint working arrangements provide a platform that Historic England 
can exploit. New joint working arrangements could be implemented with the 
organisations identified in this report. 
 
 These existing and new joint working arrangements can facilitate the protection of 
UHA’s by the creation of Memoranda of Understanding. 
 
 Historic England should consider further utilising NMIC as an existing national 
platform, through DCMS, to create or enhance joint working arrangements and the 
co-ordination of intelligence relating to underwater heritage crime. 
 
 Monitor the progress of the national project by DEFRA on the potential use of 
UAV’s for marine enforcement and, if appropriate, engage with it. 
 
 
     
 
2. Provide Resources to Facilitate Joint Working 
 
 Consideration should be given to the development of an intelligence network on 
underwater heritage crime with provision of a dedicated number to report 
suspected maritime heritage crime, including anonymously. This system could be 
utilised by both organisations involved in cross party working and public 
stakeholders.  
 
 Develop, possibly through NMIC, a system of collating information received as to 




 Address what is an almost universally accepted lack of knowledge amongst staff 
of other marine organisations as to the context, importance and regulatory 
structure surrounding UHA’s.  
 
 This could be achieved by developing a training package for coastal Rural Crime 
Teams, Border Force, MDP and IFCA staff specially but also make available to 




 This package would include the regulatory framework, an understanding of the 
nature & extent of UCH and the importance in terms of not just economic value 
but cultural value and hence scale of loss 
 
 Such a CPD Training Package should be online to minimise resource implications 
for other agencies and ensure maximum, cost-effective exposure within those 
organisations.  It would reduce the need to commit resources to staff physically 
attending courses at specified times and would have a one-off set-up cost. 
   
 Develop an electronic Common Enforcement Manual, (CEM), similar to that 
deployed for fisheries by the RNFPS, which can provide easy access to the 
substance of the regulatory framework (including marine licensing for which the 
MMO is responsible) and a pre-determined operational protocol for observation, 
investigation and communication with relevant organisations. The concept of a 
CEM was regarded as an essential prerequisite for joint working arrangements by 
the organisations interviewed and drew universal support. It is difficult, if not 
impossible, to stress the perceived importance of this by these organisations.  
 
 Develop an easily accessed and dedicated UHA register, including information on 
the location of UHA, that can be accessed both afloat and ashore, incorporating 
protected UHA and, if technically feasible, unprotected UHA or at least any 
deemed to be at risk. The extraction of such information from existing websites 
was regarded as too cumbersome and slow by other organisations. A dedicated 
and easily accessible electronic database is regarded as a prerequisite of effective 
joint working.   
 
 Increase the understanding of all parties involved in joint working and in particular, 
that of coastal Police Forces, Border Force and MDP officers as to the cultural 
impact of crime directed at UHA’s and the value of the resulting cultural loss to 
society.  This could be achieved as a component of an online training package 
and workshops or seminars.   
 
 A national protocol for UCH crime as a component of a Common Enforcement 
Manual and to assist joint working with other marine agencies, establishing what 
actions to take and who to contact when the Police or other agencies encounter 
suspected UCH crime.  
 
 Engage with DCMS and Home Office to develop a nationwide reporting protocol 
on UCH crime, which could address the perception that it is a low value regulatory 
crime with negligible impact in terms of societal impact and loss of cultural 
information. This could augment the Heritage and Cultural Crime National 








 Develop a security protocol for each protected UHA, engaging with licenced 
teams and/or other local stakeholders to create a sense of cultural value in local 
coastal communities. In particular inshore fishers could provide valuable ‘eyes 
and ears’ on the water, especially in areas less well frequented by recreational 
divers.  
 
 The UK diving community’s access to unprotected UHA, presents the most 
difficult challenges for protective action. Historic England should consider 
providing support for an expansion of the NAS’s ‘Adopt a Wreck scheme or 
support or establish similar schemes. Archaeological records are lacking for 
many sites. A comprehensive record of the intact state of the wreck would be 
useful to determine evidence necessary for prosecution. 
 
 As an adjunct to the above Historic England should provide further 
support for a public education initiative, though JNAPC and in 
conjunction with the ROW and the Diving Organisations, refreshing the 
‘Respect Our Wrecks’ initiative and adjusting it to the digital age and 
providing fresh guidance to divers, other sea users and coastal walkers.  
 
 Further, Historic England should consider developing a network of 
voluntary marine archaeologists who could provide a limited amount of 
advice and guidance to diving groups. Such a scheme would not seek 
to replace the role of the nominated archaeologist on protected sites but 
provide basic guidance and information in relation to unprotected UHA.    
 
 Develop coastal Heritage Watch Groups or Schemes, which would complement 
the above, and engage more closely with NCI.  
 
 Develop a communications strategy which highlights successful prosecutions 
and also increases public understanding of the impact of underwater cultural 
heritage crime. In particular Historic England should seek to increase the 
understanding of all parties to joint working arrangements, stakeholders and 
the public as to the cultural impact of crime directed at UHA and the extent of 
the resulting cultural loss to society.   
 
 The websites of other organisations involved in joint working arrangements 
could be utilised as additional platforms for engagement with stakeholders.  
 
 Facilitate public reporting of suspicious activity and crime directed at UHA by 
provision of a dedicated number to report suspected maritime heritage crime, 
including anonymously.  
 
 Consider engaging with coastal Police Forces to develop a maritime heritage 
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